The Death of the Performed Self (Pt 2)

Freedom, Moral Formation, and Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth

This is Part Two of The Ancient Hunger Beneath Modern Life, a series about participation, belonging, embodied wisdom, and what modern life has taught us to forget. Please note, this post will be truncated in some emails, please click “Read more” to access the entire essay.

When the Circle Closes

There is something unsettling about returning to a version of your life that once felt permanent.

Going back through these old photographs and blog posts, I could almost step inside that world again: the music, the movement, the friendships, the long drives, and the feeling of being recognized across a crowded field. For years, these people and places had helped me understand who I was. They were not simply hobbies or acquaintances orbiting an otherwise separate life. They were part of the world in which I had learned what freedom, community, individuality, and belonging were supposed to feel like.

That is what made revisiting it unexpectedly tender.

But memory changes when you know what came later.

Many of the same people I had associated with self-expression and the freedom to live differently would eventually turn on me when I expressed convictions they did not share. The upheavals of 2020 exposed something I had not wanted to see: there was tremendous room to be eccentric, spiritual, sexual, artistic, and unconventional, but considerably less room to question the moral and political assumptions holding the group together.

I first felt the circle closing while sitting on the couch in our military housing at Camp Zama in Japan, watching events unfold back home from the other side of the world.

I watched people tear down and destroy historical monuments in Richmond, Virginia, not far from where I grew up. By then I was living inside a military community, surrounded by a very different language of service, duty, order, and sacrifice. I was geographically removed from the social atmosphere many of my old friends still inhabited, and perhaps that distance allowed me to see what was happening differently.

I remember the reaction in my body before I had fully worked out the argument in my head. My stomach tightened. My palms began to sweat. I felt disgust and a strange embarrassment that this was happening so close to the place I still considered home.

My old communities began demanding allegiance to what increasingly felt like a single political script. I no longer recognized the friends and so called “tribe” which I had built so much of my identity around.

And by this point, social media was not incidental to my life.

Becoming a military spouse had physically separated me from many of the friends and communities I had accumulated over the years. Facebook and Instagram were how I stayed connected to people scattered across different cities and states. They were also where I worked. I had built my career as an online personal trainer and coach there, and my multilevel marketing business depended heavily on the same platforms. Friendship, professional identity, income, visibility, and reputation had all become strangely entangled inside the same digital space.

So what people thought of me online mattered more than I would like to admit now. These apps were not simply places I went to waste time scrolling. They had become the room where much of my social and professional life still existed.

You may think my initial reaction to being bullied online sounded absurd…and maybe it would be if you’re thinking of these as merely apps.

To me, they were not.

They were where years of photographs and memories lived, and where a public identity I had spent years constructing was suddenly being turned against me. A space that had once connected me to music, travel, friendship, and community had become somewhere I entered expecting humiliation.

The disagreement itself was not what hurt most. It was watching people who knew me join in so easily, as if my dignity stopped mattering the moment I landed on the wrong side of an issue.

The dogpile confirmed something I had felt for years: maybe I had never been held as securely inside these communities as I wanted to believe. Even during my years in Portland, I often hovered near the edges of friendship circles instead of living at their center. I remember lonely days off, knowing people were heading to the coast, the hot springs, or some other adventure I had not been invited to join.

The community gave me real friendship, joy, beauty, and belonging. I refuse to rewrite those years as though none of it mattered. I can also still admit how often I adjusted myself to remain acceptable.

Once I admitted that, I had a choice. I could stay quiet, repeat what I was expected to believe, and let other people decide the boundaries of acceptable thought. Or I could accept what might happen if I refused to perform agreement.

I chose the loneliness.

At first, it felt almost like social suicide. It also created tension in my closest relationships. The people who loved me wanted to protect me from what seemed to happen every time I spoke publicly about something controversial. From their perspective, the solution was simple: stay quiet. If no one knew what I believed, I would stop giving people reasons to turn against me.

But silence did not feel neutral to me. It felt like one more way to abandon myself.

I do not regret speaking. When I imagine looking back on my life as an old woman, I know I will be grateful that I said something when I believed it mattered.

Still, there was a cost.

These photographs remind me how many people were once in my life and how much smaller my social world has become. I know what a community can give us. I also know what happens when belonging depends upon hiding the parts of ourselves a group has decided not to tolerate.

I am no longer willing to purchase belonging that way.


If your sense of belonging depends on one-sided ideological conformity, with no room for nuance or freedom of thought, you are not part of a community. You are a cog in a crude machine—and that machine will discard you the moment you fall outside its range of tolerance. —Olympia Mahr


Festival culture was not the only place where I encountered this pattern. Around the same time, I began recognizing how much of my identity had been tied to Isagenix and the multilevel-marketing world. That community had given me encouragement, certainty, recognition, and the feeling that many people knew my name. When I spoke openly about the ways I believed the system had exploited me, plenty of people did not want to hear it. Some seemed unable to understand why I could not just admit that I knew better now and move on.

Leaving one system does not automatically heal the hunger that drew us into it.

The loss left an enormous hole, and Christianity entered through it.

At first, Christianity seemed to offer everything I had been craving: forgiveness, certainty, moral order, love, healing, and the promise that all the chaos of my life could finally be gathered into one coherent story. I wanted to do it correctly. I studied theology intensely and moved deeper into Reformed doctrine because I believed one of those competing systems had to be right. I just needed to find it and submit myself fully enough.

Then I encountered doctrinal triage, the sorting of beliefs into matters Christians could disagree about and matters that determined whether someone remained fully acceptable inside the community.

I had originally been baptized in the name of Jesus alone by a Oneness Pentecostal group. After joining a Reformed church, I was told that my baptism did not count because it had not been Trinitarian. I could no longer receive the Lord’s Supper, even though I had already taken it during my first weeks there.

The message felt familiar: belonging had conditions I had not understood when I entered.

When I lined up these chapters of my life—festival culture, Portland progressivism, multilevel marketing, diet culture, bodybuilding, and Christianity—I saw the same needs being met again and again: identity, certainty, recognition, moral language, and belonging. The worlds themselves were radically different. The risk of questioning their boundaries felt familiar.

I am not looking for a community without convictions. I do not believe every moral disagreement is trivial, and I have no interest in manufacturing intimacy with people whose vision of life is fundamentally incompatible with my own. I want like-minded people around me. I want enough shared moral ground that we can actually build something together.

I also need room for hard questions, intellectual honesty, and disagreement without humiliation. A community can have boundaries without coercing or degrading people who ask difficult questions. I want to be around people with convictions who do not immediately turn disagreement into dogpiling. And I will not betray myself just to remain welcome.

Ancient ideas have always fascinated me, of course, but curiosity was not the only reason I turned toward the old understanding of philosophy as a rite of rebirth. I was trying to figure out what parts of me remained after an entire social, spiritual, and moral identity collapsed. How was I supposed to rebuild without handing my conscience over to another system?


Freedom Without Formation

Hercules at the Crossroads Freedom is not merely the existence of choice, but the formation of character capable of choosing well.

After so many systems had promised to transform me, I began asking what transformation even meant.

I had changed my body, diet, politics, spiritual language, beliefs, and social circles. I kept entering new worlds hoping this one might finally make me whole. Each came with its own authorities, practices, taboos, vocabulary, and picture of who I could become if I followed the program correctly.

I eventually had to admit how easy it is to change identities without changing the pattern underneath. We can carry the same wounds, compulsions, and hunger for approval into a completely different community, learn all the right words, and mistake the intensity of conversion for wisdom because everything feels new.

That forced me to reconsider one of the most persistent moral slogans of modern life:

You do you.

For years, those words sounded compassionate and enlightened to me. I believed refusing judgment was the same thing as kindness. What someone did with their body, sexuality, money, health, or private life was presumed to be no one else’s concern as long as everyone involved consented and no immediate harm could be demonstrated.

Freedom meant removing constraints. The individual was sovereign, self-defining, and entitled to follow whatever desires arose from within.

I no longer believe any of us are that isolated.

Our desires do not appear in a vacuum. Families, wounds, friendships, industries, technologies, institutions, incentives, and the surrounding moral atmosphere all help shape them. We imitate what is modeled. We learn what is normal from what receives approval. Long before we have the judgment to examine any of it, we are absorbing ideas about liberation, beauty, sexuality, success, and fulfillment.

Even the self we call “authentic” has a history.

Culture does more than permit behavior. It helps form people. When an industry profits from a particular vision of empowerment, its financial incentives can disappear behind the language of individual choice. Once a behavior is publicly celebrated as liberation, questioning it begins to look like cruelty. Enough supposedly private decisions can change expectations, relationships, and the moral imagination of an entire society.

My own life makes it impossible for me to keep this argument abstract.

I once understood sex work almost entirely through the language of autonomy and empowerment. The people around me treated it as normal, even enviable. My mother told me she wished she had done it when she was younger. My sister was successful at it. My friends offered no meaningful resistance. Portland handed me an entire vocabulary through which commodifying sexuality could be framed as bold, liberated, and transgressive.

I made those choices. I own that.

I also know the person making them had been shaped by her family, her need for approval, her relationship with her body, the promise of money, and a culture that treated freedom as overcoming shame and refusing restraint. Owning my decisions does not require me to lie about the conditions surrounding them.

Years later, as a wife trying to build an enduring life with another person, I understood the consequences differently. Choices once praised as empowering had left marks on my ability to trust, attach, and understand intimacy. The language available to me at the time had plenty to say about my freedom to choose. It said very little about the person those choices might slowly form me into.

That question followed me through bodybuilding, multilevel marketing, New Age spirituality, and Christianity. Did the practices I submitted to actually make me freer? Bodybuilding fed my compulsions. The MLM world exploited my need to be seen. Other teachings encouraged me to treat struggle as evidence that I had not surrendered enough. Christianity gave me moral certainty for a while, but it also trained me to distrust my own questions.

Simply choosing something does not mean it increases our freedom.

The slogan assumes the self already knows what is good. Desire is treated as trustworthy because it feels personal. Yet desire can be trained by injury, appetite, commercial manipulation, social pressure, and the desperate need to belong. Sometimes the choice that feels most authentic is an old wound repeating itself in a new form.

This brought me back to the argument I explored in The Fragility of Freedom. A free society cannot survive through laws and procedures alone. It needs people capable of judgment, restraint, responsibility, courage, loyalty, and concern for something beyond immediate appetite. A republic can guarantee rights and limit government. It cannot legislate the character required to use freedom well.

So the political question cannot end with, What should people be legally permitted to do? We also have to ask what kind of person is capable of exercising that freedom without being ruled by appetite, compulsion, resentment, propaganda, commercial incentives, or the approval of the crowd.

Aristotle understood virtue as a capacity formed through repeated practice. Courage, temperance, generosity, responsibility, and sound judgment become part of us through habit. Anything that can be cultivated can also be neglected, distorted, or lost.

Political disagreements can therefore reach far beneath policy. People draw upon care, fairness, loyalty, authority, liberty, and the sacred, but we do not all weigh those concerns the same way. Sometimes we are not merely reaching different conclusions. We are measuring reality with different moral frameworks.

A culture organized almost entirely around liberation from constraint eventually loses the language to explain why restraint can be good. Discipline begins to look like repression. Every limit starts to resemble oppression, and we stop asking what the limit was meant to protect in the first place.

“The ancients held that there is nothing that cannot be cured by philosophy and theurgy.”

Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth by Algis Uždavinys

The Older Purpose of Philosophy

Raphael’s School of Athens.

That question of formation sent me looking for an older understanding of philosophy.

After Christianity, the last thing I wanted was another belief system demanding my allegiance. What I found in the work of Algis Uždavinys was a completely different account of what philosophy had once been for.

Uždavinys argues that the modern world has largely lost the participatory understanding of reality found in ancient philosophy. In his account, the Protestant legacy and the emergence of modernity helped move truth into the isolated individual mind. Philosophy became preoccupied with the solitary thinker questioning, doubting, analyzing, and trying to establish with certainty that anything outside the mind existed at all.

For Plato, Plotinus, Iamblichus, and the traditions that followed them, philosophy was concerned with what the pursuit of wisdom did to the soul. Reality was sacred, ordered, hierarchical, and meaningful. The soul was not sealed inside a private psychological world. It could participate in realities beyond its immediate appetites, opinions, fears, and social conditioning.

Philosophy involved contemplation, purification, discipline, initiation, sacred rites, and a change in one’s entire way of living. Knowing more was not enough. The philosopher was supposed to become capable of seeing and living differently.

My friend Brado approaches this through the concept of mediation: everything that stands between us and direct experience. Words, explanations, arguments, and even the thoughts inside our own heads can communicate something real, but they are still representations of an experience.

As he writes:

“This type of knowledge then, as it cannot be verbalized, it similarly cannot be rationalized either. As existence is surely affected by this type of knowledge rather than the other type we discussed—the knowledge mediated by discursive intellect—it can be jarring to consider that the knowing we attain from reading a word on a page or thinking a thought in our head is not the same as the knowing [we] receive from experience.”

This does not make reason useless. Discursive thought allows us to analyze, compare, question, build, and communicate. It simply cannot deliver every kind of knowing by itself.

Brado distinguishes between wisdom acquired as information and wisdom that must be received through encounter. We may prepare through study, discipline, and reflection. At some point, however, the idea has to become lived reality.

That was the philosophical form of something my body had already taught me through music, injury, repetition, and movement. Certain things cannot be transferred intact from one mind to another. They have to be entered.


Philo-sophia (the love of wisdom) was an art of seeing, loving, understanding, and living. Its purpose was not merely to construct arguments, master technical language, or accumulate information about what earlier philosophers had believed. It was a discipline of transformation that shaped perception, character, conduct, and one’s relationship with death. Wisdom had to be practiced until it became embodied. The measure of philosophy was the kind of life it produced.


Uždavinys describes its telos as a radical transformation of thought and existence in pursuit of wisdom.

The Platonic and Aristotelian traditions did not assume every desire represented the authentic self. They asked whether our desires were ordered toward what was genuinely good, beautiful, and life-giving. Freedom included liberation from confusion, compulsion, false appearances, and domination by the lower parts of ourselves.

That is far more demanding than telling me to express myself. It asks what kind of self I am becoming. Are my desires making me more lucid, courageous, capable of love, and responsible to the living world around me? A choice can be legal and sincerely felt and still lead me away from wisdom.

Adopting one more ideology could never answer that question for me. I did not need a new identity to perform or a collection of ancient ideas decorating the same unexamined life. I needed practices capable of changing how I perceived, desired, judged, and lived.

“Therefore, a philosophical journey is the mimetic and ritual-like journey of the hero, like Heracles and Orpheus, to the Netherworld, the Egyptian Duat, where all the opposites meet. This is the process of ‘dying before death’ and resurrection.”

—Algis Uždavinys, Philosophy as a Rite of Rebirth

What Must Die

Psyche Carried to Olympus Follower of Marcantonio Raimondi after Raphael

When I think about rebirth in my own life, I do not imagine becoming an entirely different person. I think about the gradual death of the person I constructed in order to survive.

Growing up inside an authoritarian household, I learned early that parental love could be conditional, discipline could mean pain, and trust could leave me exposed. I became self-reliant because I had to. That kind of self-reliance has a cost.

“I believe, toxic shame is a type of emotional flashback in which we view ourselves with the same disgust we saw reflected in our parents’ faces whenever they acted as if they were repulsed by us. Toxic shame freezes us in the fear, mortification, and hopelessness of our most traumatic times in childhood. To the degree, that our parents acted as if they couldn’t stand the side of us, to that same degree are we prone to toxic shame, attacks of feeling bad, worthless, and ugly. Parents routinely use toxic shame to dismiss children’s needs and to extinguish their ability to assert themselves and protest (or even notice) abuse and neglect.” —Pete Walker, The Tao of Fully Feeling—Harvesting forgiveness out of blame

The need for control, the drive for perfection, the desperate desire to become good enough to earn love—these were not random personality traits. They were ways of navigating a world in which I never felt securely seen, safe, or understood.

They followed me into adulthood. I tried to control my body through eating disorders and bodybuilding. I tried to control how other people perceived me through achievement, performance, and reinvention. Certainty felt like safety, so I entered communities that promised it. Again and again, I hoped that if I became the right kind of person, the old feeling of not being securely loved might finally disappear.

And so what I have learned… is my intensity does not have to die. Neither does my capacity to feel deeply or my desire for beauty, discipline, belonging, and meaning. I need to let go of the fantasy that I can fill that old absence by becoming impressive enough, obedient enough, beautiful enough, spiritually correct enough, politically acceptable enough, or perfectly understood.

There is a useful name for another illusion wrapped up in this: the end-of-history illusion. We can look backward and recognize how profoundly we have changed while imagining that the person we are now is somehow the finished version.

I can see it all through my own life. Each new world felt like an arrival. This is it. The right body. The right community. The right politics. The right spiritual vocabulary. The explanation that would finally gather every scattered piece of my life together.

I knew I had changed dramatically before arriving there. Somehow I still believed this newest self was the one I had been moving toward all along.

Of course she was not finished. I am not finished now either.

That does not mean every change is positive growth or that our values should be endlessly disposable. It means the direction of our formation matters because we are never standing still.

I can now see a difference between conversion and transformation. Conversion can change our vocabulary very quickly. Transformation is slower, less glamorous, and much harder to perform for an audience.

It shows up in steadier values, discernment, self-command, courage, and the ability to remain rooted when someone disagrees. It allows me to listen without disappearing and stand firmly without needing everyone around me to confirm that I am standing in exactly the right place.

I no longer imagine the performed self dying in one grand initiatory moment. It dies in small decisions: when I refuse to punish myself, trust what I have actually observed, remain honest despite the possibility of rejection, or stay in relationship without abandoning myself inside it.

In the Platonic language that has helped me understand this, rebirth changes perception. The frightened, grasping, passion-bound self loses its absolute claim over us, making room for something more lucid to participate in a greater order of reality.

For me, philosophy is the work of becoming able to see.

I went into the inner death and saw that outer dying is better than inner death. And I decided to die outside and live within.

– C.G. Jung, The Red Book

Divine Madness

“Divine Madness”: Roman cameo of a dancing maenad, 1st century CE.

In Part One, I wrote about learning through the body—about the moment a hula hoop stops being something you are consciously controlling and becomes something your body simply knows how to move with.

For years, ecstatic dance gave me access to another kind of knowing. The ritual container could create the conditions for something to happen, but it could not guarantee that it would. Music, ceremony, movement, and community could prepare the ground. Some Sundays remained simply joyful afternoons of dancing. Others opened into something I still struggle to describe.

Participation is not a vending machine for transcendence. Ritual can orient us toward an experience without forcing the experience to occur.

I could go week after week and have a beautiful time dancing, sweating, moving, seeing friends, and being carried by good music. Then there were certain Sundays when something else happened.

I still cannot fully explain what made the difference.

Sometimes it seemed to be the DJ or the particular arc of the music. Sometimes it was the combination of people who gathered that day. Anyone who has spent enough time in spaces like this knows the people in the room change the room. The energy could build on itself until I could no longer separate my individual experience from whatever was happening collectively.

Sociology gives us the term collective effervescence for the heightened energy that can emerge when people gather in shared ritual, movement, rhythm, and attention.

From a Heathen perspective, I also think about megin: power or vitality that does not belong only to an isolated individual, but can gather and move through relationship and communal participation.

Whatever language I use, I know the difference between having a wonderful time and entering a genuinely ecstatic state.

In those moments, ordinary self-consciousness fell away. I stopped experiencing music as something coming toward me from outside. My body was no longer selecting a sequence of movements. At a certain point, I was not listening to the music anymore. I was inside it.

My body knew what to do before I could think about it.

Those experiences come closest to what Plato described as divinely inspired madness.

Roman stucco relief of a maenad with a tympanum.

By madness, I am not talking about chaos for its own sake or the idea that anything erupting spontaneously from within us must be authentic and sacred. Plato was describing a state in which the ordinary calculating mind loosens its grip and another way of knowing becomes possible.

The ritual container mattered.

We opened together.

We danced together.

We closed together.

The room, the music, the people, the repetition of returning Sunday after Sunday, and the shared expectation that we had gathered to move instead of watch gave form to something I could not have produced alone.

Sometimes afterward I took the microphone and tried to describe what had happened. I can see now that part of that impulse came from my lifelong desire to be seen and understood. I have always had big feelings and a powerful need to give those feelings somewhere to go.

But that was not all of it.

I was trying to bring something back.

Something had happened through participation, and I wanted words for it. The words always came second.


What the Word Can Carry

Georg von Rosen, Odin as Wanderer (1886).

Writing has become one of the primary ways I make sense of my life. It takes something living as memory, sensation, grief, confusion, or half-formed insight and gives it enough shape for me to encounter it from another angle. It creates distance without necessarily cutting me off from what happened.

The writing is still not the experience.

Recently, a friend reminded me that writing does not have to be merely confessional or testimonial. It can function as external memory, a way of placing meaning outside ourselves so we can meet it again later and discover that we have changed.

The story of Odin and the runes captures something similar. Odin is not simply handed information. He hangs for nine nights upon the tree, wounded by a spear, “myself to myself,” without food or drink. Only through the ordeal does he perceive and take up the runes.

“Then I began to quicken and be wise,
and to grow and to prosper;
one word from another word found a word for me,
one deed from another deed found a deed for me.”

Hávamál, stanza 141, in The Poetic Edda, translated by Carolyne Larrington (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 32.

The marks themselves can be inscribed. They can exist outside the person, carried across distance and time. But the story does not confuse possession of the symbol with possession of wisdom. Odin has to become capable of knowing what the symbol contains.

At this point of the essay, I must say it is a little ridiculous to be writing an essay on forms of knowledge that cannot be contained inside of it.

I can tell you about ecstatic dance. I can describe the DJ, the sweat, the ceremony, the people moving beside me, and those strange days when something emerged from the group that no single person brought into the room.

I cannot put that experience inside your body.

Anyone I have ever taught to hoop eventually reaches the limit of my instructions. I can demonstrate, adjust their stance, point to their feet, and explain how to shift their weight. Eventually their body has to find it.

And then, suddenly, the hoop stays up.

They know.

That is the wisdom of participation I was reaching toward in Part One. Some things become knowable only from inside the act itself.

This is also why I continue to write. I can preserve memory, notice patterns between experiences that happened decades apart, and leave markers for myself. I can return later and understand the same words differently because I am different.

Good writing may even point another person toward an experience they have to enter for themselves.

Maybe it’s that the best words can do, is to show us where to look.

“If we cannot give a true account of ourselves and our doings it will mean that our actions have been ‘as you like it’, reckless and informal rather than to the point and in good form.” *

Becoming More Alive

Odysseus returning to Penelope, Greek terracotta plaque, ca. 460–450 BCE — after ordeal and wandering, the final movement is not escape but return.

If becoming more alive is the goal, then I still have to ask what kind of life is worth building.

If I no longer believe you do you is an adequate moral philosophy, but I also refuse to surrender my conscience to another authority simply because it promises certainty, how do I decide what is good?

An older understanding of wisdom makes that question more demanding. In much of classical philosophy, to know was to be. Wisdom was not something one simply possessed because one had encountered the correct argument, read the correct book, or even undergone an extraordinary experience. The knower had to be changed.

That shifts the question. It is not only, What do I know? It is, What kind of person am I becoming through what I claim to know?

I keep returning to this particular distinction: a life shaped merely by preference versus a life given form.

Freedom cannot mean that I never have to account for what I choose. If anything, freedom places a greater responsibility on me to ask whether my actions have direction, coherence, and some relationship to what is actually good.

So now I ask what a belief, practice, or way of living does to a person over time. Does it agree with biological and material reality, or does it ask me to deny what is plainly there? What happens when it is repeated for years instead of experienced for an afternoon? What kind of relationships does it produce? Who bears the consequences? Does it cultivate courage, responsibility, reciprocity, restraint, loyalty, honesty, and care for something beyond immediate appetite?

I have also started to value tradition. That does not make everything inherited good. It means I no longer assume one isolated mind can reconstruct a wise way of life from scratch. Traditions can carry generations of observation about human nature, family, obligation, reciprocity, sex, death, community, and meaning. We should understand what they are protecting before we casually discard them.

Tradition is not an infallible oracle either. I look toward biology, history, anthropology, sociology, lived consequences, virtue, and human flourishing. None can relieve me of judgment. Together, they demand far more than asking whether something feels authentic in the moment.

Lately, becoming more alive has looked almost embarrassingly ordinary. It means doing the dishes while actually inhabiting the moment instead of treating the task as an obstacle between me and whatever comes next. Walking slowly enough to notice what is around me. Preparing food with gratitude. Tending living things. Keeping a promise. Paying attention to the season. Putting my hands into the earth. Moving my body. Writing something true.

It also means learning what my body needs when I am overwhelmed. Sometimes I do not need another explanation. It’s somatic engagement like pressure, warmth, touch, or breathwork. I am learning how to remain honorable in relationship when it would be easier to punish, manipulate, withdraw, or perform.

There was a time when I searched for transformation through intensity. A new body. A new community. A new spiritual identity. A new doctrine. A new explanation that could make everything that hurt finally make sense.

I also found aliveness somewhere else too. As I wrote in Part One:

“We planned entire summers around gathering beneath stages and temporary tents. We drove for days to arrive somewhere that would exist for only a weekend, then disappear almost as quickly as it had formed.”

Those temporary worlds gave me music, movement, friendship, collective energy, and a kind of belonging I often struggled to find elsewhere. All of that was real. I would never diminish it.

There was an escapist edge to it too.

If the place where I felt most at home existed only for a weekend, what did that make the rest of my life?

Normal life could become the grind between festivals. Work, chores, obligations, and ordinary days were things to get through so I could afford the next tour, the next gathering, the next temporary return to myself.

What startled me while rereading my old blogs was finding a younger version of myself already wrestling with this exact problem. In 2010, after writing about staying sober at festivals, struggling with hip pain, and realizing how much I loved my work and routine, I blurted out:

“I realized that I am happier after having a great workout than I am at a music festival. whoa-wait-WHAT? I am happier living my normal routine of working as a personal trainer and teaching Hoop Classes?? How blessed am I? My real life is so incredible, i don’t need to run away for 4-5 days, indulge in drug consumption to feel happy?! wow.”

Reading that now almost made me laugh. I was already saying this back then! A younger me could feel this in her body before I had the philosophical language to explain it.

Knowing something once does not mean we know how to build an entire life around it. I lost and rediscovered that lesson through bodybuilding, multilevel marketing, Christianity, illness, political rupture, and every other identity I tried to make into a permanent home.

Now I think rebirth may be much less dramatic than another conversion. It may be the slow formation of a life I can actually inhabit.

I do not want to organize my life around the next escape. I want to bring participation, beauty, ritual, and aliveness into the days I once thought I had to get through. I want to return to my body and ordinary life, perceive what is already sacred here, and participate in relationship without abandoning myself.

That brings me back to the hunger underneath this entire series.

I thought I was writing about hooping. Then it was writing about festivals, ritual, community, religion, philosophy, and the strange succession of selves I have inhabited.

Underneath all of it was the same question:

How do we become fully present participants in our own lives?

I am no longer looking for a system that will tell me exactly who I must become. I am trying to become capable of meeting life, in all of its beauty, obligations, grief, mystery, pleasure, limits, and loss, with enough discernment and courage to participate in it fully.

Maybe rebirth has nothing to do with leaving this world for another one. Maybe it means returning to this one more alive.


Thank you so much for reading or listening! The audio always includes a few extra nuggets that aren’t in the written version, so give it a listen when you can. I’d love to hear your thoughts in the comments!

Taste of Truth is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

*Ananda K. Coomaraswamy Atmayajna: Self-Sacrifice: Selected Papers. Metaphysics, ed. Roger Lipsey, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p.137

Articles mentioned or that influenced this series:

From Conspiracy to Cult

Beyond the Crunchy-to-Alt-Right Pipeline

What Consenting Adults Do Is Our Concern

The Fragility of Freedom

Consent is not enough: The Harsh Realities of Sex Work

From Diary Entries to Digital Screens

The Way of the Gods: Clarifying Paganism

Power Through Truth

Modality and Media

First Principles: Distinction and Differentiation

Mediation, Myth and Mystery

Calories In, Common Sense Out

On metabolism, nourishment, food reverence, and the systems that shape what feeds us

Welcome back to Taste0fTruth Tuesdays. Today, we are mixing things up with a subject that is very near and dear to my heart: nutrition, metabolism, and our increasingly distorted relationship with food in our modern world.

This episode covers a lot of ground. We are moving from diet culture and my own history with restriction into metabolism, morality, industrial food, local agriculture, and the growing technological control of our food systems. It may sound like several different conversations, but they are all part of the same story.

This episode will also lay some of the groundwork for an upcoming interview at the end of the month with Jay Feldman Wellness.

Jay is a health coach, independent health researcher, and host of The Energy Balance Podcast. His work explores bioenergetic health and nutrition, including ideas influenced by biologist Ray Peat—principles I have found myself returning to, on and off, for the last several years.

But before we get there, I need to explain why this conversation is so personal for me.

As many of you know, I have spent more than 20 years in the health and fitness world. I have also written openly about how intense and complicated that journey has been.

I came of age during the late 1990s and early 2000s, an era saturated with diet magazines, celebrity weight-loss stories, low-fat everything, Special K commercials, “bikini body” workouts, and television programs that treated shrinking the body as both entertainment and moral achievement.

And those cultural messages did not exist in isolation.

I grew up in a household where my body was not simply noticed. It was scrutinized, compared, and commented on.

Those kinds of comments do not disappear with time. They become part of the architecture of how you see yourself. They follow you into mirrors, fitting rooms, photographs, swimming pools, doctors’ offices, and every room where you become aware that other people can see your body.

They teach you that the body must be managed and monitored.

They plant the belief that remaining small is the price of safety.

I grew up believing that if I could control my body well enough, I could avoid humiliation. I could avoid becoming the punchline. I could avoid being seen in the wrong way.

For a while, I turned that fear into something our culture rewards: discipline.

But fear does not stop being fear simply because it learns the vocabulary of health and fitness.

In high school, I followed plans like the Special K diet. I relied on Carnation Instant Breakfast instead of complete meals. I skipped classes to work out before heading to my afterschool job. My protein intake was low. My fear of gaining weight was high.

Restriction became familiar.

And because restriction was praised as willpower, I did not always recognize it as deprivation.

That is the background I bring into this conversation. I am not critiquing calorie culture because I have never understood its appeal. I understand it intimately.

Numbers can feel safe.

Numbers feel objective. They offer the illusion that if you calculate carefully enough, track consistently enough, and exert enough control, the body will become predictable. Calories give food a score. The scale gives the body a verdict. And when you have learned to fear your own appetite, arithmetic can feel more trustworthy than sensation.

I have lived through periods in which weight loss looked like success from the outside while my body was becoming increasingly undernourished, stressed, depleted, and disconnected from its own signals.

So when I say that weight loss and health are not synonymous, trust me: I learned that lesson the hard way.

When Discipline Stops Working

When Discipline Stops Working

Taste0ftruth

·

Jan 20

Listen now

That is why I am interested in the bioenergetic perspective. Rather than asking only, “How little can I eat to make the number on the scale decrease?” it asks a more useful question:

How well is the body actually producing and using energy?

This episode is not intended to settle every claim made within bioenergetic nutrition. That is part of what I want to explore with Jay during our upcoming conversation.

Today, I want to lay the groundwork by examining the difference between consuming calories and producing usable cellular energy; between losing weight and becoming healthy; and between treating food as a number and understanding it as biological information, ecological relationship, and participation in a living system.

Because the body is not simply a furnace. Food is not merely a number.

And losing weight is definitely not proof that a person is nourished or healthy while doing so.

Modern nutrition has flattened food into arithmetic while removing almost everything that makes it meaningful.

SAD is the perfect acronym for the Standard American Diet because, whew, it really is sad what modern food culture has become.

And I do not just mean sad in the obvious “everyone is eating ultra-processed food and wondering why they feel terrible” kind of way. I mean sad in the deeper sense.

Sad as in spiritually impoverished.

Sad as in disconnected from land, animals, seasons, labor, gratitude, death, and actual nourishment.

Sad as in we have managed to turn food (one of the most intimate relationships a human being has with the living world) into a bland, plastic-wrapped transaction between a lonely person and a microwave, or a vehicle going to a fast food drive thru window.

That sounds dramatic.

But is it really?

We live in a culture that calls ultra-processed food “good enough,” celebrates weight loss regardless of how it was achieved, and then treats anyone who questions that framework as judgmental, elitist, or unnecessarily intense.

But that is exactly the problem.

Our culture has reduced food to numbers while stripping it of meaning. Calories. Macros. Points. Deficits. Cheat meals. Protein hacks. Low-cal swaps. “If It Fits Your Macros.” (I lived and breathed that lifestyle) We talk about food like it is accounting, not relationship. Like the human body is a calculator.

Of course, calories matter. I am not pretending energy balance is fake. But if your entire health philosophy begins and ends with calorie math, you are missing the human being attached to the equation.

Food is not only fuel. Food is information. Food sends a signal. Food affects insulin, thyroid output, leptin, ghrelin, cortisol, digestion, gut signaling, inflammation, mitochondrial function, cell communication, mood, cravings, satiety, sleep, fertility, and gene expression. A Hot Pocket and a grass-fed steak may both contain calories, but they do not speak the same biological language once they enter the body.

The lie of “calories in, calories out” must die.

Not because energy does not matter. It does. But because reducing food to calorie math is one of the dumbest things modern nutrition culture has done to the human body.

A calorie is a unit of energy, but the number printed on a label cannot tell us how effectively a food will be digested, absorbed, converted into ATP, or allocated among the body’s competing demands. That process requires minerals, vitamins, enzymes, hormones, functioning mitochondria, adequate protein, and a body that is not constantly underfed, inflamed, stressed, or depleted.

This is where the “just eat less” crowd loses the plot.

Most people are not building truly nutrient-dense meals, even when they think they are. They may be tracking protein, counting calories, or hitting some macro target, while still missing the deeper nourishment their body needs to actually turn food into energy. If someone is living on refined grains, muscle meats only, no seafood, low mineral intake, low variety, and almost no traditional foods, they can be “hitting their calories” while still undersupplying some of the micronutrients and cofactors involved in energy metabolism, tissue repair, and hormonal function.

But producing energy is only part of the story.

The body must also decide where that energy goes.

Mitochondrial psychobiologist Martin Picard and his colleagues have proposed an emerging framework called the Energy Constraint model. Their central idea is that the body operates with a limited but dynamic energy budget that must continually be allocated across cells, organs, systems, and behaviors.

Everything costs energy.

Neurons firing costs energy. Producing proteins costs energy. Mounting an immune response costs energy. Digestion, movement, cognition, reproduction, tissue repair, and communication between cells all carry energetic costs.

Nothing is free in biology.

Hierarchy of Energy Needs. From @martinpicard, “Energy Constraint on Health,” based on the Energy Constraint framework developed by Alexander Behnke, Evan Shaulson, Herman Pontzer, Chris Kempes, Martin Picard, and colleagues. Reproduced with permission from Martin Picard. Original article and primary paper linked here.

In their framework, the body’s energetic demands can be divided into three broad categories: vital functions; stress responses; and growth, maintenance, and repair.

At the base are the vital functions necessary to sustain life in the immediate term: breathing, heart activity, brain function, membrane potential, ion exchange, and basic metabolism. These processes receive priority because they are necessary for survival over minutes, hours, and days.

The next category includes stress-related demands. Exercise is a stressor. So are infection, inflammation, toxins, psychological distress, injury, sleep loss, and activation of the sympathetic nervous system. All of these require the body to spend energy responding and adapting.

At the top are growth, maintenance, and repair. These processes may not be essential for surviving the next several minutes, but they are essential for healing, resilience, muscle maintenance, reproduction, cognition, motivation, vitality, and long-term health.

When the body’s total demands become difficult to sustain, energy is not distributed evenly. More urgent vital and stress-related processes may be prioritized while investment in growth, maintenance, and repair becomes compressed.

In other words, the body may preserve what is necessary to keep you alive while reducing what is available to help you recover, reproduce, think clearly, maintain muscle, and feel fully alive.

This does not mean these higher functions simply switch off in a rigid order. It means the body makes trade-offs.

And duration matters.

Not every stressor is harmful. Exercise itself temporarily redirects energy, but when it is appropriately dosed and followed by sufficient nourishment, sleep, and recovery, the body can adapt and become more resilient.

The deeper problem is stress that becomes excessive, chronic, or inescapable.

When energetic demands continue for weeks, months, or years—whether from illness, infection, psychological stress, overtraining, sleep disruption, undernourishment, or some combination of pressures—the body may repeatedly postpone the repair work that was supposed to happen later.

This framework helps explain how someone can technically be eating enough calories (or even losing weight successfully) while experiencing fatigue, poor recovery, low libido, disrupted cycles, reduced motivation, brain fog, loss of muscle, or declining resilience.

It does not mean every one of those symptoms has a single energetic cause. But it gives us a much richer way of understanding health than simply asking whether someone stayed within a calorie target.

The body is not failing to obey an equation.

It is adapting to competing demands.

Nutrient status is only one part of this energetic landscape, but it is an important one. The body’s ability to produce, allocate, and use energy is also shaped by sleep, illness, stress, activity, mitochondrial function, recovery, and the cumulative demands being placed upon it.

This is why vitamins and minerals matter so much. They are not little bonus points sprinkled on top of a diet. They are part of the machinery that turns food into usable energy. They help build hormones and neurotransmitters, repair tissue, maintain immune function, support the liver, regulate the nervous system, and keep the organs doing their jobs.

Or said more simply: macronutrients burn on the flame of micronutrients.

That is the part calorie math misses. A Hot Pocket and a mineral-rich, protein-rich, whole-food meal may both contain calories, but they do not offer the body the same tools. One delivers energy potential wrapped in industrial convenience. The other provides the raw materials the body needs to actually build, repair, signal, regulate, and produce real cellular energy.

So when people say “it’s just calories in, calories out,” what I hear is a worldview that has confused potential with function.

A body is not helped by potential alone. It needs conversion. It needs nourishment. It needs signal. It needs minerals, protein, fats, carbohydrates, vitamins, salt, sunlight, rest, and rhythm.

Food is not just a number entering a furnace. Food is a set of instructions entering a living system. And if the instructions are poor, incomplete, synthetic, depleted, or chaotic, the body will respond accordingly.

This is where the lazy appeal to “thermodynamics” becomes almost comical. Yes, the laws of thermodynamics exist. Congratulations. But the human body is not a closed metal box in a lab. It is a living, adaptive, self-regulating organism. Inputs change outputs. Food changes appetite, energy expenditure, hormones, cravings, sleep, mood, metabolic rate, and behavior. The “calories out” side is not fixed. It responds to the quality, timing, and composition of what we eat.

Rupert Sheldrake has criticized the way modern science can harden living systems into dead-mechanistic models, and that critique fits here. The calorie model treats the body like a machine. But we are not machines. We are organisms. Food is not merely burned. It is received, interpreted, metabolized, stored, signaled, and woven into the body.

So yes, calories matter. But “calories in, calories out” as a complete theory of health is basically nutritional kindergarten, and it’s time to grow out of that.


But calorie reductionism is only one way modern food culture disconnects us from the complexity of nourishment.

We also have a tendency to turn eating into a moral identity. Foods become clean or dirty, virtuous or shameful. Diets promise not only better health, but innocence: a way to eat without exploitation, suffering, contradiction, or death.

I understand the appeal of that promise because I lived inside it.

I was vegetarian for years. At the time, I genuinely believed it was both the healthier and more ethical choice. I cared about animals. I still do—deeply. I did not want to participate in harm if I could avoid it.

But eventually, health-wise, vegetarianism stopped working for me. My body was not thriving. Practitioners I trusted encouraged me to reconsider whether I was receiving enough protein and nourishment, and over time I began incorporating animal foods again. That transition gradually led me toward a more pro-metabolic, ancestral approach to food.

I am not as critical of vegetarianism as I am of veganism because vegetarian diets can still include many traditional, deeply nourishing foods: eggs, butter, cheese, milk, yogurt, cream, and honey. These foods can still connect us to animals, farms, fermentation, older foodways, and the forms of nourishment on which human communities have relied for generations.

Veganism is different. I understand the moral impulse behind it. But modern veganism often depends heavily on the very industrial food system it imagines itself resisting.

It often depends upon global supply chains, fortified products, industrial monocrops, protein isolates, seed oils, and laboratory-like replacements for foods that once came directly from local land, animals, kitchens, and communities.

That does not describe every vegan meal or every person who avoids animal foods. But veganism as a widely accessible modern lifestyle has been made possible, in large part, by the industrialization and globalization of food. It became easier to imagine a diet detached from local ecology only after the modern food system detached nearly everyone from local ecology.

Before supermarket abundance, refrigerated transport, synthetic supplementation, and year-round imports, diets were far more directly shaped by region, climate, labor, animals, seasons, preservation, and survival.

This is what troubles me about the moral certainty that can surround veganism. Morality can bind us around compassion, but it can also blind us to costs outside the frame we have chosen. A person may avoid animal foods while remaining dependent upon monocropping, habitat loss, exploited labor, heavily processed substitutes, and corporations with no meaningful relationship to the land being depleted.

The suffering has not necessarily disappeared.

It has moved out of sight.

An ethical identity can become so focused on the visible animal that it loses sight of soil, insects, wildlife, farmers, rural communities, and the ecological relationships required to sustain human life.

This is why I keep thinking about survival programs like Alone. You do not typically see people in genuine survival conditions adhering to rigid dietary identities made possible by modern abundance. They eat the carbohydrates they can gather. They fish, hunt, forage, trap, and preserve whatever food the environment makes available.

A television program does not settle the ethical debate. But it does expose how much our modern food identities depend upon stability, infrastructure, supplements, supermarkets, and global abundance.

Most of us have no idea what we would actually eat if supermarkets, refrigeration, restaurants, and global supply chains disappeared.

It is easy to construct an identity around dietary purity while standing beneath fluorescent lights in a store containing food from every climate on Earth.

Survival has a way of stripping ideology down to appetite, ecology, and availability.

The point I’m trying to make here, is the deeper problem is not simply meat. It is our total disconnection from food itself.

The Standard American Diet is not built around reverence. It is built around convenience, profit, shelf life, hyper-palatability, and perpetual consumption. It is often high in refined carbohydrates and industrial fats, low in nutrient density, easy to overeat, and engineered to override the body’s natural signals.

It keeps people fed but not nourished.

Full but not satisfied. Stimulated but depleted.

I do not blame meat itself for the sickness of modern food culture. I blame the collapse of small and local food systems. I blame industrial agriculture and the consolidation of food production. I blame ultra-processed convenience food. I blame the severing of people from land, seasons, animals, kitchens, skills, and community.

I blame a culture in which people no longer know where their food comes from, what it took to produce it, or what kind of life and death made it possible.

Because that is the uncomfortable truth: death is always involved in food.

Neither vegetarianism nor veganism remove death from the food system. Fields are cleared. Habitats are displaced. Soil life is disrupted. Insects, birds, rodents, snakes, rabbits, and countless unseen creatures are killed through large-scale crop production. Farm workers are exploited. Water is diverted. Communities are transformed to serve distant markets.

Even a plate composed entirely of plants carries a cost.

That does not mean all dietary choices are morally equivalent. It means purity is not available to us. The moral task is not to imagine that we have escaped the web of life and death. It is to become more conscious of how we participate in it.

Nature is a total system, and within that totality it is not morally tidy.

We often use the word “natural” as if it means good, pure, balanced, or morally clean. But nature does not produce constant perfection. Nature produces totality. Beauty and monstrosity. Strength and weakness. Flourishing and failure. Healthy forms, botched forms, failed adaptations, extinction, decay, renewal.

Food belongs to that same uncomfortable order. There is no pure way to eat outside of life, death, appetite, cost, and consequence. The fantasy of a morally spotless diet is just another modern escape hatch from reality.

Morality works in a similar way. It is not merely a list of rules imposed from above. It is an energy-management system. It curbs violence, lust, greed, vengeance, ambition, and appetite so a group can maintain some version of peace. Morality contains the passions so they do not destroy the social body.

At both the personal and social level, morality determines which appetites may be expressed, which must be restrained, and which costs remain visible.

And maybe this is why modern food culture feels so spiritually sick. It has stopped containing appetite. It does not discipline desire. It engineers it. It stimulates it. It tells us we can eat industrially manufactured, hyper-palatable food and reduce the whole thing to calorie math, as if the body is not receiving signals, adapting, craving, storing, resisting, inflaming, and remembering.

Food is energy, yes. But not in the dead mechanical sense. Food is energy moving through a living moral and biological system.

That is why “calories in, calories out” feels so thin. It treats food as if it enters a furnace. But food enters a body. And bodies are not furnaces. Bodies are fields of signal, memory, hunger, restraint, ancestry, hormone, and meaning.

I completely understand the discomfort around eating conscious animals. I have read so many stories from first-time farmers who raise animals with love and then struggle deeply when it is time for slaughter. That pain means something. I respect it. Honestly, I trust that pain more than the numbness of the average grocery store shopper tossing factory-farmed meat into a cart with no thought at all.

The pain shows there is still reverence there.

And maybe that is what we have lost most.

We have been removed from the reality of food for so long that we tend to swing between two false extremes. On one side, we sentimentalize animals from a distance and pretend we can opt out of the death cycle entirely. On the other hand, we consume without thought, without gratitude, without responsibility, without even a pause. Both are forms of disconnection.

The more honest path, at least for me, is not pretending death can be removed from food. It is learning to approach food with more gratitude, humility, and responsibility.

That means caring about how animals are raised. It means caring about soil. It means caring about farmers. It means caring about local food systems. It means asking whether our food builds health or slowly drains it from us. It means understanding that “cheap” food often has hidden costs paid somewhere else, by animals, by land, by farm workers, by our own bodies, by our children, and by our communities.

And yes, it also means having higher standards.

I am tired of the cultural pressure to pretend that all food choices are basically the same as long as the calories work out. They are not. A calorie deficit may lead to weight loss, but weight loss is not the same as nourishment. You can lose weight while eating foods that do very little to support your metabolism, hormones, digestion, mood, or long-term health. You can shrink a body while starving it of what it actually needs.


Real nourishment asks more of us.

It asks us to pay attention. It asks us to recover old skills. It asks us to cook, to preserve, to source better when we can, and to know the difference between food shaped by land, animals, microbes, seasons, and human hands—and food assembled in a factory to survive for months in a freezer.

This is where food becomes spiritual for me.

Not spiritual in the vague influencer sense. Not “raise your vibes with an açai smoothie bowl” nonsense.

I mean spiritual in the older, more connected to earth sense: eating is an act of dependence, participation, and transformation.

Rudolf Steiner once approached nutrition through the idea that eating is never merely mechanical. Whatever one makes of his more esoteric language, I think there is something valuable in the underlying insight: food does not simply enter the body and disappear into a calorie ledger. The body must meet it, break it down, transform it, and incorporate it into the self.

What was once sunlight, soil, rain, grass, grain, fruit, milk, muscle, mineral, or microbial life becomes blood, tissue, hormone, neurotransmitter, heat, thought, movement, and memory.

Eating is one of the most literal ways the world becomes us.

That alone should make the act feel less trivial.

We are not floating minds temporarily renting bodies. We are dependent creatures. We require soil, water, sunlight, animals, plants, microbes, farmers, bees, rain, death, decay, and renewal. Every meal places us inside a web of relationships whether we acknowledge them or not.

And this means that food may shape more than our body weight.

What we eat can influence energy, mood, cognition, resilience, inflammation, digestion, and the clarity with which we move through the world. I do not mean that one perfect diet produces spiritual enlightenment, or that illness reflects moral or spiritual failure. Food is not a purity test.

But neither is it neutral.

The quality of what we repeatedly take into the body helps shape the material conditions through which we think, feel, recover, create, and relate to others.

Modern food culture wants us to forget all of this.

It wants food to be easy, cheap, fast, addictive, and morally weightless. It wants us to believe that a frozen pocket of refined flour, industrial oils, modified starches, sodium, flavoring agents, and processed ham is simply another option.

Just calories.

Just convenience.

Just people doing their best.

But I do not believe “doing our best” means lowering our standards until nothing matters. Nor do I believe the answer is to shame ordinary people for choosing the foods that our economic and agricultural systems have made cheap, available, familiar, and nearly effortless.

It is easy to preach ancestral nourishment from a well-stocked kitchen.

A serious food ethic must also account for price, time, disability, geography, cooking knowledge, working conditions, and access. Reverence that only the wealthy can afford is not reverence.

That does not mean pretending a Hot Pocket and a nutrient-dense meal are biologically or spiritually interchangeable. They are not.

It means directing our anger beyond the individual shopper and toward a system that has made industrial convenience easier to obtain than genuine nourishment—and then taught us to call that arrangement freedom.

But reverence cannot remain an individual lifestyle choice.

Our relationship with food is shaped by the systems surrounding us: what is affordable, what is available, what is subsidized, what is processed, what is imported, and what people realistically have the time and energy to prepare.

It is one thing to tell people to eat closer to the land. It is another to live inside an economy that has made industrial food cheaper, faster, and more accessible than the local, nutrient-dense food we claim to value.

So, this is not only a question of personal responsibility.

It is also a question of access, power, and who controls the conditions under which nourishment is produced and distributed.

As of May 2026, grocery prices were 2.7 percent higher than they had been one year earlier. Fruits and vegetables were up 6.1 percent. Food away from home was up 3.5 percent. Meanwhile, overall energy prices had risen 23.5 percent over the same period. These increases are layered on top of years of cumulative inflation, and they shape what families can realistically put on the table. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Consumer Price Index Summary—May 2026.” June 10, 2026.

At the same time, the infrastructure surrounding American agriculture is becoming increasingly centralized and digitized.

In February 2026, the USDA announced its “One Farmer, One File” initiative, which is intended to create a single record following each farmer across the Farm Service Agency, Natural Resources Conservation Service, and Risk Management Agency. The department says the system will reduce duplicated paperwork, retire outdated technology, improve program delivery, and be completed in 2028.

Then, on April 22, the USDA and Palantir Technologies announced a $300 million multi-year blanket purchase agreement supporting that initiative and the National Farm Security Action Plan.

Protecting America’s farmland ​is protecting America itself, ​and ⁠this work gives USDA the visibility and speed needed to safeguard our ⁠food ​supply,” said USDA ​Chief Information Officer Sam Berry.

The government presents this as modernization: faster services, stronger cybersecurity, reduced fraud, better disaster response, and greater protection of American farmland and the food supply. Some of those goals are understandable. Farmers should not have to enter the same information into a dozen broken government systems. Disaster assistance should not be trapped behind obsolete technology. Modernization is not inherently sinister.

But neither is it irrational to ask questions when enormous amounts of agricultural information are consolidated through a company deeply involved in defense, intelligence, surveillance, and government analytics.

Who controls the data? Who is permitted to access it? How is that access audited?

Can information gathered for one purpose later be used for another?

What happens when one private contractor becomes embedded deeply enough in public infrastructure that removing it becomes nearly impossible?

How are farmers protected from political misuse, commercial exploitation, cybersecurity failures, or policies imposed by people who understand data models far better than they understand soil, weather, livestock, and living ecosystems?

Food is not merely another sector to be optimized.

Agriculture is biological, regional, unpredictable, and rooted in relationships that cannot be fully represented on a dashboard. Technology may assist farmers. Data may make government programs more efficient. But efficiency and resilience are not the same thing, and greater visibility from the top does not automatically create greater security on the ground.

A resilient food system requires more than centralized information.

It requires independent farmers, healthy soil, regional processing facilities, seed diversity, local knowledge, accessible markets, functioning supply chains, and communities that retain some capacity to feed themselves. It requires people who know how to grow something, preserve something, cook something, and recognize nourishment before a corporation packages and markets it back to them.

That is why the spiritual, biological, economic, and political dimensions of food cannot be separated.

The same reductionist worldview that treats the body as a furnace can treat the farm as a data point.

The same culture that reduces nourishment to calories can reduce agriculture to output.

The same system that tells us a calorie is a calorie can tell us that control is merely efficiency and dependence is merely convenience.

I reject both forms of reductionism.

A body is not a furnace to be calculated.

A farm is not a monocrop to be optimized or a data file to be controlled.

Food is not merely fuel, inventory, content, or data.

It is soil transformed by sunlight. It is water, labor, death, digestion, memory, culture, and life passing into life. To control food is to touch the most intimate point of contact between the individual body, the community, and the living world.

So, the question is no longer only whether we can eat without forgetting.

It is whether we can remember soon enough to reclaim some agency over what feeds us.

Our Hügelkultur keyhole garden beds 2026

The Hidden Philosophies Behind the Renaissance

When Plato Returned, Religious Authority, and the Birth of Freedom of Conscience

This week I sat down with fellow Virginian Collin Conkwright of American Esoteric to discuss a topic that has deeply fascinated me: the pagan, Platonic, and esoteric currents that helped shape the Italian Renaissance.

Most of us inherit a fairly simple story. Christianity triumphs, paganism fades away, and the Renaissance eventually arrives as an artistic and cultural flowering. But history is rarely that neat.

One reason these questions interest me is because of Jan Assmann’s idea of the “Mosaic Distinction.” You’ll hear me mention this concept several times throughout the interview, so I wanted to offer more clarification here.

In simple terms, Assmann argued that many ancient religions could accommodate multiple gods, cults, and local traditions, while the Jewish Torah tradition introduced a much sharper distinction between true religion and false religion, orthodoxy and error. A topic we discuss often here, is what happens when competing worldviews are no longer seen as different paths, but as rivals in a struggle over truth itself? That tension sits quietly beneath much of what we discussed in this episode.

Our conversation centered on figures like Gemistos Plethon, the Byzantine scholar who helped reintroduce Plato to Renaissance Italy, and the remarkable recovery of ancient philosophical traditions that many assumed had long vanished. We discussed everything from Neoplatonism and intermediary spiritual beings to the preservation, destruction, and transmission of ancient texts.

One of the themes that kept resurfacing was memory. How much of the ancient world actually survived? How much was lost? And how much of what survives comes to us through institutions that may have opposed the very ideas they were preserving?

The destruction of Plethon’s Book of Laws became a particularly fascinating example. It raises a question I’ve found myself returning to often: when we’re trying to understand antiquity, are we seeing the ancient world itself, or are we seeing the ancient world through the lens of those who copied, edited, condemned, and preserved it?

A fresco in Anagni Cathedral
C.1250, illustrating the theme of Plato’s Timaeus. At the centre of the universe, the macrocosm, is a human figure, the microcosm. The surrounding circles represent the ages of man, the seasons and the four humours.

We also explored the strange relationship between Christianity and Greek philosophy. The Renaissance recovery of Plato wasn’t entirely foreign to Christian thought. Figures like Philo of Alexandria had already fused Jewish and Platonic ideas centuries before the formal development of Christian theology. In many ways, the Renaissance reopened conversations that had never fully gone away.

This is where the story becomes especially interesting to me.

The Logos language that became so central to Christianity did not emerge from nowhere. It moved through Hellenistic Judaism, and through a world already shaped by Greek philosophical categories.

For me, the broader pattern is difficult to ignore, Christianity positioned itself as transcending both Judaism and paganism while carrying important elements of both within its own intellectual framework. The irony is striking, dontcha think? The later Christian West often came to fear the return of pagan philosophy, even though portions of its own theological architecture had been built from those exact materials centuries earlier.

The Triumph of Christianity Over Paganism, by Tommaso Laureti 1585

As Laurent Guyénot puts it, perhaps too sharply for some readers, this represented

“a turning point in Western intellectual history—a Jewish coup on the Gentile mind.”

Hermes Trismegistus passing ancient wisdom to the Greeks and Egyptians. Renaissance thinkers increasingly believed that forgotten truths could be recovered through philosophy, mysticism, and ancient texts.

One unexpected moment in the conversation led to a friendly scholarly disagreement between Collin and me. We began discussing Christianity’s relationship to power and empire, and whether the alliance between Christianity and imperial authority represented a corruption of the original movement or something more deeply rooted in the tradition itself.

Collin suggested that he couldn’t imagine Jesus signing off on the imperial structures that later developed around Christianity. My immediate reaction was that I’m not entirely convinced the divide is that clean. The language of kingship, authority, judgment, obedience, dominion, and universal truth claims seems deeply embedded within both the Old and New Testaments. For me, the harder question is not whether Christianity became attached to power, but whether some of those impulses were already present from the beginning.

We didn’t solve that debate, and honestly I’m glad we didn’t.

It’s one of those conversations where reasonable people can look at the same texts and arrive at very different conclusions. I’d be curious to hear where listeners land on that question after hearing the episode.

One reason I loved Collin’s video on Thomas Jefferson and Virginia’s fight for religious freedom is because it reminds us that Americans were not merely inheriting a tidy Christian political order. They were actively trying to disentangle state power from enforced religious authority.

The “Christian nation” narrative becomes much harder to sustain once you start looking at Enlightenment thought, classical influence, religious pluralism, and Virginia’s own struggle over conscience. Early American liberty imagery drew heavily from Greece and Rome while existing within a broadly Christian culture. The Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and Madison’s arguments against religious assessments did not emerge from nowhere. They emerged from centuries of debate over authority, conscience, philosophy, and the proper relationship between religion and the state.

In many ways, that’s what makes the Renaissance relevant to this conversation.

The recovery of ancient philosophy helped reopen intellectual space. Competing traditions could once again be examined. Older assumptions could be questioned. The monopoly of a single inherited worldview became increasingly difficult to maintain.

Raphael’s School of Athens places Plato and Aristotle at the center of the ancient intellectual world. Plato points upward toward transcendent realities, eternal forms, and truths beyond the material world, while Aristotle gestures downward toward observation, experience, and the world around us. The painting captures one of the great tensions in Western thought: revelation and reason, idealism and empiricism, the eternal and the earthly. The Renaissance did not merely rediscover classical art. It reopened an entire philosophical conversation that had been unfolding for nearly two thousand years.

The Renaissance itself was, in many ways, an act of remembering. Forgotten texts resurfaced. Ancient philosophers returned to the conversation. Assumptions that had gone unquestioned for centuries were examined again.

Whether we’re talking about Plato, Plethon, Christianity, paganism, religious freedom, or the preservation of knowledge itself, the same questions keep appearing. What do we inherit from the past? What do we forget? What gets preserved, and what gets lost? And perhaps most importantly, who gets to decide?

I hope you enjoy this conversation with Collin Conkwright as much as I did. As always, I’d love to hear your thoughts, especially on our friendly disagreement about Christianity, empire, and whether those two worlds were destined to collide from the beginning or simply converged through the circumstances of history.

Until then, maintain your curiosity, embrace skepticism, and keep tuning in! 🎙️🔒


Links 🔗 

The Secret Pagan of Renaissance Platonism: Gemistos Plethon

Virginia’s Fight for Religious Freedom in Post-Revolution America

Substack Patreon Buy his new book: https://www.amazon.com/Universalist-Universal-Principles-Experiential-Religion/dp/B0GXCDPTJB

SOURCES:
Adams, John. A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America. London: C. Dilly, 1787–1788.

Buckley, Thomas J. Establishing Religious Freedom. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013.

Freneau, Philip. On the Universality and Other Attributes of the God of Nature. In Poems Written Between the Years 1768 & 1794, 395–396. Monmouth, NJ: Printed at the press of the author, 1795.

Holmes, David L. The Faiths of Our Founding Fathers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Jefferson, Thomas. Notes on the State of Virginia. Philadelphia: Prichard and Hall, 1788.

Jefferson, Thomas. The Statute for Religious Freedom. 1777–1786. Manuscript, Virginia.

Madison, James. Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. 1785. Manuscript, Virginia.

Paine, Thomas. Age of Reason. London: J. Watson, 1794–1807.

The Christian Inheritance of the West

What Christianity Absorbed, Built, and Left Behind

Listen as you read here!

People say this all the time.

That the West got its ideas about pluralism, tolerance, and liberty from Christianity. That without it, there would be no concept of human dignity, no rights, no freedom in the modern sense. And that if those things feel unstable now, the solution is simple: return to the source.

The claim that pluralism, tolerance, and liberty are direct inheritances of Christianity is not just oversimplified. It reverses the historical pattern.

In Part 1, I pushed back on the idea that Christianity “founded the West” in any clean or singular sense, or that returning to it offers an obvious path forward. In Part 2, I stepped back and looked at something more fundamental: the fragility of freedom itself. Not as an abstract ideal, but as a social order that depends on limits, restraint, and a population capable of sustaining it. More importantly, I looked at how quickly that order begins to break down when those conditions are no longer present.

Across the responses to both pieces, there was a shared sense that something is not working. Not just politically, not just culturally, but at a deeper level that is harder to name.

One way to make sense of that is to stop looking for a single cause and start looking at how the whole inheritance fits together.

Western civilization did not develop along one track. It emerged through multiple layers operating at the same time. At a minimum, those layers include institutions, culture, and psychology.

Institutions include law, political authority, and the distribution of power. Culture includes religion, tradition, identity, and shared meaning. Psychology includes the moral instincts people use to interpret the world: instincts tied to fairness, loyalty, authority, purity, harm, belonging, and threat.

For long stretches of time, those layers reinforced one another. Institutions reflected shared values. Cultural traditions gave meaning to authority. Moral instincts were channeled through forms of life that provided both order and legitimacy.

But that fit was never permanent.

When those layers begin to pull apart, the result is not merely disagreement. It is instability.

That is the backdrop for this final piece.

The goal here is not to argue that Christianity caused the West, or that it deserves credit for everything people now associate with Western civilization. It is also not to reduce Christianity to a purely destructive force. Both approaches distort the picture in different ways.

The same problem appears in the phrase “Judeo-Christian values.” This often creates the impression of a smooth and unified inheritance, when the actual history is far more fractured. Judaism and Christianity are related, but they are not interchangeable. Christianity did not simply preserve Jewish covenantal thought. It reinterpreted it, universalized it, and claimed fulfillment over it. A tradition rooted in a particular people, law, land, and covenant was recast as a universal message for all mankind.

This repositioning changed the role of religion entirely. It no longer sits alongside other domains. It began to judge them.

It loosened religion from peoplehood and place. It made belief itself the primary marker of belonging. And once belief becomes the primary boundary, disagreement takes on a different moral weight.

Today’s article will address the harder question:

What did Christianity reorganize, what did it scale, and what did it leave unstable?

Because Christianity’s real inheritance was not simply compassion, liberty, or dignity. It reshaped how belief, authority, identity, and moral obligation functioned at a civilizational level. It expanded moral language in ways that could operate across large populations, but it also introduced sharper boundaries between true and false belief, salvation and error, belonging and exclusion.

That combination, expansion on one side and constraint on the other, is where the inheritance becomes complicated.


McClees, Helen and Christine Alexander. 1933. The Daily Life of the Greeks and Romans: As Illustrated in the Classical Collections, 5th ed. pp. 131, 133, fig. 159, New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art.

SECTION I: THE GOOD
What Christianity Absorbed and Reorganized

Before getting into what Christianity actually contributed, it’s worth being clear about what is usually attributed to it.

A moral framework. Stable family structures. The unification of fragmented tribal societies into something resembling a shared civilization. A sense of cohesion strong enough to hold large populations together.

Those developments did happen. The question is where they came from…

Because none of those things begin with Christianity. They depend on something older: stability across generations, shared practices, inherited obligations, and a way of life that binds people before it explains itself.

That is what tradition is.

The word itself comes from the Latin traditio: a handing over, a passing down, something delivered across generations. But that definition only gets you so far. Tradition is not just a set of ideas preserved in texts or doctrines. It is lived. It shows up in habits, rituals, inherited gestures, seasonal rhythms, family patterns, and the quiet repetition of things people do not always stop to explain but continue to do anyway.

It exists in the structure of daily life.

You see it most clearly in how societies deal with death.

Long before Christianity became dominant in Europe, burial practices already reflected a deep sense of connection between the living and the dead. In the Stone Age, communities used mass graves in caves or pits. Later, megalithic cultures constructed communal tombs that anchored memory to specific places. Indo-European groups developed barrows and cremation practices that changed over time while preserving the same underlying logic.

The dead were not discarded. They were placed, remembered, and integrated into the ongoing life of the community.

Tradition, in that sense, is not something invented at a particular moment. It is something carried forward, shaped and reshaped over time without losing its original intention.

Christianity enters into that world rather than creating it from scratch.

What changes is not the existence of tradition, but its scale and its organizing thought.

Earlier religious life was largely tied to local identity: tribe, land, household, ancestry, city, and people. Christianity expands beyond that. It speaks in universal terms and builds a shared symbolic order that can operate across regions and populations that do not share the same lineage, gods, rituals, or customs.

That increases the reach of the moral imagination.

Concern no longer stops at the boundary of immediate belonging. It extends outward, attaching value to individuals beyond their role within a specific family, tribe, or city. Over time, that broader vision feeds into developments people now associate with the Western inheritance: ideas about dignity, education, care for the poor, moral responsibility, and obligation toward those outside one’s immediate circle.

But this is typically where the story gets oversimplified.

Those impulses did not originate with Christianity. Traditions within the Greco-Roman world had already developed forms of civic responsibility, philanthropy, patronage, public works, and mutual obligation. Grain distributions, civic benefaction, philosophical ethics, and local forms of duty were not Christian inventions.

But even the Greco-Roman world was not self-contained. It had already absorbed influences from older and neighboring civilizations (Egyptian, Mesopotamian, Anatolian, and Phoenician) through trade, conquest, and cultural exchange. As scholars like Martin L. West and Walter Burkert have shown, Greek thought itself was shaped in part by these eastern traditions.

The ancient world was not morally empty before the church arrived. It was already layered, interconnected, and carrying forward inherited forms of order, obligation, and meaning.

You can see this clearly in Stoic thought. Christianity is often treated as if it introduced universal human concern into a cruel and indifferent ancient world. Stoicism already spoke in universal terms. It could describe human beings as participants in a shared moral order and extend concern beyond tribe, city, or immediate kinship.

But the structure was different.

The bronze Equestrian Statue of Marcus Aurelius, Capitoline Hill, Rome.

Runar Thorsteinsson’s comparison of Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism helps clarify the distinction. Stoicism could speak of universal humanity without making moral belonging depend on conversion to a saving truth. Early Christianity, by contrast, carried a universal message while also drawing a sharper boundary around religious adherence. Its moral vision expanded outward, but it did so through a division between those inside and outside the saving order.

Christianity did not invent universal concern but it did reorganize it.

It took older moral instincts, philosophical ideas, Jewish inheritance, Roman scale, and local traditions, then bound them into a universal religious narrative. It gave those instincts a broader scope, a more unified story, and a more durable institutional form.

But expansion alone does not explain why a civilization holds together.

A social order lasts when it fits the way people already experience the world.

People do not move through life as detached rational observers. They respond through instinct: loyalty and betrayal, fairness and injustice, authority and rebellion, purity and contamination, belonging and threat. These instincts do not operate on their own. They cluster.

In more traditional societies, moral intuitions tend to reinforce one another. Care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and a sense of the sacred operate together rather than pulling apart. Even when people disagree, they often draw from the same underlying moral vocabulary when interpreting what is happening around them.

That shared moral vocabulary gives a society stability.

Christianity operated at that level.

It did not simply present moral rules. It gave instinct narrative form and placed it inside a larger story about meaning, suffering, hierarchy, obligation, sin, redemption, and ultimate reality. It offered a way of interpreting the world itself.

For people living in unstable conditions, where political authority could be inconsistent and survival uncertain, that kind of story organized experience. It offered coherence in a world that might otherwise feel random. It placed individuals inside a larger order and gave meaning to suffering, duty, death, and loss.

Once that fit took hold between cultural meaning, institutional power, and moral instinct, it became difficult to dislodge.

At the same time, Christianity did not remain completely closed off to innovative thought. Even within a religious order that emphasized authority and inherited truth, there were moments where that inheritance was tested from within.

Peter Abelard represents one of those moments.

His importance lies less in the drama of his life and more in the method he applied to truth itself. The intellectual world he entered was structured around inherited authority. Figures like Augustine were treated as settled voices, and the role of the student was often to understand, organize, and transmit what had already been established.


Peter Abelard with Book Giclee

Reasoning had a place, but it operated within limits. It was expected to clarify, not destabilize.

Abelard did not reject the tradition from the outside. He worked within it and exposed its internal tensions. In Sic et Non, he placed authoritative statements side by side in a way that made contradiction difficult to ignore.

If these sources were meant to provide certainty, why did they diverge so sharply?

If truth had already been handed down in a unified form, why did it fracture under comparison?

He treated those questions as a starting point rather than a threat to avoid.

“For it is from doubt that we arrive at questioning, and in questioning we arrive at truth.”

That quote represents the change in intellectual posture.

Instead of beginning with certainty and using reason to defend it, Abelard begins with tension and uses reason to work through it. Authority alone no longer settles the issue. Claims must be examined, language clarified, and assumptions tested.

Once questioning becomes legitimate, authority can no longer rely on transmission alone. It now has to also persuade.

Abelard pushed beyond accepted limits. He applied reason to doctrines often treated as beyond rational explanation and placed greater emphasis on intention in moral evaluation. In doing so, he opened space for a more nuanced understanding of ethics, one not entirely bound to inherited categories.

The response to him was what you would expect from institutional power.

He was condemned. His works were burned. He was brought before councils that were less interested in exploring his arguments and more so in containing their implications. The reaction showed what was at stake. A religious order grounded in authority does not easily absorb a method that legitimizes doubt.

And yet the method persisted.

Even when his specific conclusions were rejected, the habit of inquiry he modeled proved difficult to suppress. The practice of setting opposing views side by side and working through contradiction became central to scholasticism. The intellectual tradition that later shaped medieval universities carried forward elements of an approach once treated as dangerous.

Abelard does not stand alone as the cause of a broader intellectual reopening. The recovery of classical texts, the reintroduction of Aristotle, contact with Islamic and Jewish scholarship, and the growth of educational institutions all played a role.

What his story represents is the shift in attitude.

Inherited knowledge no longer functions as a sealed inheritance. It became something that can be examined, refined, and, within limits, challenged.

Of course, those constraints never fully disappeared.

Abelard was allowed to question, but not indefinitely. He was permitted to reason, but not without consequence. The same religious culture that made his work possible also defined where it had to stop.

That tension between authority and inquiry did not remain confined to intellectual life. It also carried forward into the institutions that developed over time.

A university lecture (an illustration from the second half of the 14th century).

The medieval university is one of the clearest places to see this pattern at work. Often treated as a distinctly Christian achievement, it grew out of a much broader mix of influences.

In Spain, Baghdad, and Cairo, Islamic schools, libraries, and observatories held resources far beyond anything available in much of Europe at the time. Arab, Jewish, and Christian scholars shared intellectual interests through expanding trade networks and translation movements. After the Christian capture of Toledo in 1085, that city became one of the key places where these worlds met, allowing texts to move across languages, traditions, and religious boundaries.

The Western reopening of inquiry did not happen because Europe simply looked inward and rediscovered itself.

It happened because knowledge traveled.

Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle, translated into Latin, became essential sources for thirteenth-century Christian intellectuals, including Thomas Aquinas. That alone should complicate any idea that Christian scholarship developed in isolation. The university absorbed, translated, debated, and reorganized knowledge that had already passed through Greek, Arabic, Jewish, and Latin traditions.

Islamic Astronomers #1 is a photograph by Science Source

Even the structure of medieval universities reflects that broader inheritance. They developed their own corporate identities, governed collectively by masters, with distinct curricula and examination systems. By the late thirteenth century, Master of Arts could vastly outnumber Master of Theology. Historian Charles Freeman notes one example where 120 teachers of the arts were listed against only 15 Masters of Theology. That imbalance tells you what mattered most. The curriculum leaned heavily on classical texts, not purely Christian foundations.

Christian Europe helped institutionalize learning, but the material being organized was older, broader, and more cosmopolitan than the church-centered story suggests. The university becomes another example of Christianity’s larger pattern: it absorbed existing goods, gave them institutional form, and placed them inside its own theological horizon.

But the results did not move in one direction.

The same religious vision that could support care and dignity could also justify hierarchy and control. Because the tradition depended on scriptural interpretation, and interpretation depended on authority, very different conclusions could emerge from the same source material.

That instability is not only a matter of later interpretation. It is already present in the texts themselves.

The Gospels do not present a single, unified account. They offer overlapping portraits that do not fully align.

In Gospel of Matthew and Gospel of Mark, Jesus cries out, “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” while in Gospel of John, he concludes, “It is finished.” The tone shifts from abandonment to completion.

The timeline shifts as well, with the Synoptic Gospels placing the final meal at Passover, while John places the crucifixion before it begins.

Even the ethical posture is not entirely consistent: in Matthew, Jesus teaches “turn the other cheek,” while in Luke, he tells his followers, “Let the one who has no sword sell his cloak and buy one.”

Taken together, these are not minor discrepancies. They open space for fundamentally different readings of what the tradition demands.

Christianity persists not as a fixed form, but as a tradition capable of producing multiple, competing forms while still claiming continuity.

This becomes especially clear in debates over slavery.

Christians were involved in abolition movements, and that history is part of the record. The language of universal moral equality played a real role in mobilizing opposition to slavery and reshaping moral expectations.

But that is not the whole story.

The same texts were also used to defend slavery, reinforce it, and argue that existing social orders were divinely sanctioned.

That contradiction is not incidental. It reveals something important about the Christian inheritance itself.

A religious order that combines universal moral language with authoritative texts creates the conditions for both expansion and constraint. It can push moral concern outward, but it can also bind that concern within approved categories. The outcome depends on who interprets the texts, which authorities prevail, and what social pressures shape the reading.

Critics of abolitionist movements, including Thomas Carlyle, argued that what they saw as abstract humanitarian concern could override more immediate obligations or practical realities. A contemporary political cartoon captured this dynamic under the phrase “telescopic philanthropy”—a tendency to focus moral concern at a distance while neglecting what is closer at hand.

The point I’m trying to make here is not that concern beyond one’s own group is inherently false or wrong.

The point is that moral expansion creates distance.

The farther a concern stretches, the easier it becomes to neglect concrete obligations close at hand: family, neighbors, local order, inherited duties, and the people one is actually responsible for. Abstract compassion can become morally flattering precisely because it asks less of the person expressing it.

Whether one agrees with those criticisms or not, they point to something very real.

A moral order that expands obligation beyond local belonging gains reach, but it also risks losing proportion. It can elevate the stranger while forgetting the neighbor. It can speak beautifully about mankind while failing the people right in front of it.

Christianity extended moral concern beyond tribe and built institutions that carried that vision forward. But it also introduced pressures around authority, interpretation, exclusion, and the limits of acceptable thought.

The good is real, but…so is the tension inside it.

Christianity’s inheritance was not simply compassion, dignity, or education. It was a moral architecture: universal in scope, institutional in form, inward in psychology, and unstable once detached from the cultural world that had once held it together.

That brings us to our next inquiry.

Not just what Christianity gave the West, but what kind of order made those outcomes possible.


SECTION II — THE BAD

Truth, Authority, and the Limits of Inquiry

At this point, the issue is not simply what happened when Christianity moved from the margins to power. I’ve explored that elsewhere: the suppression of rival systems, the narrowing of acceptable thought, and the long habit of treating competing worldviews not as alternatives to debate, but as errors to contain.

The deeper question here is more structural.

What kind of religious order produces those outcomes in the first place?

Because the shift was a reorganization of how truth operated, how disagreement was handled, and how legitimacy was defined.

Earlier Greco-Roman religious and philosophical life was not tolerant in the modern sense, but it was more comfortable with multiplicity. Rival schools, local cults, household gods, civic rituals, and philosophical traditions could coexist without requiring one totalizing creed to absorb or eliminate the rest. That did not make the ancient world peaceful or morally pure. It did mean that truth was not always treated as one fragile object that had to be protected from every rival.

The Abrahamic worldview introduced something different, often called the “Mosaic distinction.”

God giving the Tablets of the Law to Moses, from a manuscript attributed to Chrétien Legouais, 1325 CE. Image source: gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque municipal de Rouen

It drew a sharper line between true and false in a way that changed the stakes of disagreement. Belief was no longer simply one option among many. It became a dividing line. Once that line was drawn, alternative ways of seeing the world did not remain neutral. They became errors, and error began to carry drastic consequences beyond private belief.

If truth is singular and binding, then the religious order has to decide what to do with everything outside of it. Some ideas are absorbed. Some are tolerated for a time. Others are pushed out entirely. But none of them sit comfortably alongside it anymore. They exist in tension with the claim that one truth must govern above all others.

As we previously discussed, Christianity is often credited with preserving learning and building universities, and that claim is not false. Medieval universities became important institutions for intellectual training, debate, law, theology, medicine, and philosophy. They helped organize knowledge and gave scholastic inquiry a durable form.

But that achievement has to be kept in proportion.

The medieval university was an achievement, but it was not a recovery of classical freedom. It was classical inheritance under theological supervision.

Ancient philosophy could be studied, but it had to be reconciled with Christian doctrine. Aristotle could return, but not as Aristotle alone. He had to be interpreted through Christian categories, corrected where necessary, and placed beneath revealed truth. Reason was permitted, even sharpened, but it was not sovereign.

The medieval university did not represent inquiry on open ground. It represented inquiry inside boundaries. Reason could clarify doctrine, defend doctrine, organize doctrine, and reconcile contradictions within inherited authorities. But when reason pressed too far against the architecture of belief, the limits became quite visible.

That does not make medieval learning worthless. It makes it conditional.

And that conditionality is the point.

Christian Europe did not simply preserve the classical world. It received it, edited it, baptized it, and constrained it. What could be made useful to the Christian order survived more easily. What threatened that order did not.

This is the kind of intellectual narrowing later critics would recognize in Christianity’s relationship to philosophy. Heidegger’s critique of onto-theology is not aimed at Christianity alone, but it helps name the pattern: open-ended questioning becomes absorbed into a prior explanatory order. Instead of wonder remaining primary, inquiry is routed through established claims about creation, causality, divine order, sin, and salvation.

The question is no longer allowed to remain fully open.

It has to be answered inside the architecture of doctrine.

Once orthodoxy is established it operates within boundaries that have already been set, and stepping outside those boundaries starts to carry not just intellectual consequences, but social ones. Access to authority, education, and influence becomes tied, at least in part, to alignment.

At that point, belief is no longer just something people hold. It becomes something that moves outward, seeking to correct and expand.


SECTION III: THE UGLY

Universalism, Power, and the Moral Afterlife

By the time you reach the modern West, the question is no longer whether Christianity shaped it. That much is obvious. The deeper issue is what, exactly, it left behind, and what happens when the conditions that once sustained that inheritance begin to unravel.

Christianity did not simply introduce a set of beliefs and then fade as those beliefs weakened. It reorganized moral life at a level that persists long after doctrine loses its authority. It changed how individuals understood themselves, how they related to others, where moral responsibility resided, and how truth was expected to move through the world.

The ugly side of the Christian inheritance is not merely universalism. It is universalism with a missionary engine.

Christianity does not simply say, “This is true.” It says truth must be spread. Error must be corrected. The world must be brought into submission to the saving order. That structure changes the meaning of difference. A rival worldview is not merely foreign, local, or ancestral. It becomes spiritually demonic.

And once a difference becomes an error, correction can be justified as mercy.

The religious world Christianity emerges from was already in tension with the surrounding Greek and Roman order. Second Temple Judaism didn’t simply blend into Hellenistic life. Again and again, it resisted it—politically, culturally, religiously.

D. H. Lawrence saw this tendency clearly. In Apocalypse, he describes a fear-driven impulse within Christianity—a refusal to leave other ways of understanding the world intact. Not just disagreement, but the drive to overcome, absorb, or eliminate what stands outside the truth.

That instinct is already embedded in the apocalyptic world Christianity emerges from. Second Temple Judaism carries expectations of final judgment, cosmic conflict, and the ultimate victory of a single, rightful order-the coming of the Moshiach/Messiah.) Christianity inherits that framework and gives it a wider reach.

That is where Christianity’s relationship to Rome becomes essential. Christian universalism did not spread on its own. It moved through the late imperial Roman systems: roads, cities, law, administration, literacy, political centralization, and habits of governance already trained toward scale. The faith did not merely conquer Rome. It also inherited Rome’s machinery.

Rome gave Christianity infrastructure. Christianity gave Rome a sacred moral horizon. Together, they helped produce a form of power that could move across peoples, lands, languages, and customs while claiming to operate in the name of truth rather than mere domination.

This is also why Christianity receives too much credit for goods it did not invent.

One reason it’s treated as the source of Western morality is that it became dominant enough to absorb older goods and narrate them backward as Christian achievements. Care for the poor, philosophical inquiry, civic duty, moral discipline, education, and concern for the common good did not appear out of nowhere when Christianity entered history. Many of these were already present in Greek, Roman, Jewish, and local European worlds. Christianity reorganized them inside its own story.

That reorganization gave them reach.

But it also gave them a new master narrative.

Older traditions were often embedded in particular peoples, places, households, ancestors, cities, gods, calendars, and sacred landscapes. Religion was not just a private belief system. It was woven into the life of a people. Christianity altered that relationship by making belief portable. It could cross borders, override local cults, and create a community defined less by blood, land, or inherited custom than by shared confession.

That is one of the most consequential shifts in Western history.

Christianity weakened the older link between people, place, ancestors, and gods. It did not erase those attachments overnight, and in practice it often absorbed local festivals, sacred sites, and folk customs. But the deeper logic changed. The highest belonging was no longer rooted primarily in the local or ancestral. It was relocated into a universal religious identity.

Conversion, then, was not merely persuasion. It was the remaking of belonging.

A people could be separated from their gods, their rituals, their inherited calendar, their sacred places, and their ancestral memory, then folded into a new universal story that claimed to redeem them while also replacing the world that formed them.

Not every conversion was violent. That would be too simple. Some conversions were gradual, political, strategic, sincere, blended, or partial. But once that universal truth claim became tied to salvation, rival traditions do not remain equal neighbors. They become obstacles to be overcome, errors to be corrected, or remnants to be absorbed.

The First Crusade: Pope Urban II and Jerusalem vs. Diplomatic Unification

The crusades make this structure visible in its most explicit and militarized form.

They were not only political wars. They were religious wars shaped by sacred geography, penitential promise, and the belief that violence could be folded into a redemptive order.

The Crusades did not simply mobilize Europe—they redirected it toward Jerusalem, a sacred center that was not its own.

That does not mean every participant had the same motive, and it does not mean politics, land, wealth, status, and military ambition were irrelevant. Of course they mattered. But the crusading imagination reveals something specific: once warfare is placed inside a sacred story, conquest can be interpreted as obedience, purification, defense, or salvation.

That is the danger of missionary structure joined to power.

It sanctifies expansion.

And this is not confined to medieval history. The same basic pattern can reappear whenever politics inherits religious moral intensity. The opponent is no longer merely wrong about policy. He becomes a threat to truth, justice, salvation, progress, safety, democracy, equality, or whatever sacred term now carries the old theological weight.

At that point, disagreement becomes harder to contain.

The modern West inherited this moral intensity even as explicit Christian authority declined. Most people inherited a world in which Christianity had already begun to lose its grip, but nothing fully replaced it. The rituals became optional. The authority fractured. Yet many of the underlying assumptions remained intact.

What had once been explicitly theological was gradually translated into secular terms.

At the center of that structure is a form of universalism Christianity helped entrench: the idea that all people stand beneath one moral order, that identity is secondary to a broader human category, and that truth applies universally rather than locally. That assumption did not disappear with religious decline. It migrated.

Liberalism, in many of its modern forms, carries that template forward: the individual abstracted from place, lineage, inherited duty, and thick communal belonging, then positioned inside a universal framework of rights, equality, and moral expectation.

The language changes. The structure does not.

The West moved from Christian universalism to liberal universalism without seriously interrogating the universalism itself. It replaced theological justification with philosophical or political justification, but it retained the assumption that the highest moral order transcends particular identities rather than emerging from them.

And what carries forward is not only universal morality, but missionary mentality.

Salvation becomes progress. Sin becomes injustice. Heresy becomes hate. Evangelism becomes activism. The world must still be corrected. The morally backward must still be brought into line.

And the irony is hard to miss. The same people who pride themselves on rejecting religious dogma often reproduce its structure almost perfectly—moral certainty, heresy-hunting, and the impulse to correct and convert, just without calling it religion.

You can see this most clearly in the modern left, especially in its activist and radical edges. What presents itself as political theory often behaves like secularized salvation mythology. The infrastructure is unchanged: the world is broken and the masses need liberation. God is removed, but everything else remains. The heretics still need correction. Sin becomes hierarchy. Salvation becomes self-rule. The missionary doesn’t disappear—he just changes form.

It still sorts people into the righteous and the condemned. It still creates moral taboos. It still treats disagreement as contamination. It still imagines that the world can be redeemed if only the right moral order is imposed—with enough force, shame, education, policy, or institutional pressure.

That is not the absence of Christianity.

It is part of its afterlife.

Later European expansion, and even modern geopolitical projects, often operate within the same structure—intervention framed as liberation, reform, or progress.

Whenever universal moral claims are aligned with power and tied to the belief that truth must spread, action begins to feel necessary rather than optional.

To understand why it persists, and why it adapts so easily across different historical contexts, you have to look at what is happening at a deeper level. Not just in institutions or empires, but within the individual.

Because the most enduring change Christianity introduces is not only institutional.

It is psychological. It altered where morality is located.

In earlier classical traditions, especially in Aristotle, the moral life is oriented outward. The Greek conception of eudaimonia assumes that human beings can develop toward excellence. Flourishing is cultivated through practice, discipline, rational activity, and participation in the world. Character is formed through what one does, and the moral life is outward, embodied, and lived over time within a shared civic and social context.

Christianity, especially through Augustine of Hippo, redirects that focus inward.

The problem is no longer simply what a person does, but what a person is. Human nature itself becomes suspect, marked from the beginning. The doctrine of original sin reframes the individual not as someone developing toward excellence, but as someone starting already compromised. This is not just about isolated wrongdoing. It is about a baseline disorder built into human existence, transmitted across generations, shaping inclination before any conscious choice is made.

From that premise, morality reorganizes itself accordingly. If the problem lies within, then moral evaluation cannot remain limited to outward behavior. It extends inward, into thought, desire, intention, and impulse—the parts of life no one else sees but are still treated as morally significant.

Fra Angelico, The Conversion of St. Augustine (c. 14301435)

This becomes structured into daily practice. Monastic traditions classify internal states (temptation, pride, doubt, desire) as if they were items that could be named, tracked, and corrected. Authority expands beyond regulating behavior into defining what counts as acceptable thought, shaping not just action but the boundaries of the inner life itself.

Once it relocates inward, the primary site of regulation is no longer only the community. It is the individual mind, where conscience, guilt, confession, fear, and self-regulation operate continuously, often without any visible external enforcement.

You can see the implications of this in the conflict between Augustine and Pelagius. Pelagius emphasizes human capacity: the ability to choose, improve, and take responsibility for moral development. Augustine rejects that position, insisting on dependence—on God’s grace, on divine intervention, on something beyond human effort.

This is not only a theological disagreement.

It is also a question about agency.

If the individual cannot fully rely on their own capacity to move toward the good, then moral development becomes entangled with God’s authority. Responsibility does not disappear, but it no longer stands on its own. It becomes mediated, conditioned, and in some cases limited, as the individual is situated within a framework that places ultimate transformation outside of purely human reach.

Over time, that tension begins to shape intellectual life as well. Historians like Charles Freeman do not argue that inquiry simply disappeared, but that the conditions surrounding it changed. When belief becomes tied to salvation, and when error carries not only intellectual but spiritual consequences, curiosity itself begins to look different. Questions are no longer neutral exercises. They take on moral weight, and in certain contexts, they begin to carry risk.

Writers like Thomas Paine noticed this and pushed directly against the idea that truth can rest on inherited authority. In The Age of Reason, Paine argues that revelation, once it passes through human hands, can no longer function as unquestionable truth. What begins as divine claim becomes human interpretation, and therefore something that must be examined rather than simply accepted. That move cuts directly against the structure that treats questioning as risk. It reopens the possibility that belief itself should be subject to the same scrutiny as anything else.

Mark A. Noll describes a similar pattern in later Christian intellectual culture: a tendency to preserve belief rather than extend it. Questioning is not always welcomed as curiosity. It can be interpreted as disloyalty, a sign that alignment is weakening rather than deepening. The safest position, in that environment, becomes one of conformity rather than exploration.

The obedient mind is the secure mind.

This is not new. It is already visible earlier in the tradition. The same system that could produce figures like Abelard (where questioning began to reopen) also produces the conditions Noll is describing, where belief becomes something to preserve rather than extend.

The instinct to monitor thought, to moralize disagreement, to treat deviation as more than error—those habits do not emerge in a vacuum. They develop within specific historical conditions, and they persist even as the surrounding language changes.

This is why the internal reorganization matters.

It is not only about doctrine.

It is about how individuals learn to relate to themselves.

If Augustine relocates morality inward, Protestantism amplifies and personalizes that shift. The individual is placed in more direct relation to truth, expected to read, interpret, examine, and align himself without the same mediating structures that once guided that process. Authority does not vanish. It becomes more diffuse and more demanding.

The church hierarchy may weaken in some places, but new pressures emerge through scripture, sermon, household discipline, community surveillance, literacy, and conscience. The individual is made more responsible before God, but also more exposed.

The burden of interpretation moves further into the self.

Over time, that inward structure detaches from the communal and cultural worlds that once gave it shape. What remains is a society of individuals expected to interpret, justify, and regulate themselves inside a universal moral order, but without a shared culture capable of holding that process together.

That misalignment becomes visible in how people interpret conflict, identity, history, and political life.

In modern America, this can still be seen in forms of biblical literalism, dispensationalism, and end-times prophecy that shape how many Christians understand Israel, war, nationhood, and world events. These beliefs do not remain private. They influence political imagination. They affect how people interpret history, alliances, enemies, and what they believe is inevitable or divinely sanctioned.

In this context, belief stops being just belief. It starts shaping how everything else is seen.

That is the same mechanism operating in another key. The pattern that once defined orthodoxy and constrained variation does not disappear. It adapts as the cultural environment shifts. The language evolves, but the underlying habit remains… truth is singular, error is dangerous, and those outside the moral order must be corrected, converted, contained, or cast out.

What this reveals is not a simple story of progress or decline.

Christianity did not leave behind a stable moral foundation that the West either followed or abandoned. It left behind a set of interacting pressures: universalism and particular identity, internalized morality and external authority, individual responsibility and collective order, compassion and conquest, salvation and exclusion.

For a time, those pressures could be held in relative balance, but this fit no longer holds.

The institutions remain, but they no longer command the same trust. The moral instincts remain, but they are no longer guided by a shared tradition. The universal language remains, but it floats above increasingly fractured peoples, places, and loyalties.

Conflict becomes more moralized. Disagreement becomes harder to contain.

This is why the modern West feels both thin and volatile.

Thin, because inherited forms of continuity have weakened.

Volatile, because the moral pressure embedded in the inheritance remains, now operating without the older structures that once gave it proportion.

That is the condition the modern West has inherited.


CONCLUSION: Why the West Still Cannot Escape the Problem

The Christian inheritance of the West cannot be reduced to either gratitude or resentment.

It gave moral concern, meaning to suffering, durable institutions, and the preservation and transmission of knowledge, even as that knowledge was filtered through doctrine. It created a shared moral vocabulary capable of binding large populations together.

But it also changed the terms of belonging.

It loosened religion from peoplehood, place, ancestry, and local custom. It made belief portable. It turned truth into something singular and binding, making disagreement morally charged. Once rival traditions became errors rather than neighbors, the pressure to absorb, correct, or suppress them followed naturally.

The West did not abandon Christianity so much as carry its habits forward. The missionary impulse remained. The abstract individual remained. The suspicion of rooted identity remained. Social Justice became their new end times.

That is why a return to Christianity does not solve the problem. It would not restore a stable foundation but reassert one layer of the inheritance while leaving its tensions unresolved.

Secular liberalism does not solve it either. It often preserves the universalism while stripping away the cultural limits that once gave it proportion, asking people to live as abstract individuals inside a moral framework detached from place, memory, and inherited obligation.

What remains is not a coherent worldview, but a contradictory one.

From the beginning, the inheritance carried competing impulses. Early Christianity emerged from an apocalyptic environment while also developing moral and institutional frameworks for life within the world. Over time, those tensions were not resolved but reworked and emphasized in different ways.

Within Protestantism alone, some strands treated the world as something to be ordered and reformed, energizing movements like abolition, while others emphasized its corruption and eventual end, orienting life toward endurance and escape. The divergence is not a break from the tradition, but a difference in emphasis within it.

The result is a system that can point in opposite directions while still claiming the same foundation.

This is not a foundation a civilization can stand on.

A civilization needs moral scale, but also proportion. Compassion, but not so abstract that it forgets its own people. Rights, but not detached from duty. Inquiry, but not subordinated to sacred certainty. Space for disagreement, but enough shared identity to keep it from becoming civilizational warfare.

Above all, it needs rooted obligations.

A civilization cannot survive on abstract principles alone. It needs loyalty, shared memory, boundaries, place, and a people capable of recognizing what is theirs to preserve.

Because removing structure does not remove power. It removes the forms that make power visible and accountable. And when that happens, power does not disappear. It shifts—into forms that are harder to see and harder to resist.

We are not standing outside this inheritance.

We are still working within it.

And the task is not to romanticize Christianity, completely demonize it, or pretend we have escaped it, but to understand what it absorbed, what it built, what it destabilized, and what it left behind clearly enough to stop repeating its most destructive patterns.


Sources

Abelard, Peter. Sic et Non.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics.

Aristotle. Politics.

Arktos Journal and Laurent Guyénot, The Crusading Civilisation: From the Middle Ages to the Middle East” (Substack, April 3, 2026).

Atkinson, Kenneth. “Judean Piracy, Judea and Parthia, and the Roman Annexation of Judea: The Evidence of Pompeius Trogus.” Electrum 29 (2022): 127–145. https://doi.org/10.4467/20800909EL.22.009.15779

Augustine. Confessions.

Augustine. The City of God.

Brown, Peter. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000

Burkert, Walter. The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Carlyle, Thomas. “Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question.”

Doner, Colonel V. “Cognitive Dissonance of Political Activists, Or Whatever Happened to the Religious Right?” Chalcedon, July 1, 1999.

Freeman, Charles. The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason. London: Heinemann, 2002.

Freeman, Charles. The Reopening of the Western Mind: The Resurgence of Intellectual Life from the End of Antiquity to the Dawn of the Enlightenment. London: Head of Zeus, 2023.

Lawrence, D. H. Apocalypse. 1931.

Locke, John. A Letter Concerning Toleration. 1689.

MacCulloch, Diarmaid. Reformation: Europe’s House Divided, 1490–1700. London: Allen Lane, 2003.

MacMhaolain, Aodhan. The Transmission of Fire: How To Keep Tradition Burning. The Enchiridion, April 9, 2026.

Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat. The Spirit of the Laws. 1748.

Noll, Mark A. The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994.

Paine, Thomas. The Age of Reason. 1794–1807.

Paine, Thomas. Common Sense. 1776.

Thorsteinsson, Runar M. Roman Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparative Study of Ancient Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

West, Martin L. The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

The Fragility of Freedom

What Liberty Actually Depends On

Hey hey, welcome back to Taste of Truth Tuesdays. Today’s episode is where we dig into philosophy, culture, history, and the ideas that have shaped the world we’re living in—everything from classical texts to the American founding documents that are still very much relevant to how we should think about freedom today.

Listen here:

There’s a growing sense that something isn’t working.

You see it in the fragmentation of identity, the erosion of shared norms, and the breakdown of trust across institutions.

You don’t have to look very hard to notice it.

People don’t trust elections, medicine, or the media—sometimes all at once, and often for completely different reasons.

Dating is “freer” than it’s ever been, and yet it feels more unstable, more transactional, and more confusing than most people expected.

Corporations speak like moral authorities, issuing statements about justice and truth, while operating through incentives that have nothing to do with either.

Everything is still functioning. But less of it feels legitimate.

In my last piece, I traced one part of this problem back to a common assumption, that Christianity built the foundations of the West. But when you actually follow the development of those ideas, much of what we associate with Western thought—natural law, reason, and the structure of political life—has deeper roots in the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition.

That matters, because the frameworks we inherit shape what we think freedom is, and what we expect it to do.

This piece is a continuation of that question. Not only about where those ideas came from, but about what they require to hold together.

Because a free society doesn’t sustain itself on freedom alone. It depends on discipline, restraint, and a shared understanding of limits—conditions that the system itself cannot produce.

And when those begin to erode, the system doesn’t just break. It follows a pattern that’s been observed for a very long time.

Jefferson intentionally designed the Virginia Capitol in Richmond directly after the Roman temple Maison Carrée~16 CE

I. The Fear Beneath the Founding

This isn’t a new problem.

The relationship between freedom and instability shows up wherever societies try to govern themselves.

The American founding emerged out of that concern. The people designing the system weren’t just thinking about how to create liberty, they were trying to understand why it collapses.

The colonists weren’t casually referencing Rome. English translations of Vertot’s Revolutions that Happened in the Government of the Roman Republic (1720) were in almost every library, private or institutional, in British North America. They studied how free societies decay, how power shifts from shared trust into something self-serving, and how internal corruption (not just external threat) brings systems down.

They believed they were watching it happen in real time.

What they took from antiquity was not blind optimism about freedom, but caution.

And this wasn’t limited to classical history. As Bernard Bailyn observed, the colonists were immersed in dense and serious political literature, shaped by philosophy, and sustained reflection on the problem of power.

Part of what they were working with was an older line of thought running through Greek and Roman philosophy.

The idea that human life is not directionless. That there are patterns to how people live, and that some ways of living lead to stability and flourishing, while others lead to breakdown.

You can already see the foundation of this in Aristotle. He didn’t use the term “natural law,” but the structure is there. Human beings have a nature, and flourishing comes from living in alignment with it—not whatever we happen to want in the moment, but a way of life shaped by discipline, balance, and the cultivation of virtue over time.

The Stoics make this more explicit. They describe the world as ordered by reason—logos—and argue that human beings can come to understand that order.

From that perspective, moral truth isn’t something we invent. It’s something we discover. And law, at its best, should reflect that underlying structure rather than contradict it.

By the time you get to Rome, this idea is articulated more directly. Cicero describes a true law grounded in right reason and in agreement with nature—something universal, not dependent on custom or preference, but rooted in reality itself.

These ideas don’t disappear. They are carried forward and developed.

Christian thinkers later absorb and expand them, especially through Thomas Aquinas, who integrates Greek philosophy and Roman legal thought into a more explicit framework of natural law. And that influence is real. It’s part of the Western story whether we like it or not.

But that’s not the point of this piece.

What matters here is that by the time you reach the early modern period, this idea of a structured moral order—something that places limits on behavior and grounds freedom in discipline—is already well established.

You can see that continuity clearly in how the Founders and colonists read earlier political thought. Returning to those earlier sources, Plato describes how political systems degrade over time, arguing that excessive and undisciplined freedom can produce disorder, which eventually leads people to accept tyranny in the search for stability. Aristotle traces how democracies collapse when law gives way to persuasion and personality. Polybius maps the recurring cycle through which governments rise and decay.

What he described was called anacyclosis, a recurring cycle of political systems. Governments begin in relatively stable forms, rule by one, by a few, or by many, but over time they degrade. Kingship becomes tyranny. Aristocracy becomes oligarchy. Democracy, when it loses discipline, collapses into what he called ochlocracy, rule by the mob.

This wasn’t abstract to the colonists, like I said,  they believed they were watching this pattern unfold in real time. And it shows up just as clearly in the political language of the founding era itself.


As Bailyn explains, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy were each seen as capable of producing human happiness. But left unchecked, each would inevitably collapse into its corrupt form: tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule.


Writings like Cato’s Letters were widely read in the colonies and helped shape how ordinary people understood government, power, and liberty.

What’s striking when you read Cato more closely is how little confidence they placed in moral restraint alone. It doesn’t describe freedom as unlimited expression or personal autonomy. The idea that belief, fear of God, or good intentions would keep power in check is treated as dangerously naive. Power is not self-regulating, and it is not made safe by the character or beliefs of those who hold it. It has to be exposed, limited, and actively resisted—because even institutions and ideas meant to restrain it, including religion, can be repurposed to justify its expansion.

It describes government more as a trust—one that exists to protect the conditions that make ordinary life possible.

As Cato writes:

“Power is like fire; it warms, it burns, it destroys. It is a dangerous servant and a fearful master”

And more directly:

“What is government, but a trust committed…that everyone may, with the more security, attend upon his own?”

The assumption is clear. Power must be restrained. Freedom depends on it.

But in Cato’s framing, that restraint doesn’t come from structure alone. It depends on constant exposure and resistance. Freedom of speech and a free press aren’t treated as abstract rights, but as active safeguards—tools for uncovering corruption and preventing power from consolidating unchecked. The logic is simple but demanding: power does not correct itself. It expands, protects its own interests, and, if left unchallenged, begins to operate beyond the limits it was given.

The point of understanding the political cycles of revolution wasn’t to say that any one system was uniquely flawed. It was that all systems are vulnerable to the same underlying problem:

Human nature.

Self-interest eventually creeps in. Restraint erodes. Power shifts from a trust into something personal and extractive.

And once that shift happens, the form of government matters less than the character of the people within it. That thread runs directly into the founding.

The American system wasn’t designed as a pure democracy. It was an attempt to stabilize a problem earlier thinkers had already identified.

Rather than choosing a single form of government, the founders built a mixed system, blending elements of rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by many. An executive to act with decisiveness. A Senate to provide deliberation and continuity. A House to represent the people more directly.

This wasn’t accidental.

It reflected an awareness that each form of government carries its own risks, and that concentrating power in any one place tends to accelerate its corruption.

By distributing power across different institutions, the goal was to create tension within the system itself. Ambition would check ambition. Competing interests would slow the consolidation of power.

From my understanding, they weren’t trying to escape the cycle Polybius described. They were trying to manage it.

They weren’t designing a perfect system. They were attempting to design one built to withstand imperfect people.

But even that depended on something it could not guarantee.

In Federalist No. 10, James Madison writes:

“The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man.”

He’s not describing a temporary problem. He’s describing a permanent one.

Differences in opinion, interests, wealth, and temperament don’t disappear. They organize. They form groups. And those groups will sometimes pursue aims that are at odds with the rights of others or the stability of the system itself.

Madison’s conclusion is straightforward:

“The causes of faction cannot be removed… relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”

That distinction is crucial. He doesn’t try to eliminate conflict or force unity. He assumes conflict is inevitable and builds a system around that reality.

Instead of requiring perfect discipline from individuals, the structure disperses power, multiplies interests, and forces negotiation. Representation slows decision-making. Scale makes domination more difficult.

Freedom is preserved not by removing conflict, but by structuring it.


They looked ahead with anxiety, not confidence. Because they believed liberty was collapsing everywhere. New tyrannies had spread like plagues. The world had become, in their words, “a slaughterhouse.” Across the globe:  Rulers of the East were almost universally absolute tyrants…Africa was described as scenes of tyranny, barbarism, confusion and violence. France ruled by arbitrary authority. Prussia under absolute government. Sweden and Denmark had “sold their liberties.” Rome burdened by civil and religious control. Germany is a hundred-headed hydra. Poland consumed by chaos. Only Britain (and the colonies) were believed to still hold onto liberty. And even there… barely. From revolutionary-era political writings, as compiled by Bernard Bailyn


University of Virginia Rotunda-Modeled after the Roman Pantheon

II. Ordered Liberty and the Kind of Person It Requires

The founders believed in liberty, but not as an unlimited good. They believed in ordered liberty. Freedom that exists within a framework of responsibility, discipline, and civic virtue. The system they designed assumed a certain kind of person, one capable of self-governance, restraint, and participation in a shared moral world.

That assumption was not optional. It was structural. It’s easy to miss how much is built into that.

And this is where the modern tension and the current understanding of freedom begins to diverge from its origins.

Classical Liberalism, in its earlier form, was not about as Deneen states in Why Liberalism Failed, detaching individuals from all institutions, identities, or relationships. But it was about protecting individuals from tyranny while preserving the conditions necessary for a functioning society. It assumed the continued existence of family, community, religious frameworks, and shared norms.

But where Deneen is right, early liberal thought did introduce something new. 

John Locke, for example, reframed institutions like marriage as voluntary associations rather than fixed, inherited structures. That didn’t mean early liberal political philosophy was designed to erode the family. But it did change how those institutions were understood. It placed individual choice alongside social stability in a way that could be expanded over time.

To understand where this expansion comes from, you have to look at what came before it


Without freedom of thought, there can be no such thing as wisdom; and no such thing as publick liberty, without freedom of speech: Which is the right of every man, as far as by it he does not hurt and control the right of another; and this is the only check which it ought to suffer, the only bounds which it ought to know. Cato’s letters No.15


III. The Moral Inheritance of the West

The Lia Fail Inauguration Stone on the Hill of Tara in County Meath Ireland

In many pre-Christian societies, moral life wasn’t organized primarily around abstract rules or universal doctrines, but around continuity. Identity was tied to lineage, family, and inherited roles. Authority came not from individual preference, but from what had been passed down—customs, obligations, and expectations shaped over generations. To live well wasn’t just a personal project. It meant upholding something larger than yourself: maintaining the reputation of your family, fulfilling your role within a community, and carrying forward a way of life that you didn’t create but were responsible for preserving.

You can see how this played out in places like Anglo-Saxon England, where social structure and legal life were more embedded in family and local custom than in centralized doctrine. Women, for example, could own property, inherit land, appear in legal proceedings, and in some cases exercise real economic and political influence. These weren’t modern equality frameworks, but they complicate the assumption that agency and rights only emerge through later “progress.”

That structure did more than organize society. It created cohesion. It gave people a shared reference point for what mattered, what was expected, and what should be restrained—even when no one was watching. Authority wasn’t something constantly renegotiated. It was inherited, lived, and reinforced through participation in a shared way of life.

Greek and Roman life was also structured around civic duty, hierarchy, and inherited roles.

Their moral frameworks reflected that structure. Thinkers like Aristotle emphasized virtue as balance, habits cultivated over time within a community, oriented toward harmony and the common good.

As Christianity spread, moral authority became less tied to lineage and local custom, and more anchored in universal doctrine—rules that applied across communities, not just within them. Obligation didn’t vanish, but it was increasingly reframed. Less about inherited roles within a specific people, more about the individual’s relationship to a broader moral order.

That shift didn’t happen all at once, and it’s not a simple story. The development of early Christianity, its integration into the Roman Empire, and the ways it reshaped intellectual life and authority are far more complex than a few paragraphs can capture here. I’ve gone into that in more detail elsewhere, particularly around the Constantinian period and the rise of revelation and fall of reason.

This development intensifies further with the rise of Protestantism, where that reframing of obligation becomes even more explicit.The movement from the Seven Deadly Sins to the Ten Commandments as a dominant moral framework.

Avarice (Avaritia), from “The Seven Deadly Sins”
Pieter van der Heyden Netherlandish
After Pieter Bruegel the Elder Netherlandish
Publisher Hieronymus Cock Netherlandish
1558

The Seven Deadly Sins, pride, greed, lust, envy, gluttony, wrath, and sloth, are not rules in the strict sense. They describe internal dispositions, patterns of character that distort judgment and pull a person out of balance. They are concerned with formation, with who you are becoming.

The Ten Commandments, by contrast, are structured as prohibitions. You shall not. They define boundaries, obedience, and transgression in relation to divine authority.

Both frameworks aim at moral order. But they operate differently. One is oriented toward the cultivation of character within a shared moral world. The other emphasizes compliance, law, and accountability before God.

The Protestant Reformation further reduced the role of mediating institutions, emphasizing personal conscience, direct access to scripture, and an individual relationship to truth. Authority became less external and more internalized, but also more individualized and less uniformly shared.

The emphasis is unmistakable. Moral responsibility is no longer primarily inherited or communal, but individual and direct.

This did not dissolve the community. But it did begin to relocate the moral center of gravity, from the maintenance of balance within a community, to the accountability of the individual before God.

A political system built on individual rights and self-governance emerged from a cultural framework that had already begun to center moral responsibility at the level of the individual.

At the same time, Christianity reshaped how the natural world was understood. Earlier traditions often treated nature as infused with meaning, order, or even divinity. Christianity maintained that the world was ordered, but no longer sacred in itself. It was created, not divine.

That distinction introduced a kind of distance. A world that is no longer sacred in itself becomes, over time, easier to treat as something external, something to study, measure, and ultimately use.

None of these shifts were inherently destabilizing on their own. But they altered the underlying framework.

Over time, they contributed to a gradual reorientation, one that made it easier to conceive of the individual as separate, autonomous, and capable of standing apart from inherited structures.

That development would later be expanded and amplified through liberal thought.

But the point is not that Protestant Christianity caused modern individualism. It is that it helped make it thinkable.

By the time you reach the Enlightenment and the American founding, those earlier shifts had not disappeared. They had been carried forward and reworked into a new framework—one increasingly shaped by reason, not as a rejection of religion entirely, but as a refusal to let authority go unquestioned simply because it claims moral or divine legitimacy.


The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions… (and) when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

-John Locke on the rights to life, liberty, and property of ourselves and others


IV. When Freedom Loses Its Structure

Over the next two centuries, that framework continued to expand. Early expansions focused on political participation—who could vote, who counted as a citizen, and who could take part in public life.

By the mid-20th century, that expansion accelerated through civil rights movements, which pushed the language of equality and access further into law, culture, and institutions.

In the 1960s into the 1970s, the focus widened into personal life. Questions of family, marriage, sexuality, and individual identity were increasingly reframed in terms of autonomy and personal choice.

The sexual revolution, in particular, was widely understood as an expansion of personal freedom: loosening traditional constraints around sex, marriage, and family life. But over time, some of the assumptions underlying that shift have come under renewed scrutiny. The idea that women can navigate complete sexual and relational autonomy without significant cost appears increasingly fragile, especially in the absence of the social structures that once provided stability and direction.

Expanding rights changes the system, not just access to it.

What’s often assumed is that this expansion is self-justifying—that extending rights is always a net good, and that the system can absorb that expansion without consequence. But that assumption is rarely examined.

As the scope of participation widens, so does the demand placed on the system and on the people within it.

A political system built on equal participation assumes a level of judgment, responsibility, and long-term thinking that is not evenly distributed. It assumes that individuals, given more freedom, will be able to navigate it without undermining the conditions that make it possible in the first place.

What we also see in modern times is the cultural and institutional structures that once shaped behavior—family expectations, community standards, shared moral frameworks have become much weaker, more contested, or easier to reject.

For most of known human history, moral behavior wasn’t just a matter of personal conviction. It was embedded in small, stable, reputation-based communities where actions were visible, remembered, and judged over time. Behavior carried consequences because it was tied to relationships that endured.

That community system relied on three conditions: shared standards, stable enforcement, and long-term relationships. As those weaken, accountability becomes less consistent or non existent. Not because human nature has changed, but because the structures that made behavior visible and tied to consequences have broken down.

Part of that shift is tied to the broader move toward secularism. As religious frameworks lose authority, the shared narratives that once provided cohesion, meaning, and moral orientation begin to fragment. This doesn’t eliminate the human need for structure—it shifts where people look for it. It disperses into competing sources of identity, morality, and meaning.

In The Republic, Plato makes a similar observation about belief itself. What matters is not just what people claim to believe, but whether those beliefs hold under pressure. “We must test them… to see whether they will hold to their convictions when they are subjected to fear, pleasure, or pain.”

Without shared structures reinforcing those convictions, belief becomes more reactive, more situational, and more easily reshaped by external forces.

We are left with a society of multiple, incompatible systems of belief—each with its own values, demands, and claims to legitimacy, but no widely accepted structure holding them together. 

What was once a shared moral world becomes a contested one.

In Propaganda, Edward Bernays makes a blunt observation: the conscious and intelligent manipulation of the masses is not only possible, but essential to managing modern society. That insight becomes more relevant, not less, in the absence of a shared framework.

Because when a society loses the unifying structures that once held it together, the vacuum doesn’t stay empty. New ideologies rush in (secular, political, cultural) offering belonging, morality, and meaning, often with more intensity than the systems they replaced.

More autonomy. Less formation. More fragmentation. Less agreement on what freedom even demands.

This raises a harder question: whether removing earlier constraints produced the kind of freedom it promised, or simply replaced one set of pressures with another.

As that imbalance deepens, people don’t simply become more independent. They look for stability elsewhere.

This is where Deneen’s observation becomes useful, even if I don’t fully agree with his framing. As traditional institutions weaken, dependence doesn’t disappear—it shifts. From local, relational structures to larger, more abstract systems like the state and the market.

Another way to see this is that societies don’t just rely on formal institutions. They rely on something less visible—a kind of cultural immune system. Shared norms, expectations, and informal boundaries that regulate behavior without constant enforcement.

When those weaken, systems don’t become freer. They become easier to exploit.

One of the clearest examples of that vulnerability is the modern corporation.

The American system was designed in deep suspicion of concentrated power, yet over time it has extended expansive protections to corporate entities, allowing large institutions, backed by wealth, media, and legal abstraction, to shape public life in ways the founding framework was poorly equipped to restrain. 

The founders were wary of concentrated power, but they were not designing a system for multinational corporations with vast economic and informational reach. Over time, constitutional doctrine expanded in ways that made these entities increasingly difficult to limit, culminating in decisions like Citizens United, where the Court held that independent political spending by corporations and unions could not be restricted under the First Amendment.

This is part of the same pattern. A system built to preserve liberty becomes easier to exploit when power no longer appears as a king, a church, or a visible ruling class, but as diffuse institutions operating through law, markets, and media.

And as we have seen that happen, trust has eroded, cooperation breaks down, and the very conditions that made freedom possible have begun to unravel.

But I don’t think that was the original aim of classical liberalism.

It’s not that it set out to dismantle the community. It’s that over time, through cultural, economic, and technological changes, the balance between freedom and structure eroded. And now we’re dealing with the consequences of that imbalance.

The more I read, the harder it is to ignore the tension at the heart of the American Revolution itself.

It speaks the language of liberty, but often operated through pressure, surveillance, and social enforcement. Groups like the Sons of Liberty didn’t just resist authority—they replaced it with their own forms of coercion, loyalty tests, and public punishment.

The sons of liberty regularly tar and feathered anyone who offended them or were officers of the British government.

I am not saying the ideals were wrong. It means liberty, on its own, doesn’t sustain itself.When formal authority is rejected, power doesn’t disappear. It simply relocates.

And without shared discipline or internal restraint, it often reappears in more fragmented, less accountable forms.

Liberty is not the absence of power.

It’s a problem of how power is structured, restrained, and lived.

There’s another reaction to this tension that’s worth acknowledging, even if it goes too far.

Thinkers like Mencken argued that the real problem isn’t the system, but the people—that democracy inevitably lowers the standard because it reflects the average citizen. 

And I understand the sentiment; but that framing misses something important.

The issue isn’t that people are inherently incapable of self-government.

It’s that self-government requires habits, discipline, and formation that a system alone cannot produce.

What makes this moment particularly interesting is that the unease people feel doesn’t map neatly onto political categories.

Across both the left and the right, there’s a growing intuition that something isn’t functioning the way it should.

You see it in the rare points of agreement. Public frustration over the lack of transparency in the Epstein files cuts across political lines, with overwhelming majorities convinced that key information is still being withheld and justice is yet to be served. 

You see it in foreign policy as well. Even in a deeply divided country, there is broad skepticism toward escalating conflicts like the war involving Iran, with many of us questioning the purpose, cost, and direction of involvement. 

That concern isn’t new. It shows up clearly in Cato’s Letters, where distrust of power wasn’t abstract—it was grounded in history. The Roman Empire was a constant reference point, especially in how standing armies, once established, could be turned inward, gradually eroding liberty and consolidating control.

They weren’t against defense. But they were deeply wary of permanent military power and foreign entanglements that primarily served those in control, not the public. War wasn’t just protection. It was one of the fastest ways power could expand.

And it’s hard not to wonder how they would look at what we now call the military-industrial complex—how permanent it’s become, how embedded it is, and how easily it justifies its own expansion. 

Power attracts interests that seek to influence it through money, proximity, and favor and over time those interests become embedded within the system itself, shaping decisions in ways that are no longer aligned with the public.

How this shows up today in modern times points to the fact that governmental power no longer feels like a trust. We The People who want to put America and her people’s needs First, are witnessing an occupied government like never before. And that our institutions are no longer held accountable. They have become self-protective and disconnected from the very people they’re meant to serve.


“Power, in proportion to its extent, is ever prone to wantonness.” — Josiah Quincy Jr., Observations on the Boston Port-Bill (1774)

“The supreme power is ever possessed by those who have arms in their hands.” (colonial political writing, mid-18th century)

Standing armies, they warned, could become “the means, in the hands of a wicked and oppressive sovereign, of overturning the constitution… and establishing the most intolerable despotism.” — Simeon Howard, sermon (c. 1773–1775)

Which is why Jefferson insisted on keeping “the military… subject to the civil power,” not the other way around (1774).


There’s also empirical evidence from over a decade ago pointing in that direction. 

Sometimes known as “the oligarchy study” published in 2014 by Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page analyzed nearly 1,800 policy decisions in the United States and found that economic elites and organized business interests have a substantial independent influence on policy outcomes, while average citizens have little to no independent impact.

Policies favored by the majority tend to pass only when they align with the preferences of the wealthy. When they don’t, public opinion has almost no measurable effect.

This one study doesn’t prove that the system has fully collapsed into oligarchy.

But it does reinforce our intuition that something has shifted, that power is no longer functioning as it should and that representation is much more limited than we assume.

What I’ve learned from putting this together is that this concern is not new. It’s ancient.

It’s the same fear that appears in the Greek philosophers, carries through Rome, reemerges in the founding era, and is now unfolding again in modern society.

This is the same dynamic Madison was pointing to in Federalist No. 10. When legitimacy starts to weaken, people don’t simply disengage.

They form groups around competing explanations for what’s gone wrong—different interests, different priorities, different visions of what should replace it.

Within the modern left, those responses are not all the same.

Establishment Democrats still operate within existing systems. Liberals tend to push for reform through policy. Progressives begin to question the structure itself. And further out, democratic socialists and revolutionary groups are not aiming to fix the system, but to replace it entirely.

That distinction matters. Because once you move from reform to replacement, you’re no longer arguing about how to use a system.

You’re arguing about whether it should exist at all. At the far end of that spectrum, some movements push toward dismantling foundational structures entirely, treating them as irredeemably corrupt.

You can see this in specific, coordinated efforts.

Large-scale protest movements like the recent “No Kings” demonstrations, like on March 28th, 2026, bringing 8 million people into the streets across the United States. With more than 3,300 coordinated events spanning all 50 states, the mobilization set a record for the largest single day of protest in U.S. history.

They have planned actions like May Day strikes, where activists are calling for mass labor disruption and economic shutdown. And organized noncooperation campaigns designed to train people in how to resist, overwhelm, or halt existing systems altogether.

Their logic is that the system of capitalism is no longer seen as something to work within, but something to resist, bypass, or bring to a stop.

Not reform. But disruption and replacement.

I’ve spent enough time around these spaces to understand the appeal. When institutions feel captured or unresponsive, the instinct is not to reform them—but to burn them down to the ground.

Freedom is not collapsing because people have rejected it. It’s becoming unstable because we can no longer agree on what it is, what it requires, or what its limits should be.

And as more of the burden falls on individuals while leadership fails to model it, people start to feel both responsible and powerless. And that’s where apathy begins to take hold——when it no longer feels like it matters, especially to the people at the top.

United States Capitol Rotunda — The Dome Painting “The Apotheosis of Washington” Painted by Constantino Brumidi in 1865

V. The Human Problem at the Center of Freedom

A republic doesn’t survive on laws alone.

It survives on citizens who can exercise restraint, who understand limits, who see freedom not just as permission, but as responsibility.

One way to understand this shift more clearly is through moral psychology. Human beings don’t arrive at morality purely through reasoning. We rely on a set of underlying intuitions (care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and a sense of the sacred) that shape how we judge right and wrong before we ever explain why.

In more conservative or traditional societies, these moral intuitions tend to operate together rather than in isolation. Care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and a sense of the sacred reinforce one another, creating a more unified moral framework. People may still disagree, but they are drawing from a shared moral language, with expectations around family, roles, restraint, and what should or should not be done.

But that kind of shared moral framework doesn’t hold evenly across modern society.

The second way to see this is by looking at how these moral intuitions organize into distinct patterns cluster across different groups. In the chart, you can see three broad orientations: progressives, conservatives, and libertarians. Progressives tend to cluster around care and fairness. Conservatives draw from a wider range, incorporating loyalty, authority, and a sense of the sacred alongside those concerns. Libertarians center heavily on liberty, placing less weight on the others. What looks like a disagreement about politics is often a difference in moral orientation—people emphasizing entirely different parts of the same moral landscape.

And the differences don’t just show up in orientation, but in intensity.

This bar graph illustrates this pattern more clearly when we look at how different groups actually prioritize these moral intuitions. 

Secular liberals and the religious left tend to emphasize care and fairness most strongly, focusing on reducing harm and promoting equality. By contrast, more traditional or socially conservative groups draw more evenly across a broader set of values, including loyalty, authority, and a sense of the sacred alongside care and fairness. Libertarians tend to narrow even further, prioritizing individual liberty while placing less emphasis on collective or traditional moral structures. 

The result isn’t just disagreement over morality—it’s a difference in what people are even measuring in the first place, which makes shared judgment harder to sustain.

You can see the split in how people respond to the same breakdown in trust.

For those on the left, freedom means removing constraint entirely and that leads to a push to dismantle systems they see as corrupt or oppressive. 

For those on the right, it produces deep suspicion: distrust of elections, media, public health authority, and government itself, along with a desire to restore order, stability, and clearer boundaries. In some cases, that turns into nostalgia for earlier structures: family roles, gender norms, and forms of religious authority that are seen as more stable, even if that restoration comes with its own trade-offs.

These aren’t just different political positions. 

They reflect different instincts about what matters most and different assumptions about what freedom is for.

And both risk missing the deeper question.

Not just: what system creates freedom?

But what kind of people can sustain it?

This is where Aristotle’s framework becomes difficult to ignore. In that sense, his may be closer to the truth than many modern assumptions. It starts from the premise that people are not equal in their capacity for judgment or self-governance—and builds from there, rather than pretending those differences don’t matter.

It shows up in how people live, how they make decisions, and how they exercise restraint. That’s where his framework of virtue comes in—not as an ideal, but as a way of describing what it actually takes to live well and participate in a functioning society.

He didn’t think virtue was about perfection. He thought of it as balance. Courage sits between cowardice and recklessness.

Self-control between indulgence and insensibility.

Generosity between stinginess and excess.

Virtue is not automatic. It is cultivated. And it can be lost.

He applied that same logic to political systems. A government can exist in a healthy form, oriented toward the common good, or in a corrupted form, serving only a faction. At that point, the difference isn’t just structural. It comes down to character.

One tension that keeps resurfacing in political thought is the gap between equality in principle and inequality in capacity.

You can see this play out in small, everyday ways. Give ten people the same freedom, the same opportunity, the same set of rules—and you don’t get the same outcomes. Some plan ahead. Some act impulsively. Some take responsibility. Others look for ways around it. The structure is equal, but the response isn’t. 

Because human beings are not identical in judgment, discipline, or temperament. Some are more capable of long-term thinking, self-restraint, and navigating complexity than others.

A free society doesn’t eliminate those differences. It has to operate in spite of them. And that creates the real challenge.

A system built on self-government depends on habits it cannot enforce, on restraint it cannot require, and on a shared understanding of limits it cannot guarantee.

Which raises a difficult question:

What happens when a system built on equal freedom depends on unequal capacities to sustain it?

Freedom is not self-sustaining. The more we treat it like it is, the more fragile it becomes. 

When those conditions weaken, the structure doesn’t collapse all at once. It loosens, then drifts, and eventually begins to follow the same pattern that earlier thinkers warned about. 

Not because the idea of freedom was flawed, but because it was always contingent on something more demanding than we like to admit.

And that’s what makes the older warnings so difficult to ignore. The concerns that show up in Greek philosophy, carry through Rome, and reappear in the founding era weren’t tied to one moment in history. They’re describing something recurring. Power doesn’t stay put. It accumulates. It protects itself. And without pressure against it, it shifts (often quietly) into something more self-serving than it was at the start.

The documents and letters from the founding era weren’t written for a stable world. They were written by people who assumed this drift was inevitable. That’s why they were obsessed over things like faction, corruption, and the abuse of power. Not just as political problems, but as moral ones. Because once corruption sets in, it doesn’t just distort institutions. It reshapes the people within them. A corrupt government cannot be a just government. That’s why they treated free speech, free press and an informed public less like ideals and more like important tools—ways of forcing power into the open before it had the chance to consolidate.

Cato’s letters, in particular, were relentless on this point. They knew that a society that becomes consumed with wealth, status, and self-interest doesn’t just become unequal. It becomes easier to manipulate, easier to divide, and eventually less capable of governing itself at all. Civic virtue wasn’t a side note. It was the condition that made freedom possible in the first place.

And when you look at it from that angle, it doesn’t feel like you’re reading writings from the 18th century. It feels familiar, much closer to home. 

Of course, the scale is different now. The mechanisms are different. But the tension is very much the same. Governments and corporations operate with a level of reach the founders never could have imagined with technology. Information is filtered, behavior is shaped, and power often moves through systems that don’t look like power at all. You don’t always see it directly. But you feel the effects of it.

So the responsibility doesn’t go away. It never did.

If anything, it becomes less obvious and more necessary at the same time.

A system like this doesn’t hold because it was designed well. It holds, when it does, because enough people are still paying attention. Still pushing back. Still unwilling to let power define its own limits.

And once that slips…once that expectation fades, the structure doesn’t fail all at once. It just stops holding in the way it used to. And the pattern continues.

United States Capitol Rotunda — The Dome Painting “The Apotheosis of Washington” Painted by Constantino Brumidi in 1865

Resources: 

This piece pulls from a mix of ancient sources, founding-era writing, and modern critiques. Not because I agree with all of them, but because each one sharpens a different part of the problem. If you want to work through it yourself, these are the ones that shaped how I’m thinking about it:

Corporate Rights and the Most Absurd Legal Fiction: A Reactionary History and Analysis of Corporate Personhood

Bernard Bailyn — The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
Less about what the founders built, more about what they were reacting to—especially the collapse of earlier republics.

Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay — The Federalist Papers
A direct look at how they thought about human nature, power, and why freedom needs structure to hold.

Patrick Deneen — Why Liberalism Failed
I don’t agree with all of it, but the critique of modern individualism and the erosion of shared norms is worth taking seriously.

Plato — The Republic
Still one of the clearest descriptions of how excessive freedom destabilizes a society.

Aristotle — Politics
Helpful for understanding how democracies drift when law loses authority and personality takes over.

Polybius — Histories
His framework for how governments rise and decay is hard to unsee once you see it.

Louise Perry — The Case Against the Sexual Revolution
A modern example of how expanded freedom doesn’t always produce the outcomes people expect.

Jonathan Haidt — The Righteous Mind
Useful for understanding why reason alone doesn’t hold societies together—and why people experience morality so differently.

Charles Freeman — The Closing of the Western Mind
Explores how early Christianity reshaped intellectual life in the West.
Also recommended: The Opening of the Western Mind

Roger E. Olson — The Story of Christian Theology
A clear overview of how Christian thought developed over time and how its internal tensions evolved.

Judith Bennett — Women in the Medieval English Countryside
Insight into everyday life, structure, and roles in pre-modern society.

Christine Fell — Women in Anglo-Saxon England
A look at social organization and cultural norms in early English society.

Consciousness, Myth & the Power of Belief

Panpsychism, the Emergence Problem, and the Fractures Inside Mythicism with Dr. Skrbina

Today’s conversation isn’t just about whether Jesus existed.

It’s about something sitting underneath that entire debate.

Most mythicist conversations, meaning scholars and skeptics who argue that Jesus may be a literary or constructed figure, operate inside a philosophical framework called materialism.

Materialism in this sense doesn’t simply mean “trust science.” It’s a deeper metaphysical claim: that everything that exists is ultimately physical. Matter is fundamental, and consciousness is something the brain produces when matter is arranged in the right way.

Revisit a past episode where we discussed the dogma of materialism further

In that picture, mind comes after matter.
Meaning comes after biology.
Religion becomes a byproduct of social evolution.

But there’s a philosophical tension hiding inside that assumption.

Evolution can explain how biological bodies change. It can describe how organisms adapt and diversify. What it does not explain is something much more basic:

Why is there subjective experience at all? Why does pain actually hurt? Why does the color red look like something?

If matter is completely mindless at the ground level, how does experience suddenly appear?

Philosophers call this the emergence problem.

One alternative view (panpsychism) proposes that consciousness isn’t produced by matter at all. Instead, consciousness may be fundamental to reality itself.

That’s where philosopher Dr. David Skrbina enters the conversation.

His book Panpsychism in the West traces this idea across centuries of philosophical thought, showing that the notion of a mind-infused cosmos has appeared again and again throughout Western intellectual history.

But Skrbina has also stepped directly into the mythicist debate with his book The Jesus Hoax. More recently, he published a sharp response to criticism from fellow skeptics David Fitzgerald and Richard Carrier.

Add to that Adam Green’s recent book The Jesus Deception, which approaches early Christianity from yet another angle, and something interesting starts to appear:

Mythicism isn’t a unified theory. It’s fracturing into camps.

So, this conversation moves across several layers at once:

• consciousness and materialism
• the emergence problem
• whether panpsychism overlaps with Neoplatonism
• Paul: historical strategist or literary construct?
• and how The Jesus Hoax differs from The Jesus Deception

Let’s start with the philosophical ground beneath it all.


Consciousness and the Return of Panpsychism

Panpsychism is one of those philosophical ideas that sounds strange the first time you hear it but becomes harder to dismiss the more you think about the alternatives.

In plain terms, the idea is simple: mind or experience may exist at some level throughout reality.

That doesn’t mean rocks are thinking thoughts. Rather, it suggests that the basic constituents of the universe may possess extremely simple forms of experience.

The reason this idea keeps resurfacing across centuries of philosophy is precisely because of the emergence problem.

If consciousness appears only when matter becomes sufficiently complex, we still have to explain how completely mindless matter suddenly gives rise to subjective experience.

Panpsychism flips that question around. Instead of asking how consciousness emerges from matter, it proposes that matter itself may already possess proto-mental properties.

Skrbina’s historical work traces this idea from ancient Greek philosophy through early modern thinkers and into contemporary debates in philosophy of mind.

The interesting thing is that the idea never quite disappears. Even in periods dominated by strict materialism, it keeps resurfacing whenever philosophers run into the same problem: explaining how subjective experience arises from purely physical processes.


Materialism and the Emergence Problem

Materialism has been extraordinarily successful as a scientific framework.

It assumes that the universe is composed of physical entities governed by consistent laws. That assumption has allowed science to model everything from particle physics to molecular biology.

But when we apply that framework to consciousness, something unusual happens.

If matter is entirely mindless at the fundamental level, then at some point in the evolutionary process subjective experience must suddenly appear.

But where?

There’s no obvious “magic neuron” where awareness switches on. There’s no clear moment in development when matter transforms from non-experiencing to experiencing.

This is the emergence problem in its most basic form: explaining how subjective experience arises from purely physical systems.

Some scientists have attempted to address this by looking deeper into physics itself. Theories like Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff’s Orch-OR model propose that consciousness may be connected to quantum processes occurring inside neurons.

Whether or not those models succeed, they reveal something important: even within science, researchers are exploring ways to rethink the relationship between mind and matter.

Panpsychism is one such attempt.


Is Panpsychism Just Neoplatonism?

Because panpsychism proposes a cosmos infused with mind, people often assume it’s simply a modern version of Neoplatonism.

But the two traditions aren’t identical.

Neoplatonism describes reality as a hierarchical structure flowing from the One— a metaphysical unity that gives rise to intellect and soul. It carries strong teleological and ethical implications about how humans align themselves with the structure of reality.

Panpsychism, by contrast, is often framed as a metaphysical hypothesis about the nature of matter and consciousness, without necessarily including the moral or spiritual framework found in Neoplatonic thought.

Still, the overlap is hard to ignore. Both challenge the idea that the universe is purely mechanical.

Both suggest that mind and reality may be deeply intertwined.


The Mythicism Debate Fractures

Another interesting tension here is that some of the things Skrbina is criticized for aren’t that far from ideas that already exist in mythicist literature.

One of the central claims in The Jesus Hoax is that St Paul and a small cabal of early Christians may have functioned as a kind of non-military strategy within the Roman world. Instead of armed revolt, the movement theologically conquered by the spread through ideas, theology, and cultural influence.

Skrbina frames this as a kind of ideological or narrative strategy that could reshape behavior across the empire.

What makes the criticism somewhat puzzling is that a similar concept appears in Richard Carrier’s own work.

In Not the Impossible Faith, Carrier describes early Christianity as a movement that spread not through military rebellion but through cultural transformation. Rome could defeat armed revolts, but it could not easily suppress ideas that moved through communities, texts, and belief.

Carrier even characterizes this as a kind of revolutionary strategy. If Rome would always win a military conflict, the only rebellion that could succeed would be a cultural one— a war of ideas rather than armies. (Carrier, Not the Impossible Faith, Ch. 9).

In that sense, the notion that early Christianity functioned as a non-military cultural movement is not controversial. It is widely recognized that the early Jesus movement spread through persuasion, networks, and theology rather than organized violence.

Where the real disagreement emerges is over intent and origin.

Skrbina interprets this cultural transformation as something that may have been deliberately constructed or strategically shaped. His critics tend to view it as an organic religious development rather than a coordinated narrative project.

Another point raised in the exchange concerns the authorship of the gospels, particularly the question of whether Luke was a Gentile writer. Skrbina notes that even if certain details of authorship were revised, for example: if Luke were ultimately shown to be Gentile, the core structure of his argument would not collapse. It would simply require refinement.

That willingness to concede smaller points while maintaining the broader model is something he addresses repeatedly in his response.

The broader takeaway from this debate is that mythicism itself is not a single theory. It is a field where scholars often agree that the traditional gospel narrative is historically unreliable but disagree sharply about what actually replaced it.

David Fitzgerald’s Review of David Skrbina’s Amateur Jesus Hoax • Richard Carrier Blogs

When Propaganda Masquerades as Book Review: Reply to Fitzgerald and Carrier


Paul: Strategist or Literary Construct?

One of the most important figures in this entire discussion is Paul of Tarsus.

Skrbina’s model treats Paul as a strategic actor who played a central role in shaping early Christian theology.

But other scholars have raised a more radical possibility: that the Pauline corpus itself may not represent a stable first-century historical figure at all.

Research such as Nina Livesey’s work on the Roman literary context of the Pauline letters suggests that some of these texts may reflect later second-century developments.

If Paul himself were partly a literary construct, it would reshape the debate considerably.

Yet even in that scenario, Skrbina argues, the broader thesis of deliberate narrative construction would not necessarily collapse. It would simply require revision.


Adam Green and the Midrashic Jesus

Adam Green’s recent book The Jesus Deception adds another dimension to the conversation.

Green emphasizes the possibility that the gospel narratives were crafted through midrashic techniques, weaving together Hebrew scriptures to construct the story of Jesus.

This raises a broader question about how religious narratives function historically.

Are they simply stories? Or do they operate as cultural scripts that shape behavior across entire societies?

Green invokes a concept from cultural theory called hyperstition: the idea that beliefs can begin to influence reality because people act as if those beliefs are true.

In other words, a prophecy doesn’t need to be literally true to become historically powerful.

It only needs to be believed strongly enough that people start behaving in ways that bring it about.

That possibility becomes particularly interesting when we look at modern geopolitics.

Some recent reports have suggested that military personnel have framed conflicts in the Middle East through apocalyptic biblical language, describing events as part of a divine plan leading toward Armageddon.

Whether or not such interpretations reflect official policy, they illustrate how powerful religious narratives can be in shaping political imagination.

MRFF Inundated with Complaints of Gleeful Commanders Telling Troops Iran War is “Part of God’s Divine Plan” to Usher in the Return of Jesus Christ – Military Religious Freedom Foundation


Where the Debate Goes Next

In the end, the debate over Jesus may be downstream from something even deeper.

Our interpretation of religious history is shaped by our metaphysical assumptions.

If materialism is the only acceptable framework, religion must be explained as a social or psychological byproduct.

But if consciousness itself is fundamental to reality or if human beliefs can influence the unfolding of history the picture becomes far more complex.

The discussion of consciousness, myth, and belief may be one of the most important philosophical frontiers of our time.

And that conversation is just beginning.


Sources & Further Research

Books, News, Links | Univ of Michigan Dearborn | David Skrbina, PhD

Jesus Hoax website

Know More News-Adam Green with Dr. David Skrbina

For readers who want to explore the topics discussed in this episode more deeply, the following books and research have shaped the ideas discussed in this conversation. These works cover philosophy of consciousness, panpsychism, early Christianity, and the intellectual history of the ancient world.

Philosophy of Consciousness & Panpsychism

Panpsychism in the West – David Skrbina
A comprehensive historical survey tracing the idea that mind or experience may be fundamental to reality across centuries of Western philosophy.

Science Set Free – Rupert Sheldrake
A critique of the assumptions underlying modern scientific materialism and an exploration of alternative ways of thinking about nature, consciousness, and scientific inquiry.

The Emperor’s New Mind – Roger Penrose
A physicist’s investigation into the nature of consciousness, the limits of artificial intelligence, and the possibility that consciousness is tied to deeper physical processes in the universe.

The Jesus Hoax – David Skrbina
Explores the possibility that early Christian narratives functioned as a strategic cultural movement within the Roman world.

The Jesus Deception – Adam Green
Argues that the story of Jesus may have been constructed through Jewish midrashic storytelling traditions.

Not the Impossible Faith – Richard Carrier
Carrier’s argument that Christianity’s success in the Roman Empire was historically improbable given the cultural environment of the time.

The Letters of Paul in Their Roman Literary Context – Nina Livesey
A scholarly examination of whether the Pauline letters reflect later Roman literary production and rhetorical conventions.

The Opening of the Western Mind – Charles Freeman
A history of classical Greek and Roman intellectual traditions and the philosophical foundations of the ancient world.

The Closing of the Western Mind – Charles Freeman
Examines how classical philosophical traditions were gradually replaced by Christian orthodoxy in late antiquity.

Christianity and the Myth of Saving the West

A historical documentary blended with a personal reckoning and a cultural warning

This one has been sitting with me for a long time.

Six months, maybe more. Notes in the book margins. Tons of screenshots. Quotes stacked in my notes folder. Books half-highlighted and folded pages revisited. Every time I thought I was ready to write it, I wasn’t…

Because this isn’t just about history. It’s about a story we keep repeating with confidence: that Christianity saved the West and what happens when you actually slow down to examine that claim.

The claim that Christianity civilized Europe. Christianity gave us human rights, pluralism, rational inquiry, restraint. And if Western civilization feels unstable today, the prescription is simple— return to Christian moral supremacy.

I find myself increasingly tired of hearing it.

Tired of watching “Judeo-Christian values” invoked as shorthand for liberty. Tired of hearing that our freedoms, our intellectual life, our legal architecture all flow directly from the Bible. Tired of the way paganism is casually used as a synonym for barbarism, ego, domination — while Christianity is cast as the moral counterweight, the conscience that civilizes power.

A recent example sharpened that fatigue. Leighton Woodhouse published an opinion piece in The New York Times titled Donald Trump, Pagan King. The framing was familiar and rhetorically smooth. Paganism was associated with appetite, force, and unchecked authority. Christianity appeared as restraint, humility, moral seriousness. The implication was subtle but unmistakable: whatever is broken in our politics represents a departure from Christian virtue.

The structure of this narrative is ancient. Pagan equals raw power. Christian equals moral discipline.

But that framing rests on an assumption that deserves far more scrutiny than it receives. It assumes that Christianity is the moral software of the West. Before it, there was chaos; after it, civilization.

The deeper I have gone into late antiquity, through Catherine Nixey’s The Darkening Age, Charles Freeman’s analysis of intellectual narrowing, Ramsay MacMullen’s documentation of coercive conversion, and through primary sources from both Christian and pagan voices— the more that tidy civilizational story begins to unravel.

Because when Christianity gained institutional dominance, what followed was not the natural flowering of pluralism and inquiry. It was very opposite.

And for us to truly understand, we have to begin this story before Christianity held power.


A World Before Monopoly

The Greco-Roman world was not a utopia. It had power structures, that were often violent, and deeply unequal. But it operated within a religious and intellectual framework that functioned very differently from exclusive monotheism.

Roman religion was additive rather than subtractive. One could honor household gods, civic gods, the imperial cult, foreign deities, and philosophical conceptions of the divine without renouncing the others. Orthopraxy mattered more than orthodoxy. What counted was correct ritual performance, not exclusive belief. The pax deorum (the peace with the gods) was maintained through observance, not doctrinal conformity.

Philosophically, multiplicity was the norm. Stoics, Epicureans, Skeptics, and Platonists argued openly about cosmology, ethics, and the nature of reality. Protagoras could admit uncertainty about the gods without being erased from the record. Cicero articulated natural law grounded in reason and universality long before Christianity gained political authority. Debate was public. Rhetorical training was a civic skill. Argument was like oxygen at the time.

Cicero

The Roman legal system developed sophisticated structures of administration and legislation that would profoundly shape Western law. None of this depended on exclusive revelation. It depended on human reasoning operating within a plural environment.

Rome suppressed what it perceived as politically dangerous. It was capable of cruelty. But structurally, it tolerated metaphysical competition. Truth was not framed as singular and jealous in the way later Christian orthodoxy would insist.

Christianity did not enter this world as one more school of thought among many. It entered with a different moral architecture. Not “add Christ to the pantheon.”

But “burn down the rest.”

That distinction is not merely cosmetic. It is foundational to understanding the real history.


The Architecture of Exclusivity

The Hebrew scriptures that Christianity inherited contain a recurring moral posture toward rival worship. Altars are to be broken down. Sacred groves burned. Idols smashed. “You shall have no other gods before me” is not a suggestion of preference; it is a declaration of exclusivity. Rival worship is not seen as a mere mistake; it is corrupting.

When confined to private devotion, this posture functions as identity formation. When fused with state power, it moves from conviction to coercion.

For the first three centuries of its existence, Christianity lacked imperial authority. It survived in the margins of society. The decisive shift came when Christianity aligned with imperial power under Constantine and his successors.

Estimates vary, but many scholars place Christians at roughly ten percent of the empire around the year 300. The exact percentage is debated (ancient demographic modeling is necessarily approximate) but the trajectory is clear. Within a few generations, that minority became the ruling faith. By the end of the fourth century, imperial law assumed Christianity as normative and increasingly treated rival ritual as illegal.

This demographic reversal was not merely theological. It was political.

Once exclusivist theology acquired enforcement capacity, differences in beliefs was no longer merely error. It was threat.

In the 380s and 390s, imperial edicts against non-Christian ritual multiplied. In 399, a Christian emperor issued a decree stating:

“If there should be any temples in the country districts, they shall be torn down without disturbance or tumult. For when they are torn down and removed, the material basis for all superstition will be destroyed.”

The language is bureaucratic. The effect was not.

These edicts provided legal cover for demolition. Bishops lobbied rulers for stricter laws. Congregations became demolition crews. Rival worship was framed as superstition whose material foundation had to be eradicated.

As Ramsay MacMullen demonstrates, once rival belief is conceptualized as spiritually dangerous, compromise becomes morally suspect. In a plural system, rivals are mistaken. In an exclusivist system, rivals are demonic. And demons are not debated. They are expelled.

This is the mechanism. And it becomes visible in stone.


The Destroyers and the Image of Wisdom

Once theology fused with imperial authority, enforcement did not remain theoretical. It moved outward into public space. It moved into cities. It moved into stone.

Catherine Nixey opens The Darkening Age not with doctrine but with an image. The choice is deliberate. Arguments can be abstract. Statues cannot.

The Temple of Athena in Palmyra had stood for centuries. It was not a relic in a museum. It was part of a living civic landscape. Its columns had watched merchants pass through the city, soldiers march under banners, pilgrims move between worlds. Within it stood Athena— goddess of wisdom, of strategic intelligence, of disciplined thought. She represented more than devotion. She embodied the classical inheritance itself: philosophy, rhetoric, ordered reasoning, the cultivation of mind.

When the destroyers arrived, what they attacked was not simply stone.

Nixey describes a man entering the temple with a weapon and striking the back of Athena’s head with such force that the goddess was decapitated. The violence did not stop there. Her nose was sliced off. Her cheeks crushed. Her once composed face mutilated with intention.

And yet her eyes were left intact.

Those eyes still exist.

They look out from a ruined face that once symbolized wisdom.

This was not accidental vandalism. It was theology enacted physically. The old gods were not to be debated, not to be reinterpreted, not to be absorbed into new meaning. They were to be neutralized. Their presence was dangerous. Their very material existence was a threat to salvation.

The word often used for this period is triumph. Christianity triumphed over paganism. But triumph over what? Over multiplicity? Over a world in which philosophical disagreement could exist without annihilation? Over the idea that wisdom might not belong exclusively to one revelation?

The violence at Palmyra was not isolated. Temples across the empire were damaged, repurposed, stripped of ornament, or demolished. Some were converted into churches. Others were dismantled entirely. Sacred spaces that had structured civic and religious life for centuries were rendered spiritually illegitimate almost overnight.

What makes the image of Athena more destabilizing is its repetition.

In 2015, Islamic State militants bulldozed the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud because it was deemed idolatrous. The reconstructed remnants of Athena were attacked again. Beheaded again. An arm sheared off again.

Different century. Different scripture. Different empire.

Same logic. When rival sacred presence is conceptualized as contamination, destruction becomes purification.

This is not about equivalence between traditions. It is about structure. When any Abrahamic framework defines truth as singular, exclusive, and threatened by proximity to rivals, pluralism becomes fragile. Once that framework acquires political power, fragility becomes enforcement.

And enforcement does not stop at statues.


Hypatia and the Enforcement of Certainty

If Athena represents symbolic erasure, Hypatia represents human cost.

Hypatia of Alexandria was not an obscure mystic. She was a philosopher, mathematician, and teacher in a city long known for intellectual life. Alexandria had been home to the great library and to competing schools of thought for centuries. Hypatia occupied a visible position within that tradition.

By the early fifth century, Alexandria was also home to a group known as the parabalani — often translated as “the reckless ones.” Officially devoted to acts of charity, they functioned in practice as muscle for ecclesiastical authority. By some estimates there were hundreds of them in the city. Roman legal documents describe them using the word terror.

Hypatia lived in the same civic space as these enforcers.

Her murder was not random street violence. It occurred within an atmosphere already shaped by escalating Christian authority and shrinking tolerance for rival influence. When exclusivist theology defines truth as singular and civic order as dependent upon that truth, intellectual figures outside that structure become destabilizing.

Hypatia was stripped, beaten, and killed by a mob associated with Christian zeal.

Her death did not mark the beginning of violence. It marked the normalization of it.

Once difference is framed as corruption and corruption as emergency, elimination becomes defensible.

This pattern appears again and again in late antiquity. Pagan philosophers were exiled. Schools were closed. Public debate narrowed. The emperor Justinian would eventually close the philosophical schools of Athens entirely. Inquiry did not vanish overnight, but the atmosphere changed. What had once been competition became suspicion.

And suspicion reshapes a civilization quietly before it reshapes it violently.


Fear as Teacher

One of the most revealing threads in the historical record is not the destruction itself but the emotional atmosphere that made it possible.

Demonology was not marginal superstition. It structured perception. Pagan temples were described as inhabited by malevolent spirits. Sacrifices were not merely mistaken rituals but demonic feasts. The world itself became morally charged terrain.

The Devil Belial before the Gates of Hell, from Das Buch Belial, published in Augsburg, 1473

Christians wrote anxious letters asking whether they could sit in places pagans had sat, use baths used on feast days, drink from wells near deserted temples, eat food that might have been associated with sacrifice. The fear was not symbolic. It was visceral.

Augustine’s response: that it was better to refuse contaminated food with Christian fortitude even if one starved, reveals a hierarchy of values. Survival could be negotiable. Purity could not.

John Chrysostom’s sermons described eternal punishment in sensory detail: rivers of fire, venomous worms, inescapable bonds, exterior darkness. Fear was not incidental rhetoric. It trained the imagination to view error as catastrophe and proximity to rival belief as existential threat.

When fear becomes formative, pluralism becomes psychologically intolerable.

And when that psychology is paired with law, narrowing becomes institutional.


The Disappearance of Thought

The destruction of statues is visible. The destruction of thought is quieter.

One of the most devastating aspects of late antique Christianization was not merely the smashing of temples but the narrowing of what was considered worth preserving.

The ancient Mediterranean world once contained the greatest concentration of written knowledge humanity had yet assembled. The Library of Alexandria, even allowing for scholarly debate about its exact size, symbolized an ambition toward accumulation. Knowledge was not singular. It was expansive. It was contradictory. It was messy.

Scholars selecting and reading scrolls in the Great Library of Alexandria hall

What remains of that intellectual inheritance is fragmentary.

By some estimates, only about one percent of Latin literature survives from antiquity. Entire authors are known only by name. Entire schools of philosophy survive only in hostile summaries written by opponents. Whole lines of speculation disappeared not because they were refuted but because they were not copied.

Copying is survival.

In the late antique world, the people doing the copying increasingly operated within Christian institutions.

And institutions preserve selectively.

“Stay clear of all pagan books!” reads the Apostolic Constitution. The warning is not casual. It reflects a moral anxiety about contamination. Texts are not neutral. They are spiritually charged. Exposure to the wrong argument is dangerous.

Celsus, one of the few pagan critics whose voice survives, accused Christians of discouraging inquiry. He mocked the posture: “Do not ask questions; just believe.” His tone is sharp, even sarcastic, but the anxiety is real. In Greek philosophy, reason was virtue. Inquiry was sacred. Faith, as unexamined assent, was the lowest epistemic posture.

Even Origen, writing within the Christian tradition, conceded the problem with striking bluntness, remarking that “the stupidity of some Christians is heavier than the sand of the sea.” The anti-intellectual reputation of early Christianity was not a later invention. It was noted by contemporaries.

The tragedy of Democritus crystallizes this narrowing.

Democritus — the philosopher often described as the father of atomic theory — wrote extensively across cosmology, mathematics, and ethics. He proposed a universe composed of atoms and void centuries before modern physics. And yet none of his works survive intact.

Not one.

What we know of his thought survives because it was partially preserved inside a single poem, Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, which itself survived precariously through a single manuscript discovered in a German monastery centuries later.

The physicist Carlo Rovelli has called the total loss of Democritus’s writings “the greatest intellectual tragedy to ensue from the collapse of the old classical civilisation.”

An entire philosophical lineage survived by accident.

That should unsettle anyone who claims Christianity simply “preserved learning.”

Yes, monasteries copied texts. But copying is filtration. Texts deemed dangerous, frivolous, obscene, or spiritually corrupt were less likely to be preserved. When a civilization narrows its moral boundaries, its archive narrows with it.

Charles Freeman, in The Closing of the Western Mind, argues that the most significant shift was not physical destruction but the narrowing of acceptable modes of thought. Public philosophical debate gradually gave way to appeals to authority and revealed certainty. Disputes were settled by councils backed by imperial power. Orthodoxy was defined not by open inquiry but by boundary enforcement.

The world did not stop thinking overnight. But the conditions for free competition of ideas shifted.

And once intellectual diversity contracts, recovery takes centuries.


The Martyr Myth and Moral Insulation

The martyr narrative sits at the emotional center of Christian self-understanding. It does more than preserve memory. It defines identity.

The story is familiar: early Christians were persecuted by a pagan empire. They were imprisoned, tortured, executed for their faith. They endured without retaliation. They did not conquer. They survived.

There is truth in this. The Great Persecution under Diocletian was real and brutal. Scriptures were burned. Churches destroyed. Christians were imprisoned and executed. No serious historian denies that.

What modern scholarship questions is scale and continuity. The most severe empire-wide persecution lasted roughly a decade. Other persecutions were local, sporadic, and uneven across regions. They were not a continuous three-century campaign of systematic eradication.

Martyr literature itself expanded over time. Detailed analysis of saints’ calendars reveals duplication, embellishment, and narrative layering. Some figures appear under multiple names. Some accounts contain anachronisms or miraculous flourishes that complicate their historical reliability.

The historian G. E. M. de Ste. Croix observed that later martyr literature increasingly displayed what he called “a contempt for historicity.”

That line matters. Because it signals a shift: suffering was not only remembered. It was shaped.

And shaped suffering serves a purpose.

Martyrdom of Saint Sebastian is an Italian Renaissance Tempera Painting created by Andrea Mantegna in c.1480.

Once Christianity aligned with imperial authority, the martyr narrative did not recede. It hardened into interpretive insulation. The same tradition that now authorized temple closures and school shuttings still understood itself as historically persecuted.

The story generates moral asymmetry: whatever Christians do can be framed as response, not domination.

And the function of the martyr narrative did not end in late antiquity. In modern apologetics, it often operates as proof. The logic runs like this: the apostles would not have died for something they knew was false; early Christians endured torture rather than recant; therefore, their testimony must be true.

But willingness to suffer proves sincerity, not metaphysical accuracy. People across religions have died for beliefs that contradict one another. Martyrdom establishes conviction. It does not establish truth.

This is why the martyr story is so stabilizing. It allows a movement to wield authority while retaining the self-image ofinnocence. It transforms power into protection and critique into persecution.

When temples were outlawed and philosophical schools shuttered, the tradition exercising authority did not see itself as conqueror. It saw itself as guardian of truth under threat.

If you are always defending truth, enforcement feels righteous.


The Last Pleas for Coexistence

One of the tragedies of this period is that the archive becomes overwhelmingly Christian. The winners preserved their own voices. The losing side survives in fragments.

But some fragments remain.

Libanius, a pagan orator in the fourth century, watched as temples across the empire were damaged, repurposed, or destroyed. His speeches are not the rantings of a fanatic. They are the anxious observations of a man watching his world contract. He describes sacred spaces falling into ruin, rituals forbidden, property seized. He notes opportunists dividing temple lands for personal gain under the cover of piety. What Christian historians later frame as triumph, Libanius experiences as loss.

Then there is Symmachus.

In 382 CE, the Christian emperor Gratian ordered the removal of the Altar of Victory from the Roman Senate House. For centuries, senators had offered ritual observances there before conducting civic business. It was not merely religious decoration; it was part of Rome’s public identity.

Symmachus wrote an appeal for its restoration.

His language is remarkable for its restraint. He does not demand dominance. He does not threaten revolt. He argues for coexistence.

“We look on the same stars,” he writes. “The sky is common. The same world surrounds us. What difference does it make by what pains each seeks the truth? We cannot attain to so great a secret by one road alone.”

It is difficult to imagine a clearer articulation of pluralism in the ancient world.

He closes not with hostility but with humility: “We offer now prayers, not conflict.”

He lost. The altar was not restored. The plea for multiplicity was overridden by certainty.

This moment matters because it reveals a collision between two moral architectures. One sees truth as approached through many paths. The other sees truth as singular and threatened by rival proximity.

Symmachus represents not pagan decadence but civic pluralism. He is not asking to suppress Christianity. He is asking for coexistence.

The answer he receives is enforcement. The narrowing was not accidental. It was structural.


The Long Return of Pluralism

The narrowing of late antiquity did not permanently extinguish intellectual life. But it did change its conditions. For centuries, inquiry moved within theological boundaries defined by ecclesiastical authority. Councils determined orthodoxy. Deviation could be punished. Philosophical speculation survived, but often cautiously, often cloaked.

What we now call the Enlightenment did not arise as a natural extension of Christian supremacy. It arose within tension — sometimes quiet, sometimes explosive — with religious monopoly.

Beginning in the Renaissance, Europe experienced a gradual rediscovery of classical texts. Manuscripts long buried in monastic libraries re-entered circulation. Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura, preserving echoes of Democritus’s atomism, resurfaced. Greek philosophy was studied not merely as commentary on theology but as intellectual inheritance in its own right.

The recovery of classical thought did not instantly dissolve Christian authority. But it reintroduced plurality into the bloodstream of European intellectual life.

The Enlightenment sharpened that reintroduction.

Thinkers like John Locke articulated natural rights grounded not in revelation but in reason and shared human nature. Locke’s arguments for religious toleration did not emerge from biblical exclusivity; they emerged from a recognition that coercion in matters of belief corrupts both faith and civic peace.

Montesquieu analyzed the separation of powers not as a theological doctrine but as a structural safeguard against concentration of authority. His framework was explicitly concerned with preventing tyranny — whether monarchic or clerical.

These ideas did not descend seamlessly from medieval orthodoxy. They developed alongside, and often in resistance to, religious entanglement with state power.

When we reach the American founding, the tension becomes explicit.

The framers of the Constitution were deeply literate in classical thought. They read Cicero. They read Tacitus. They studied Roman republicanism. They were steeped in Enlightenment political theory. They feared concentrated power, including ecclesiastical power.

The Constitution contains no reference to Jesus Christ. It prohibits religious tests for office. The First Amendment forbids establishment of religion and protects free exercise. This was not a casual omission. It was intentional architecture.

The American experiment was not a biblical republic.

It was a republic designed to prevent religious monopoly.

Thomas Jefferson provides a particularly revealing case. Jefferson famously produced his own edited version of the Gospels, physically cutting out miracles and supernatural elements. The result, often referred to as the Jefferson Bible, retained ethical teachings while discarding divine intervention.

This was not the act of a man seeking to found a theocracy.

It was the act of a man separating moral philosophy from revealed absolutism.

Jefferson’s project reflects a broader Enlightenment impulse: to preserve ethical insight while disentangling it from exclusivist authority.

Roger Olson’s theological scholarship further complicates the claim that Christianity simply “gave us” pluralism. Olson emphasizes that Christianity was never doctrinally uniform in its early centuries. Orthodoxy was consolidated through contest, suppression, and boundary enforcement. The unity later invoked as civilizational foundation was itself the product of narrowing.

The Enlightenment did not grow naturally from that narrowing. It reopened debate.

It reintroduced skepticism as virtue.

It separated church and state not to destroy religion but to protect civic plurality.

If Christianity had already secured pluralism, the Enlightenment would have been unnecessary.

The fact that it was necessary tells us something profound.

Pluralism survived not because exclusivity reigned, but because exclusivity was restrained.


Did Christianity Give Us Human Rights?

At this point, the most common objection surfaces.

Even if there were excesses. Even if there was narrowing. Even if temples fell and texts disappeared. Christianity still gave us the concept of human dignity. Christianity laid the groundwork for human rights.

The claim sounds intuitive because Christian theology does contain a powerful moral idea: humans are made in the image of God. That idea has inspired reformers and abolitionists and activists. It matters.

But the existence of moral language is not the same thing as institutional pluralism.

The Stoics articulated a form of universal human rationality centuries before Christianity held power. Roman law developed ideas of legal personhood and universality that would influence later legal systems. Cicero’s natural law did not depend on revelation.

Christianity contributed to moral discourse. That is true.

But the institutional protection of dissent: the right to disagree publicly, to publish heterodox ideas, to worship differently without legal annihilation… did not emerge during periods of Christian monopoly. Those protections developed when religious authority was structurally limited.

Rights require restraint of power.

And historically, the moments when Christianity was most fused with state authority were not the moments when pluralism expanded.


What This Feels Like From the Inside

What unsettles me most about this history is not simply that it happened. It is that I recognize the mechanism.

I have lived the internal version of it.

Burn the books. Throw away the tarot cards. Remove your new age spirituality material. Avoid contamination of demonic entities. Guard the mind. Monitor the thoughts. Stay pure.

When you inhabit Christianity long enough, the anxiety internalizes. You become your own enforcer. You police your curiosity. You treat rival ideas not as intellectual challenges but as spiritual threats.

When I read about Christians in late antiquity asking whether they could sit where pagans had sat or drink from wells near deserted temples, it was too relatable.

The narrowing does not begin with demolition crews. It begins with fear.

Fear reshapes perception. Fear shrinks curiosity. Fear frames difference as danger.

Scale that fear across institutions and you have late antiquity.

Scale it across a nation and you have something far more consequential.


The Warning

This is why the rhetoric of Christian supremacy unsettles me.

Not because Christianity has contributed nothing to Western civilization. It has shaped art, music, law, charity, moral imagination. That is undeniable.

Much of this period is still narrated as civilizational triumph rather than suppression. As the academic John Pollini notes, “modern scholarship, influenced by a Judeo-Christian cultural bias, has frequently overlooked or downplayed such attacks and even at times sought to present Christian desecration in a positive light.”

But the claim that Christianity saved the West collapses complexity into myth. It erases the plural foundations of Greco-Roman thought. It erases the Enlightenment’s deliberate separation of church and state. It erases the long struggle to restrain religious monopoly.

Reformers like John Calvin did not argue for a secular state. In his Institutes, Calvin insisted that magistrates had a duty to suppress blasphemy and false worship.

Pluralism did not emerge from supremacy.

It survived by limiting it.

When modern commentators frame Christianity as the sole guardian of civilization and paganism as barbaric force, they repeat a frame older than they realize. They invoke a story in which exclusivity is equated with order and multiplicity with chaos.

History suggests something different.

Civilizations are stabilized not by monopoly but by constraint. Not by erasing rivals but by tolerating them. Not by conflating revelation with law but by separating the two.

If we forget that, if we mythologize exclusivity as the foundation of freedom, we risk mistaking that narrowing for renewal.

And that is not a mistake history makes gently.

aaaand that’s all I have for you today folks. If you’ve been here for a while, you know this is what Taste of Truth Tuesdays is about. Not tearing down for sport. Not defending tradition out of reflex. But slowing down long enough to ask: Is the story we’re repeating actually true?

and As always…

Maintain your curiosity.
Embrace skepticism.
And keep tuning in.

Endnotes

  1. Leighton Woodhouse, “Donald Trump, Pagan King,” The New York Times, February 11, 2026.
    (Referenced as an example of contemporary framing of paganism versus Christianity.)
  2. Catherine Nixey, The Darkening Age: The Christian Destruction of the Classical World (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).
    Charles Freeman, The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith and the Fall of Reason (New York: Knopf, 2002).
    Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (A.D. 100–400) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).
    See also Ramsay MacMullen, Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
  3. On Roman religion as orthopraxic and plural in structure, see:
    Mary Beard, John North, and Simon Price, Religions of Rome, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
    Jörg Rüpke, Religion of the Romans (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007).
  4. Cicero’s articulation of natural law appears in De Re Publica and De Legibus. See:
    Cicero, On the Republic and On the Laws, trans. James E. G. Zetzel (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
  5. On late fourth-century anti-pagan legislation, see:
    Theodosian Code 16.10 (various edicts restricting sacrifice and authorizing temple closures).
    For analysis: Michele Renee Salzman, The Making of a Christian Aristocracy (Harvard University Press, 2002).
    Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire.
  6. On the debated scope and frequency of early Christian persecutions:
    Candida Moss, The Myth of Persecution (HarperOne, 2013).
    G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Christian Persecution, Martyrdom, and Orthodoxy (Oxford University Press, 2006).
    These works challenge the traditional narrative of continuous empire-wide persecution and note embellishment in later martyr literature.
  7. On the parabalani and Hypatia:
    Socrates Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, Book VII.
    Christopher Haas, Alexandria in Late Antiquity (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
    Edward J. Watts, Hypatia: The Life and Legend of an Ancient Philosopher (Oxford University Press, 2017).
    Roman legislation regulating the parabalani appears in Theodosian Code 16.2.42 and related laws.
  8. On the Altar of Victory controversy and Symmachus:
    Symmachus, Relatio 3 (Petition for the Restoration of the Altar of Victory).
    Ambrose of Milan’s response in Epistle 17–18.
    See also: Michele Renee Salzman, The Making of a Christian Aristocracy.
  9. On demonology and late antique Christian perceptions of paganism:
    Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom (Blackwell, 1996).
    Catherine Nixey, The Darkening Age.
    Brown discusses the moralization of the inner life and late antique anxiety regarding contamination and spiritual danger.
  10. On the survival rate of classical literature:
    It is widely acknowledged among classicists that only a small fraction of ancient literature survives.
    See: Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Harvard University Press, 1997).
    James J. O’Donnell, Avatars of the Word (Harvard University Press, 1998).
    The exact percentage is debated, but the scale of loss is undisputed.
  11. On Democritus and the loss of his works:
    Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers (Book IX).
    Carlo Rovelli, Reality Is Not What It Seems (Riverhead Books, 2016), where Rovelli refers to the loss of Democritus as a major intellectual tragedy.
    Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, as the principal ancient source preserving atomist philosophy.
  12. On the closure of pagan philosophical schools under Justinian:
    Procopius, Secret History.
    Edward J. Watts, The Final Pagan Generation (University of California Press, 2015).
  13. On Enlightenment political theory and religious toleration:
    John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689).
    Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (1748).
  14. On Thomas Jefferson’s edited Bible:
    Thomas Jefferson, The Life and Morals of Jesus of Nazareth (commonly known as the Jefferson Bible), completed in 1820.
    See also: Edwin Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God: A Religious Biography of Thomas Jefferson (Eerdmans, 1996).
  15. On early Christian theological diversity and consolidation of orthodoxy:
    Roger E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology (InterVarsity Press, 1999).
    Bart D. Ehrman, Lost Christianities (Oxford University Press, 2003) (for broader context on early doctrinal diversity).

Projection, Power, and the Pagan Revival

When Belief Becomes Control

This episode isn’t about religion versus religion.
It’s about power, fear, and what happens inside belief systems when conformity becomes more important than honesty.

In this conversation, I’m joined by Sigrin, founder of Universal Pagan Temple.

She’s a practicing Pagan, a witch, a public educator, and someone who speaks openly about leaving Christianity after experiencing fear-based theology, spiritual control, and shame. I want to pause here, because even as an agnostic, when I hear the word witch, my brain still flashes to the cartoon villain version. Green. Ugly. Evil. That image didn’t come from nowhere. It was taught.

One of the things we get into in this conversation is how morality actually functions in Pagan traditions, and how different that framework is from what most people assume.

She describes leaving Christianity not as rebellion, but as self-preservation. And what pushed her out wasn’t God. It was other Christians.

For many people, Christianity isn’t learned from scripture.
It’s learned from other Christians.

The judgment.
The constant monitoring.
The fear of being seen as wrong, dangerous, or spiritually compromised.

In high-control Christian environments, conformity equals safety. Questioning creates anxiety. And the fear of social punishment often becomes stronger than belief itself.

When belonging is conditional, faith turns into survival.


What We Cover in This Conversation:

Paganism Beyond Aesthetics

A lot of people hear “Paganism” and immediately picture vibes, trends, or cosplay. We spend time breaking that assumption apart.

  • Sigrin explains that many beginners jump straight into ritual without actually invoking or dedicating to the divine.
  • She talks about the difference between aesthetic practice and intentional practice.
  • For people who don’t yet feel connected to a specific god or goddess, she offers grounded guidance on how to approach devotion without forcing it.
  • We talk about the transition she experienced moving from Christianity, to atheism, to polytheism.
  • We explore the role of myth, story, and symbolism in spiritual life.
  • She shares her experience of feeling an energy she couldn’t deny, even after rejecting belief entirely.
  • We touch on the wide range of ways Pagans relate to pantheons, including devotional, symbolic, ancestral, and experiential approaches.

The takeaway here isn’t “believe this.”
It’s that Paganism isn’t shallow, trendy, or uniform. It’s relational.


No Holy Book, No Central Authority

One of the most misunderstood aspects of Paganism is the absence of a single text or governing authority.

  • Sigrin references a line she often uses: “If you get 20 witches in a room, you’ll have 40 different beliefs.”
  • We talk about how Pagan traditions don’t operate under enforced doctrine or centralized belief.
  • She brings up the 42 Negative Confessions from ancient Egyptian tradition as an example of ethical self-statements rather than commandments.
  • These function more like reflections on character than laws imposed from above.
  • We compare this to moral storytelling across different myth traditions rather than rigid rule-following.
  • She emphasizes intuition and empathy as core tools for ethical decision-making.
  • I add the role of self-reflection and introspection in systems without external enforcement.

This raises an important question: without a script, responsibility shifts inward.

Why This Can Be Hard After Christianity

We also talk honestly about why this freedom can be uncomfortable, especially for people leaving authoritarian religion.

  • Sigrin notes how difficult it can be to release belief in hell, even after leaving Christianity.
  • Fear doesn’t disappear just because belief changes.
  • When morality was once externally enforced, internal trust has to be rebuilt.
  • Pagan paths often require learning how to sit with uncertainty rather than replacing one authority with another.

This isn’t easier.
It’s quieter.
And it asks more of the individual.

That backdrop matters, because it shapes how Paganism gets misunderstood, misrepresented, and framed as dangerous.


The “Pagan Threat” Narrative

One of the reasons Pagan Threat has gained attention and sparked controversy is not just its content, but whose voice it carries and how it’s framed at the outset.

  • The book was written by Pastor Lucas Miles, a senior director with Turning Point USA Faith and author of other conservative religious critiques. The project is positioned as a warning about what Miles sees as threats to the church and American society. The foreword was written by Charlie Kirk, founder of Turning Point USA. His introduction positions the book as urgent for Christians to read.

From there, the book makes a striking claim:

  • It describes Christianity as a religion of freedom, while framing Paganism as operating under a hive mind or collective groupthink.

A key problem is which Paganism the book is actually engaging.

  • The examples Miles focuses on overwhelmingly reflect liberal, online, or activist-adjacent Pagan spaces, particularly those aligned with progressive identity politics.
  • That narrow focus gets treated as representative of Paganism as a whole.
  • Conservative Pagans, reconstructionist traditions, land-based practices, and sovereignty-focused communities are largely ignored.

As a result, “wokeness” becomes a kind of explanatory shortcut.

  • Modern political anxieties get mapped onto Paganism.
  • Gender ideology, progressive activism, and left-leaning culture get blamed on an ancient and diverse spiritual category.
  • Paganism becomes a convenient container for everything the author already opposes.

We also talk openly about political realignment, and why neither of us fits cleanly into the right/left binary anymore. I raise the importance of actually understanding Queer Theory, rather than using “queer” as a vague identity umbrella.

To help visualize this, I reference a chart breaking down five tiers of the far left, which I’ll include here for listeners who want context.

Next, in our conversation, Sigrin explains why the groupthink accusation feels completely inverted to anyone who has actually practiced Paganism.

  • Pagan traditions lack central authority, universal doctrine, or an enforcement mechanism.
  • Diversity of belief isn’t a flaw. It’s a defining feature.
  • Pagan communities often openly disagree, practice differently, and resist uniformity by design.

The “hive mind” label ignores that reality and instead relies on a caricature built from a narrow and selective sample.

 “Trotter and Le Bon concluded that the group mind does not think in the restricted sense of the word. In place of thoughts, it has impulses, habits, and emotions. Lacking an independent mind, its first impulse is usually to follow the example of a trusted leader. This is one of the most firmly established principles of mass psychology.”  Propaganda by Edward L. Bernays

We contrast this with Christian systems that rely on shared creeds, orthodoxy, and social enforcement to maintain cohesion.

Accusations of groupthink, in that context, often function as projection from environments where conformity is tied to spiritual safety.

In those systems, agreement is often equated with faithfulness and deviation with danger.

Globalism, Centralization, and Historical Irony

We end the conversation by stepping back and looking at the bigger historical picture.

  • The book positions Christianity as the antidote to globalism.
  • At the same time, it advocates coordinated religious unification, political mobilization, and cultural enforcement.
  • That contradiction becomes hard to ignore once you zoom out historically.

Sigrin points out that pre-Christian Pagan worlds were not monolithic.

  • Ancient polytheist societies were highly localized.
  • City-states and regions had their own gods, rituals, myths, and customs.
  • Religious life varied widely from place to place, even within the same broader culture.

I reference The Darkening Age by Catherine Nixey, which documents this diversity in detail.

  • Pagan societies weren’t unified under a single doctrine.
  • There was no universal creed to enforce across regions.
  • Difference wasn’t a problem to be solved. It was normal.

Christianity, by contrast, became one of the first truly globalizing religious systems.

  • A single truth claim.
  • A centralized authority structure.
  • A mandate to replace local traditions rather than coexist with them.

That history makes the book’s framing ironic.

  • Paganism gets labeled “globalist,” despite being inherently local and decentralized.
  • Christianity gets framed as anti-globalist, while proposing further consolidation of belief, power, and authority.

What This Is Actually About

This isn’t about attacking Christians as people.
And it’s not about defending Paganism as a brand.

It is a critique of how certain forms of Christianity function when belief hardens into certainty and certainty turns into control.

Fear-based religion and fear-based ideology share the same problem.
They promise safety.
They demand conformity.
And they struggle with humility.

That doesn’t describe every Christian.
But it does describe systems that rely on fear, surveillance, and moral enforcement to survive.

What I appreciate about this conversation is the reminder that spirituality doesn’t have to look like domination, hierarchy, or a battle plan.

It can be rooted. Local. Embodied.

It can ask something of you without erasing you.

And whether someone lands in Paganism, Christianity, or somewhere else entirely, the question isn’t “Which side are you on?”

It’s whether your beliefs make you more honest, more grounded, and more responsible for how you live.

That’s what I hope people sit with after listening.

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The historical Jesus Fact or Fiction? PART 2

Archaeology, “External Evidence,” and Groundhog Day in the Comment Section

Welcome back to Taste of Truth Tuesdays, where we stay curious, stay skeptical, and keep a healthy distance from any dogma, whether it’s wrapped in a Bible verse or a political ideology.

This is Part Two of my Jesus Myth series, and I’m going to be straight with you:

This one is a doozy.
Buckle up, buttercup. Feel free to pause and come back.

Originally, the plan was to bring David Fitzgerald back for another conversation. If you listened to Part One, you know he’s done a ton to popularize the idea that Jesus never existed and to dismantle Christian dogma. I still agree with the core mythicist claim: I don’t think the Jesus of the Gospels was a real historical person. If you missed it, here is the link.

But agreeing with someone’s conclusion doesn’t mean I hand them a free pass on how they argue.

After our first interview, I went deeper into Fitzgerald’s work and into critiques of it (especially Tim O’Neill’s long atheist review that absolutely shreds his method.) While his critique of Fitzgerald’s arguments is genuinely useful; his habit of branding people with political labels (“Trump supporter,” “denier”) to discredit them is… very regressive.

It’s the same purity-testing impulse you see in progressive (should be regressive) spaces, just performed in a different costume.

And that’s what finally pushed me over the edge:
The more I watch the atheist/deconstruction world online, the more it reminded me of the exact rigid, dogmatic cultures people say they escaped.

Not all atheists, obviously. But a very loud chunk of that ecosystem runs on:

  • dunking, dog-piling, and humiliation
  • tribal loyalty, not actual inquiry
  • “You’re dead to me” energy toward anyone who may lean conservative or shows nuance

It’s purity culture in different branding.

Then I read how Fitzgerald responded to critics in those archived blog exchanges (not with clear counterarguments) but with emotional name-calling and an almost devotional defense of his “hero and mentor,” Richard Carrier. For me, that was a hard stop.

Add to that: his public Facebook feed is full of contempt for moderates, conservatives, “anti-vaxxers,” and basically anyone outside progressive orthodoxy. My audience includes exactly those people. This space is built for nuance for people who’ve already escaped one rigid belief system and are not shopping for a new one.

He’s free to have his politics.
I’m free not to platform that energy.

So instead of Part Two with a guest, you’re getting something I honestly think is better:

  • me (😜)
  • a stack of sources
  • a comment section that turned into a live demo of modern apologetics
  • and a segment at the end where I turn the same critical lens on the mythicist side — including Fitzgerald himself

Yes, we’re going there. Just not yet.


Previously on Taste of Truth…

In Part One, I unpacked why “Jesus might never have existed” is treated like a taboo thought — even though the historical evidence is thin and the standards used to “prove” Jesus would never pass in any other field of ancient history.

Then, in a Taste Test Thursday episode, I zoomed out and asked:
Why do apologists argue like this at all?
We walked through:

  • early church power moves
  • modern thought-stopping tricks
  • and Neil Van Leeuwen’s idea of religious “credences,” which don’t function like normal factual beliefs at all

That episode was about the machinery.

Today is about the evidence. Especially the apologetic tropes that showed up in my comments like a glitching NPC on repeat.


⭐ MYTHS #6 & #7 — “History and Archaeology Confirm the Gospels”

Papyrus P52 (𝔓52), often called the oldest New Testament manuscript. (It’s the size of a credit card)
Apologists treat it like a smoking gun.
It contains… one complete word: ‘the.’

These two myths always show up together in the comments, and honestly, they feed off each other. People claim, “history confirms the Gospels,” and when that collapses, they jump to “archaeology proves Jesus existed.” So, I’m combining them here, because the evidence (and the problems) overlap more than apologists want to admit.

In short:
Archaeology confirms the setting. History confirms the existence of Christians.
Neither confirms the Jesus of the Gospels.

And once you actually look at the evidence, the apologetic scaffolding falls apart fast.


1. What Archaeology Really Shows (and What It Doesn’t)

If Jesus were a public figure performing miracles, drawing crowds, causing disturbances, and being executed by Rome, archaeology should show something tied to him or to his original movement.

Here’s what archaeology does show:

  • Nazareth existed.
  • Capernaum existed.
  • The general layout of Judea under Rome.
  • Ritual baths, synagogues, pottery, coins.
  • A real Pilate (from a fragmentary inscription).

That’s the setting.

Here’s what archaeology has never produced:

  • no house of Jesus
  • no workshop or tools
  • no tomb we can authenticate
  • no inscription naming him
  • no artifacts linked to the Twelve
  • no evidence of a public ministry
  • no trace of Gospel-level notoriety

Not even a rumor in archaeology that points to a miracle-working rabbi.
Ancient Troy existing doesn’t prove Achilles existed.
Nazareth existing doesn’t prove Jesus existed.

Apologists push the setting as if it confirms the character. It doesn’t.


2. Geography Problems, Anachronisms & Literary Tells

If the Gospels were eyewitness-based biographies, their geography would line up with first-century Palestine.

Instead, we get:

• Towns that don’t match reality

The Gerasene/Gadarene/Gergesa demon-pig fiasco moves between three different locations because the original story (Mark) puts Jesus 30 miles inland… nowhere near a lake or cliffs.

• Galilee described like a later era

Archaeology shows Galilee in the 20s CE was:

  • taxed to the bone
  • rebellious
  • dotted with large Romanized cities like Sepphoris and Tiberias

But the Gospels portray quaint fishing villages, peaceful Pharisees, and quiet countryside. This reflects post-70 CE Galilee: the era when the Gospels were actually written.

• Homeric storms on a tiny lake

Mark treats the Sea of Galilee like the Aegean (raging storms, near capsizings, disciples fearing death) even though ancient critics mocked this because the “sea” is a small lake.

Dennis MacDonald shows Mark lifting whole scenes from Homer, which explains the mismatch: his geography serves his literary needs, not the historical landscape.

• Joseph of “Arimathea” (a town no one can find)

Carrier and others point out the name works more like a literary pun (“best disciple town”) than a real toponym.

• Emmaus placed at different distances

Luke places it seven miles away. Other manuscripts vary. There was no fixed memory.

These aren’t the mistakes of people writing about their homeland.
They’re the mistakes of later authors constructing a symbolic landscape.


3. The Gospel Trial Scenes: Legally Impossible

This is the part Christians never touch.

One of the most respected legal scholars of ancient Jewish law did a line-by-line analysis of the Gospel trial scenes. He wasn’t writing from a religious angle, he approached it strictly as a historian of legal procedure.

His conclusion?
The trial described in the Gospels violates almost every rule of how Jewish courts actually worked.

According to his research:

  • capital trials were never held at night
  • they were not allowed during festivals like Passover
  • capital verdicts required multiple days, not hours
  • the High Priest did not interrogate defendants
  • witness testimony had to match
  • beating a prisoner during questioning was illegal
  • and Jewish courts didn’t simply hand people over to Rome

When you stack these facts together, it becomes clear:

The Gospel trial scenes aren’t legal history…. they’re theological storytelling.

That’s before we even get to Pilate.

Pilate was not a timid bureaucrat.

He was violent, ruthless, removed from office for brutality.


4. Acts Doesn’t Remember Any Gospel Miracles

If Jesus actually:

  • drew crowds,
  • fed thousands,
  • raised the dead,
  • blacked out the sun,
  • split the Temple curtain,
  • and resurrected publicly…

Acts (written after the Gospels) should remember all of this.

Instead:

  • No one in Acts has heard of Jesus.
  • No one mentions an empty tomb.
  • No one cites miracles as recent events.
  • Roman officials are clueless.
  • Paul knows Jesus only through visions and the scriptures.

Acts behaves exactly like a community whose “history” was not yet written.


5. Manuscripts: Many Copies, No Control

Apologists love saying:

“We have 24,000 manuscripts!”

Quantity isn’t quality.

  • almost all are medieval
  • the earliest are tiny scraps
  • none are originals
  • no first-century copies
  • scribes altered texts freely
  • entire passages were added or deleted
  • six of Paul’s letters are pseudonymous
  • many early Christian writings were forged

Even Origen admitted that scribes “add and remove what they please” (privately, of course.)

The manuscript tradition looks nothing like reliable preservation.


6. The Church Fathers Don’t Help (and They Were Tampered With Too)

This is where Fitzgerald’s chapter hits hardest.

Before 150 CE, we have:

  • no Church Father quoting any Gospel
  • no awareness of four distinct Gospels
  • no clear references to Gospel events

Justin Martyr (writing in the 150s) is the first to quote anything Gospel-like, and:

  • he never names Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John
  • many of his quotes don’t match our Gospels
  • he calls them simply “the memoirs”

Even worse:

The writings of Ignatius, Polycarp, Dionysius of Corinth, and many others were tampered with.
Some were forged entirely.

So the apologetic claim “The Fathers confirm the Gospels” collapses:

They don’t quote them.
They don’t know them.
And their own texts are unstable.

Metzger claimed we could reconstruct the New Testament from the Fathers’ quotations but his own scholarship shows the Fathers don’t quote anything reliably until after the Gospels were circulating.


7. External Pagan Sources: Late, Thin, and Dependent on Christian Claims

This is the other half of the myth… that “history” outside the Bible confirms Jesus.

Let’s look quickly:

• Tacitus (116 CE)

Reports what Christians of his day believed.
He cites no source, no archive, no investigation.

• Pliny (c. 111 CE)

Says Christians worship Christ “as a god.”
Confirms Christians existed — not that Jesus did.

• Josephus (93 CE)

The Testimonium is tampered with.
Even conservative scholars admit Christian hands were all over it.
The “James, brother of Jesus” line is ambiguous at best.

These are not independent confirmations.
They’re late echoes of Christian claims.


In closing:

You can confirm:

  • towns
  • coins
  • synagogues
  • political offices
  • geography

But that only shows the world existed, not the characters.

The Gospels are theological narratives composed decades later, stitched out of scripture, symbolism, literary models, and the needs of competing communities.

Archaeology confirms the backdrop.
History confirms the movement.
Neither confirms the biography.

Once you strip away apologetic spin, the evidence points to late, literary, constructed narratives, not eyewitness records of a historical man.


Myth #8: “Paul and the Epistles Confirm the Gospels”

Albert Schweitzer pointed out that if we only had Paul’s letters, we would never know that:

  • Jesus taught in parables
  • gave the Sermon on the Mount
  • told the “Our Father” prayer
  • healed people in Galilee
  • debated Pharisees

From Paul and the other epistles, you wouldn’t even know Jesus was from Nazareth or born in Bethlehem.

That alone should make us pause before saying, “Paul confirms the Gospels.”

Paul’s “Gospel” Is Not a Life Story

When Paul says “my gospel,” he doesn’t mean a narrative like Matthew, Mark, Luke, or John. His gospel is:

  • Christ died for our sins
  • was buried
  • was raised
  • now offers salvation to those who trust him

No:

  • Bethlehem, Nazareth, Mary, Joseph
  • John the Baptist
  • miracles, exorcisms, parables
  • empty tomb story with women at dawn

And this isn’t because Paul is forgetful. His letters are full of perfect moments to say, “As Jesus taught us…” or “As we all know from our Lord’s ministry…”

He never does.

Instead, he appeals to:

  • his own visions
  • the Hebrew scriptures (in Greek translation, the Septuagint)
  • what “the Lord” reveals directly to him

For Paul, Christ is:

  • “the image of the invisible God”
  • “firstborn of all creation”
  • the cosmic figure through whom all things were made
  • the one who descends to the lower realms, defeats spiritual powers, and ascends again

That is cosmic myth language… not “my friend’s rabbi who did a lot of teaching in Galilee a few decades ago.”

The “Lord’s Supper,” Not a Last Supper

The one place people think Paul lines up with the Gospels is 1 Corinthians 11, where he describes “the Lord’s Supper.”

Look closely:

  • He never calls it “the Last Supper.”
  • He never says it was a Passover meal.
  • He never places it in Jerusalem.
  • He says he received this ritual from the Lord, not from human eyewitnesses.

The phrase he uses, kuriakon deipnon (“Lord’s dinner”), is the same kind of language used for sacred meals in pagan mystery cults.

The verb he uses for “handed over” is used elsewhere of God handing Christ over, or Christ handing himself over not of a buddy’s betrayal. The specific “Judas betrayed him at dinner” motif shows up later, in the Gospels.

Then, when later authors retell the scene, they can’t even agree on the script. We get:

  • Paul’s version
  • Mark’s version
  • Matthew’s tweak on Mark
  • Luke’s two different textual forms
  • and John, who skips a Last Supper entirely and relocates the “eat my flesh, drink my blood” thing to a synagogue sermon in Capernaum

That looks less like multiple eyewitness reports and more like a liturgical formula evolving as it gets theologized.

Hebrews and the Missing Connection

The author of Hebrews:

  • goes deep on covenant and sacrificial blood
  • quotes Moses: “This is the blood of the covenant…”
  • spends time on Melchizedek, who brings bread and wine and blesses Abraham

In other words:
The author sets up what would be a perfect sermon illustration for the Last Supper… but he never takes it. No “as our Lord did on the night he was betrayed.” No Eucharist scene. No Passover meal.

The simplest explanation:
He doesn’t know that story. He knows the ritual meaning; the later narrative scene in Jerusalem hasn’t been invented yet in his circle.

How Paul Says He Knows Christ

Paul is very clear about his source:

  • He did not receive his gospel from any human (Galatians 1).
  • He barely met the Jerusalem “pillars,” waited years to even visit them, and insists they added nothing to his message.
  • He says God “revealed his Son in me.”
  • His scriptures are the Septuagint, which he reads as a giant coded story about Christ.

In other words, for Paul:

  • Christ is a hidden heavenly figure revealed in scripture and visions.
  • The “mystery” has just now been unveiled.

That only makes sense if there wasn’t already a widely known human teacher whose sayings and deeds were circulating everywhere.

The Silence of the Other Epistles

If it were just Paul, we could say, “That’s just Paul being weird.”

But the pattern runs across the other epistles:

From the New Testament letters outside the Gospels and Acts, you would never know:

  • Jesus was from Nazareth or born in Bethlehem
  • he grew up in Galilee
  • he taught crowds, told parables, healed people, or exorcised demons
  • he had twelve disciples, one of whom betrayed him
  • there were sacred sites tied to his life in Jerusalem

“Bethlehem,” “Nazareth,” “Galilee” do not appear in those letters with reference to Jesus. Jerusalem is never presented as, “You know, the place where all this just happened.”

The supposed “brothers of the Lord” never act like family with stories to tell. The letters attributed to James and Jude don’t even mention they’re related to Jesus.

When these early authors argue about circumcision, food laws, purity, and ethics, they consistently go back to the Old Testament…not to anything like a Sermon on the Mount.

That is very hard to reconcile with a memory of a recent, popular Galilean preacher inspiring the entire movement.


Myth #9: “Christianity Began With Jesus and His Twelve Besties”

If you grew up on Acts, you probably have this movie in your head:

  • Tiny, persecuted but unified Jesus movement
  • Centered in Jerusalem
  • Led by Jesus’ family and the Twelve
  • Paul shows up later in season two as the complex antihero

That’s the canonical story.

When you step back and read our earliest sources on their own terms, that picture melts.

Fragmented from the Start

In 1 Corinthians, Paul complains:

“Each of you says, ‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to Cephas,’ or ‘I belong to Christ.’ Is Christ divided?” (1 Cor. 1:12–13)

That’s not “one unified church.”

He also:

  • rants about people “preaching another Jesus”
  • calls rival apostles “deceitful workers,” “false brothers,” “servants of Satan”
  • invokes curses on those preaching a different gospel (Gal. 1:6–9; 2 Cor. 11)

Meanwhile, the early Christian manual Didakhē warns communities about wandering preachers who are just “traffickers in Christs” (what Bart Ehrman nicknames “Christ-mongers.”)

Right away, we see:

  • multiple groups using the Christ label
  • competing versions of what “the gospel” even is
  • no sign of one tight central group everyone agrees on

Different Jesuses for Different Communities

By the time the Gospels and later texts are in circulation, we can already see:

  • Paul’s Christ: a cosmic, heavenly savior, revealed in scripture and visions, ruling spiritual realms
  • Thomasine Christ: in the Gospel of Thomas, salvation comes through hidden wisdom; there’s no crucifixion or resurrection narrative
  • Mark’s Jesus: a suffering, misunderstood Son of God who’s “adopted” at baptism and abandoned at the cross
  • John’s Jesus: the eternal Logos, present at creation, walking around announcing his unity with the Father
  • Hebrews’ Christ: the heavenly High Priest performing a sacrifice in a heavenly sanctuary

These are not just “different camera angles on the same historical guy.” They reflect:

  • different liturgies
  • different cosmologies
  • different starting assumptions about who or what Christ even is

And notice: there is no clean pipeline from “this man’s twelve students carefully preserved his teachings” into this wild diversity.

Paul vs. Peter: Not a Cute Disagreement

Acts spins the Jerusalem meeting as:

  • everyone sits down
  • hashes things out
  • walks away in perfect unity

Paul’s own account (Galatians 2) is… not that:

  • he calls some of the Jerusalem people “false brothers”
  • he says they were trying to enslave believers
  • he says he “did not yield to them for a moment”
  • he treats the supposed “pillars” (Peter, James, John) as nobodies who “added nothing” to his gospel

That’s not a friendly staff meeting. That’s two rival Christianities:

  • a more Torah-observant, Jerusalem-centered Jesus-sect
  • Paul’s law-free, Gentile-mystic Christ-sect

Acts, written later, airbrushes this into harmony. The letters show how close the whole thing came to a full split.

Where Are the Twelve?

If Jesus’ twelve disciples were:

  • real,
  • the main founders of Christianity,
  • traveling around planting churches,

we’d expect:

  • lots of references to them
  • preserved teachings and letters
  • at least some reliable biographical detail

Instead:

  • the lists of the Twelve don’t agree between Gospels
  • some manuscripts can’t even settle on their names
  • outside the Gospels and Acts, the Twelve basically vanish from the first-century record

Paul:

  • never quotes “the Twelve”
  • never appeals to them as the final authority
  • treats Peter, James, John simply as rival apostles, not as Jesus’ old friends

We have no authentic writings from any of the Twelve. The later “Acts of Peter,” “Acts of Andrew,” “Acts of Thomas,” etc., are generally acknowledged to be later inventions.

The simplest explanation is not that the Twelve were historically massive and weirdly left no trace. It’s that:

  • “The Twelve” are symbolic: twelve tribes, twelve cosmic seats, twelve zodiac signs, take your pick.
  • Their names and “biographies” were built after the theology, not before.

The Kenosis Hymn: Jesus as a Title, Not a Birth Name

In Philippians 2, Paul quotes an early hymn:

“Being found in human form, he humbled himself
and became obedient to the point of death — death on a cross.
Therefore God highly exalted him
and gave him the name that is above every name,
so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow…”

Notice:

  • The hymn does not say God gave him the title “Lord.”
  • It says God gave him the name Jesus after the exaltation.

That is not what you expect if “Jesus” was already the known name of a village carpenter from Nazareth. It makes a lot more sense if:

  • “Jesus” functions originally as a divine name for a savior figure (“Yahweh saves”),
  • assigned in the mythic story after his cosmic act,
  • and only later gets retrofitted as the everyday name of a human hero.

Mark: From Mystery Faith to “Biography”

All of this funnels into the earliest Gospel: Mark.

Mark announces up front that he’s writing a gospel, not a biography. Modern scholars have shown that Mark:

  • builds scenes out of Old Testament passages
  • mirrors patterns from Greek epics
  • structures the story like a giant parable, where insiders are given “the mystery of the kingdom,” and outsiders only get stories

In Mark’s own framework, Jesus speaks in parables so that many will see but not understand. The whole Gospel plays that way: symbolic narrative first, later read as straight history once the church gains power.

So did Christianity “begin with Jesus and his apostles”?

If by that you mean:

One coherent movement, founded by a famous rabbi with twelve close disciples, faithfully transmitted from Jerusalem outward…

Then no. That’s the myth.

What we actually see is:

  • multiple competing Jesuses
  • rival gospels and factions
  • no clear paper trail from “Jesus’ inner circle”
  • later authors stitching together a cleaned-up origin story and branding rivals as “heresy”

Biographies came after belief, not before.


Myth #10: “Christianity Was a Miraculous Overnight Success That Changed the World”

The standard Christian flex goes like this:

“No mere myth could have spread so fast and changed the world so profoundly. That proves Jesus was real.”

Let’s slow that down.

But before we even touch the growth rates, we need to name something obvious that apologists conveniently forget:

Christianity wasn’t the first tradition built around a dying-and-rising savior. Not even close.

Long before the Gospels were written, the ancient Near East had already produced fully developed resurrection myths. One of the oldest (and one of the most important) belonged to Inanna, the Sumerian Queen of Heaven.

Ancient Akkadian cylinder seal (2350–2150 BCE) depicting Inanna

Inanna’s Descent (c. 2000–3000 BCE) is the earliest recorded resurrection narrative in human history.

She descends into the Underworld, is stripped, judged, executed, hung on a hook, and then through divine intervention, is brought back to life and restored to her throne.

Learn more about the story of Inanna here.

This story predates Christianity by two thousand years and was well known across Mesopotamia.

In other words:

The idea that a divine figure dies, descends into darkness, and returns transformed was already ancient before Christianity was even born.

So, the claim that “no myth could spread unless it were historically real” falls apart immediately. Myths did spread. Myths do spread. Myths shaped entire civilizations long before Jesus entered the story.

Now (with that context in place) let’s actually talk about Christianity’s growth..

Christianities Stayed Small…. Until Politics Changed

Carrier’s modeling makes it clear:

  • even if you start with generous numbers (say 5,000 believers in 40 CE),
  • you still don’t get anywhere near a significant percentage of the Empire until well into the third century

And that includes all groups who believed in some form of Christ — including the later-branded “heretics.”

So, for the first ~250 years, Christianity:

  • is tiny
  • is fragmented
  • is one cult among many in a very crowded religious landscape

The “miracle” is not early explosive growth. It’s what happens when their tiny, disciplined network suddenly gets access to empire-level power.

Rome Falls; Christianity Rises

Fitzgerald is right that Christianity benefitted from Rome’s third-century crisis:

  • chronic civil wars
  • inflation and currency debasement
  • border instability and barbarian incursions
  • trade networks breaking down
  • urban life contracting

As conditions worsened:

  • Christianity’s disdain for “worldly” culture
  • its emphasis on endurance, suffering, and heavenly reward
  • its growing bishop-led structure and charity networks

…all became more attractive to the poor and dispossessed.

“It was a mark of Constantine’s political genius … that he realized it was better to utilize a religion … that already had a well‑established structure of authority … rather than exclude it as a hindrance.” Charles Freeman, The Closing of the Western Mind: The Rise of Faith & the Fall of Reason  

But there’s a step many historians including Fitzgerald often underplay:

How Christianity destroyed the classical world.

From Tolerated to Favored to Tyrannical

A quick timeline:

  • 313-Constantine legalizes Christianity (Edict of Milan). Christianity is now allowed, not official. Constantine still honors Sol Invictus and dies as a pagan emperor who also patronized bishops.
  • 4th century– Christian bishops gain wealth and political leverage. Imperial funds start flowing to churches. Pagan temples begin to be looted or repurposed.
  • 380– Emperor Theodosius I issues the Edict of Thessalonica: Nicene Christianity becomes the official state religion.
  • 395 and after– Laws begin banning pagan sacrifices and temple worship. Pagan rites become crimes.

Catherine Nixey’s The Darkening Age and Charles Freeman’s The Closing of the Western Mind document how this looked on the ground:

  • temples closed, looted, or destroyed
  • statues smashed
  • libraries and shrines burned
  • philosophers harassed, exiled, or killed
  • non-Christian rites criminalized

Christianity didn’t “persuade” its way to exclusive dominance. It:

  • received funding and legal favor
  • then helped outlaw and dismantle its competition

That is not a moral judgment; it’s just how imperial religions behave.

The “Overnight Success” That Took Centuries and a State

So was Christianity a new, radically different, overnight success?

  • Not new: it recycled the son-of-god savior pattern, sacred meals, initiation, and rebirth themes common in the religious world around it. Even early church fathers admitted the similarities and blamed them on Satan “counterfeiting” Christianity in advance.
  • Not overnight: it stayed statistically tiny for generations.
  • Not purely spiritual success: it became powerful when emperors needed an obedient, centralized religious hierarchy to stabilize a collapsing state.

Christianity didn’t “win” because its evidence was overwhelming.

It won because:

  • it fit the needs of late-imperial politics
  • it built a strong internal hierarchy
  • it could supply social services
  • its leaders were willing to suppress, outlaw, and overwrite rival traditions

This is not unique. It’s a textbook case of how state-backed religions spread.


Why the Pushback Always Sounds the Same

After Part One, my comment sections turned into Groundhog Day:

  • “You’re ignoring Tacitus and Josephus!”
  • “Every serious scholar agrees Jesus existed.”
  • “Archaeology proves the Bible.”
  • “There are 25,000 manuscripts.”
  • “Paul met Jesus’ brother!”
  • “If Jesus wasn’t real, who started Christianity?”
  • “Ancient critics never denied his existence — checkmate.”
  • “You just hate religion.”
  • “This is misinformation.”

Different usernames. Same script.

This is where Neil Van Leeuwen’s work on religious credences helps:

  • Factual beliefs are supposed to track evidence. If you show me credible new data, I update.
  • Religious credences function differently: they’re tied to identity, community, and morality. Their job isn’t to track facts; it’s to hold the group together.

So when you challenge Jesus’ historicity, you’re not just questioning an ancient figure. You’re touching:

  • “Who am I?”
  • “Who are my people?”
  • “What makes my life meaningful?”

No wonder people come in hot.

That doesn’t make them stupid or evil. It just means the conversation isn’t really about Tacitus. It’s about identity maintenance.


Now Let’s Turn the Lens on Mythicism (Yes, Including Fitzgerald)

Here’s where I want to be very clear:

  • I am a mythicist.
  • I do not think the Jesus of the Gospels ever existed as a historical person.

But mythicism itself doesn’t get a free pass.

Carrier’s Probability Model: When Someone Actually Does the Math

Most debates about Jesus collapse into appeals to authority. Richard Carrier’s On the Historicity of Jesus at least does something different: it quantifies the evidence.

Using Bayesian reasoning, he argues roughly:

  • about a 1 in 3 prior probability that there was a “minimal historical Jesus”– a real Jewish teacher who got executed and inspired a movement
  • about 2 in 3 for a “minimal mythicist” origin– a celestial figure whose story later got historicized

Then, after weighing the actual evidence (Paul’s silence, the late Gospels, contradictions, etc.), he argues the probability of a historical Jesus drops further, to something like 1 in 12.

You don’t have to agree with his exact numbers to see the point:

  • Once you treat the sources like data, not dogma, the overconfident “of course Jesus existed, you idiot” stance looks a lot less justified.

O’Neill’s Critique of Fitzgerald: Atheist vs Atheist

Tim O’Neill, an atheist historian, wrote a long piece on Fitzgerald’s Nailed and does not hold back. His basic charges:

  • Fitzgerald oversells weak arguments
  • cherry-picks and misuses sources
  • ignores mainstream scholarship where it contradicts him
  • frames mythicism as bold truth vs. “apologist cowards,” which is just another tribal narrative

When Fitzgerald responded, he didn’t do so like someone doing serious historical work. He responded like an internet keyboard warrior.

And that same ideological vibe shows up in how he talks about people in general, which I said in the beginning.

Atheism as New Orthodoxy

The more time I spend watching atheist and deconstruction spaces online, the more obvious it becomes that a lot of these folks didn’t escape religion, they just changed uniforms. They swapped their church pews for Reddit threads, pastors for science influencers, and now “logic” is their new scripture.
Ya feel me?
It’s the same emotional energy: tribal validation, purity tests–like what do you believe or think about this? And the constant hunt for heretics who dare to ask inconvenient questions.

Say something even slightly outside the approved dogma…like pointing out that evolution (calm down, Darwin disciples) still has gaps and theoretical edges we haven’t fully nailed down and suddenly the comment section becomes the Inquisition.
They defend the theory with the exact same fervor evangelicals defend the Book of Revelation.
It’s wild.

And look, I’m all for science. I’m literally the girl who reads academic papers for funsies.
But when atheists start treating evolution like a sacred cow that can’t be questioned, or acting like “reason” is this perfect, unbiased tool that magically supports all their existing beliefs… that’s not skepticism. That’s a new orthodoxy, dressed up as a freethinker.
Different vocabulary, same psychology.
Good gravy, baby— calm down.

and….here’s the uncomfortable truth a lot of atheists don’t want to hear:

Reason isn’t the savior they think it is.

French cognitive scientists Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber have spent years studying how humans actually use reason and prepare yourself because: we don’t use it the way we think. Their research shows that reason didn’t evolve to help us discover truth. It evolved to help us win arguments, protect our identities, and persuade members of our group.

In other words:

  • confirmation bias isn’t a flaw
  • motivated reasoning isn’t a glitch
  • tribal loyalty isn’t an accident

They are features of the reasoning system.

Which is why people who worship “logic” often behave exactly like the religious communities they left… just with new vocabulary and a different set of heretics.

This is also why intellectual diversity matters so much. You cannot reason your way to truth inside an ideological monoculture. Your brain simply won’t let you. Without competing perspectives, reasoning becomes nothing more than rhetorical self-defense, a way to signal loyalty to the tribe while pretending to be above it.

John Stuart Mill understood this long before modern cognitive science confirmed it. In On Liberty, Mill argues that truth isn’t something we protect by silencing dissent. Truth emerges through friction, through the clash of differing perspectives. A community that prides itself on “rational superiority” but cannot tolerate disagreement becomes just another church with a different hymnal.

And that’s where many atheist and deconstruction spaces are now.

They haven’t transcended dogma.
They’ve recreated it. Trading one orthodoxy for another.

This isn’t just about online atheists. This is about what happens when any movement stops questioning itself.


Challenging the Mythicist Side (Without Turning It Into Another Tribe)

Let’s get honest about the mythicist world too — because every camp has its blind spots.

Tim O’Neill’s critique of David Fitzgerald wasn’t just angry rhetoric. Strip away the insults, and he raises a few legitimate issues worth taking seriously:

1. Accusation of Agenda-Driven History

O’Neill argues that Fitzgerald starts with the conclusion “Jesus didn’t exist” and works backward, much like creationists do with Genesis.

Now Fitzgerald absolutely denies this. In his own words, he didn’t go looking for mythicism; mythicism found him when he started examining the evidence. And that’s fair.

But the deeper point still stands:

The mythicist movement can get so emotionally invested in debunking Christianity that it mirrors the very dogmatism it critiques.

You see this all over atheist spaces today — endless dunking, no nuance, purity tests, and very little actual curiosity.

That’s a valid critique.

2. Amateurism and Overreach

O’Neill also accuses Fitzgerald of relying too heavily on older scholarship, making confident claims where the evidence is thin, and occasionally overstating consensus.

Again — not entirely wrong.
Fitzgerald’s book is sharp and compelling, but it’s not the cutting-edge end of mythicism anymore.

There are places where he simplifies. There are places where he speculates.

This matters because mythicism deserves better than overconfident shortcuts.

3. Fitzgerald doesn’t push far enough

And ironically, this is where I diverge from O’Neill entirely. He thinks Fitzgerald goes too far; I think Fitzgerald stops too soon.

There are areas where the mythicist case has advanced beyond Fitzgerald’s framework, and he doesn’t touch them:

• The possibility that “Paul” himself is a literary construct

Nina Livesey and other scholars argue that:

  • The Pauline voice may be a 2nd-century invention.
  • The letters reflect Roman rhetorical conventions, not authentic 1st-century correspondence.
  • The “apostle Paul” may be a theological persona used to unify competing sects.

Fitzgerald doesn’t address this— but it’s now one of the most provocative frontiers in the field.

• The geopolitical legacy of Abrahamic supremacy

Fitzgerald critiques Christian nationalism. Great.
But he doesn’t go upstream to examine the deeper architecture:

It focuses almost exclusively on Christian excess while leaving the deeper architecture untouched: how Abrahamic identity claims themselves shape law, land, empire, and modern geopolitics.

When you zoom out, the story is not “Christian nationalism versus secular reason.”

It is competing and cooperating Abrahamic power structures, each with theological claims about chosen-ness, inheritance, land, and destiny.

Abrahamic Power Is Not Just Christian

Very few people are willing to look at the broader landscape of Abrahamic influence in American politics and global power structures. When they do not, they miss how deeply intertwined these traditions have been for over a century.

One under-discussed example is the longstanding institutional relationship between Mormonism and Judaism, particularly around shared claims to Israel and the “house of Israel.”

This is not hidden history.

In 1995, Utah Valley State College established a Center for Jewish Studies explicitly aimed at “bridging the gap between Jews and Mormons” and guiding relationships connected to Israel. One of the board members was Jack Solomon, a Jewish community leader who publicly praised the LDS Church as uniquely supportive of Judaism.

Solomon stated at the time that “there is no place in the world where the Christian community has been so supportive of the Jewish people and Judaism,” noting LDS financial and symbolic support for Jewish institutions in Utah going back to the early twentieth century.

This matters because Mormon theology explicitly claims descent from the house of Israel. Mormons do not merely admire Judaism. They see themselves as part of Israel’s continuation and restoration.

That theological framework shapes real-world alliances.

1. The Mormon Church Is a Financial Superpower

Most Americans have no idea how wealthy the LDS Church actually is.

The Mormon Church’s real estate & investment arm, Ensign Peak Advisors, was exposed in 2019 and again in 2023 for managing a secret portfolio now estimated at:

👉 $150–$200 billion

(Source: SEC filings, whistleblower leaks, Wall Street Journal)

To compare:

  • PepsiCo market cap: ~$175B
  • ExxonMobil (oil giant): ~$420B
  • Disney: ~$160B

Meaning:

📌 The LDS Church is financially on par with Pepsi and Disney, and not far behind Big Oil.

This is not a “church.” This is an empire.

And it invests strategically:

  • massive real estate acquisitions
  • agricultural control
  • media companies
  • political lobbying
  • funding influence networks

And let’s be clear:
Mormons see themselves as a literal remnant of Israel (the last tribe) destined to help rule the Earth “in the last days.”

Which brings us to…

2. Mormonism’s Quiet Partnership with the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR)

NAR is the movement behind the so-called “Seven Mountain Mandate”— the belief that Christians must seize control of:

  1. Government
  2. Education
  3. Media
  4. Arts & Entertainment
  5. Business
  6. Religion
  7. Family

This is the backbone of Christian nationalism and it’s far more organized than people realize. But here’s the part that never gets discussed:

Mormon elites collaborate with NAR leadership behind the scenes.

Shared goals:

  • influence over U.S. political leadership
  • shaping national morality laws
  • preparing for a prophetic “kingdom age”
  • embedding power in those seven spheres

This isn’t fringe. This is the largest religious–political coalition in the country, and yet most journalists never touch it.

3. The Ziklag Group: A $25M-Minimum Christian Power Circle

You want to talk about “elite networks”?

Meet Ziklag: an ultra-exclusive Christian organization named after King David’s biblical stronghold. Requirements for membership: a minimum net worth of $25 million Their mission?
Not charity. Not discipleship.

Influence the Seven Mountains of society at the highest levels.

Members include:

  • CEOs
  • hedge-fund managers
  • defense contractors
  • political donors
  • tech founders

Including the billionaire Uihlein family, who made a fortune in office supplies, the Greens, who run Hobby Lobby, and the Wallers, who own the Jockey apparel corporation. Recipients of Ziklag’s largesse include Alliance Defending Freedom, which is the Christian legal group that led the overturning of Roe v. Wade, plus the national pro-Trump group Turning Point USA and a constellation of right-of-center advocacy groups.

AND YET…

Most people yelling about “Christian nationalism” have never even heard of Ziklag.

4. Meanwhile, Chabad-Lubavitch Has Met with Every U.S. President Since 1978

Evangelical influence isn’t the only Abrahamic power Americans ignore.

Chabad (a Hasidic cult with global reach) has:

  • direct access to every U.S. president
  • annual White House proclamations (“Education & Sharing Day”) explicitly honor a religious leader as a moral authority over the nation.
  • a network of emissaries (shluchim) embedded in power centers around the world

This is influence, not conspiracy.

This is religious lobbying at the highest level of government, treated as unremarkable simply because the public doesn’t understand it.

See the Pattern Yet?

When people say “Christian nationalism,” they’re talking about one branch of a much older tree.

Christianity isn’t the problem. Atheism isn’t the solution.

The issue is Abrahamic supremacy: the belief that one sacred lineage has the right to rule, legislate, moralize, and define history for everyone else.

Across denominations, across continents, across political parties, the pattern is the same:

  • chosen-people narratives
  • divine-right entitlement
  • mythic land claims
  • sacred-tier influence operations
  • the blending of theology with statecraft

“Groupish belief systems that justify valuing one’s group above others must be inventable.”
Religion as Make-Believe.

Exactly.

These power structures aren’t ancient relics. They’re alive, wealthy, organized, and deeply embedded in American political life. And yet we’re told to panic exclusively about MAGA Christians…
while studiously ignoring:

  • Mormon financial empires
  • NAR infiltration of U.S. political offices
  • Zionist influence networks
  • Chabad’s presidential pipeline
  • elite Christian dominionist groups like Ziklag

This isn’t about blaming individuals.

It’s about naming systems. Because if we’re going to talk honestly about orthodoxy, myth, and power…

we need to talk about all of it— not just the parts that are fashionable to critique.

4. Mythicism still hasn’t grappled with empire

Most mythicist writing stops at:
“Jesus didn’t exist.”

Cool. Now what? The real question is:

HOW? How did a mythical figure become the operating system for Western civilization?

So, here’s where I actually land:

Christianity didn’t emerge from a single man.
It emerged from competing myths, political incentives, scriptural remixing, imperial needs, and evolving group identities.

And if that makes me someone who doesn’t quite fit in the Christian world, the atheist world, or the deconstruction world? Perfect. My loyalty is to the question, not the tribe. That’s exactly where I plan to stay.

That’s exactly where I plan to stay.

aaaand as always, maintain your curiosity, embrace skepticism, and keep tuning in. 🎙️🔒


Footnotes

1. Jodi Magness, Stone and Dung, Oil and Spit (Eerdmans, 2011).

Archaeologist specializing in 1st-century Judea; emphasizes that archaeology illuminates daily life, but cannot confirm Jesus’ existence or Gospel events.

2. Eric M. Meyers & Mark A. Chancey, Archaeology, the Rabbis, and Early Christianity (Baker Academic, 2012).

Shows how archaeology supports context, not Gospel narrative details.

3. Steve Mason, Josephus and the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Hendrickson, 2003).

Explains why the Testimonium Flavianum is partially or heavily interpolated and cannot serve as independent confirmation of Jesus.

4. Alice Whealey, “The Testimonium Flavianum in Syriac and Arabic,” New Testament Studies 54.4 (2008): 573–590.

Analyzes manuscript traditions showing Christian editing of Josephus.

5. Louis Feldman, “Josephus,” Anchor Bible Dictionary, vol. 3 (Yale University Press, 1992).

Standard reference summarizing scholarly consensus about the unreliable portions of Josephus’ Jesus passages.

6. Brent Shaw, “The Myth of the Neronian Persecution,” Journal of Roman Studies 105 (2015): 73–100.

Shows Tacitus likely repeats Christian stories, not archival Roman data, making him a witness to Christian belief — not Jesus’ historicity.

7. Pliny the Younger, Epistles 10.96–97.

Earliest Roman description of Christian worship; confirms Christians existed, not that Jesus did.

8. Bart D. Ehrman, Misquoting Jesus (HarperOne, 2005).

Explains why New Testament manuscripts contain thousands of variations, with no originals surviving.

9. Dennis R. MacDonald, The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark (Yale University Press, 2000).

Argues Mark intentionally modeled episodes on Homeric motifs — supporting literary construction rather than eyewitness reporting.

10. Attridge, Harold W., The Epistle to the Hebrews (Hermeneia Commentary Series).

Shows how Hebrews relies on celestial priesthood imagery and makes no connection to a recent earthly Jesus, even when opportunities are obvious.

11. Earl Doherty, The Jesus Puzzle (1999).

Early mythicist argument emphasizing the epistles’ lack of biographical Jesus data.

12. Richard Carrier, On the Historicity of Jesus (Sheffield Phoenix, 2014).

Presents a Bayesian model estimating mythicist origins as more probable than historicity.

13. Richard Carrier, Proving History (Prometheus, 2012).

Explains the historical method he uses for evaluating Jesus traditions.

14. Paula Fredriksen, From Jesus to Christ (Yale University Press, 2000).

Demonstrates the pluralism and fragmentation within earliest Christianity.

15. Burton Mack, The Christian Myth: Origins, Logic, and Legacy (Continuum, 2006).

Describes the emergence of various Jesus traditions as literary and theological constructions.

16. Clayton N. Jefford, The Didache (Fortress Press).

Analyzes early church manual revealing “wandering prophets,” factionalism, and market-style competition among early Jesus groups.

17. Catherine Nixey, The Darkening Age (Macmillan, 2017).

Documents the destruction of pagan culture under Christian imperial dominance.

18. Charles Freeman, The Closing of the Western Mind (Vintage, 2005).

Explores how Christian orthodoxy displaced classical philosophy.

19. Ramsay MacMullen, Christianizing the Roman Empire (Yale University Press, 1984).

Shows Christianity expanded primarily through imperial power, incentives, and legislation, not mass persuasion.

20. H.A. Drake, Constantine and the Bishops (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

Outlines Constantine’s political use of Christianity and the shift toward enforced orthodoxy.

21. Peter Brown, The Rise of Western Christendom (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

Provides context for how Christianity overtook the Roman religious landscape.

22. Neil Van Leeuwen, “Religious Credence Is Not Factual Belief,” Cognition 133 (2014): 698–715.

Explains why religious commitments behave like identity markers, not evidence-responsive beliefs.

23. Whitney Phillips, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things (MIT Press, 2015).

Useful for understanding modern online purity culture dynamics, relevant to atheist-internet behavior discussed in your commentary section.

24. Joseph Reagle, Reading the Comments (MIT Press, 2015).

Analyzes comment-section behavior and ideological enforcement online.

25. Tim O’Neill, “Easter, the Existence of Jesus, and Dave Fitzgerald,” History for Atheists (2017).

Atheist historian critiquing Fitzgerald’s methodological errors, exaggerated claims, and misuse of sources.

26. Raphael Lataster, Questioning the Historicity of Jesus (Brill, 2019).

Secular academic arguing mythicism is plausible but insisting on higher methodological rigor than many popularizers use.

27. Richard Carrier, various blog critiques of Fitzgerald (2012–2019).

Carrier agrees with mythicism but critiques Fitzgerald for overstatement and inadequate source control.

The Historical Jesus Fact or Fiction?

Nailed: Ten Christian Myths That Show Jesus Never Existed at All

Today’s episode is one I’ve been looking forward to for a long time. I sat down with author and researcher David Fitzgerald, whose book Nailed: Ten Christian Myths That Show Jesus Never Existed at All has stirred up both fascination and controversy in both historical and secular circles.

Before anyone clutches their pearls — or their study Bible — this conversation isn’t about bashing belief. It’s about asking how we know what we think we know, and whether our historical standards shift when faith enters the equation.

Fitzgerald has spent over fifteen years investigating the evidence — or lack of it — surrounding the historical Jesus. In this first part of our series, we cover Myth #1 (“The idea that Jesus being a myth is ridiculous”) and Myth #4 (“The Gospels were written by eyewitnesses”). We also start brushing up against Myth #5, which explores how the Gospels don’t even describe the same Jesus.

We didn’t make it to Myth #7 yet — the claim that archaeology confirms the Gospels…. so, stay tuned for Part Two.

And for my visual learners!! I’ve got you. Scroll below for infographics, side-by-side Gospel comparisons, biblical quotes, and primary source references that make this episode come alive.

🧩 The 10 Myths About Jesus — According to Nailed

Myth #1: “The idea that Jesus was a myth is ridiculous!”
→ Fitzgerald argues that the assumption of Jesus’ historicity persists more from cultural tradition than actual historical evidence, and that questioning it isn’t fringe. It’s legitimate historical inquiry.

Myth #2: “Jesus was wildly famous — but somehow no one noticed.”
→ Despite claims that Jesus’ miracles and teachings drew massive crowds, there’s an eerie silence about him in the records of contemporaneous historians and chroniclers who documented far lesser figures.

Myth #3: “Ancient historian Josephus wrote about Jesus.”
→ The so-called “Testimonium Flavianum” passages in Josephus’ work are widely considered later Christian insertions, not authentic first-century testimony.

Myth #4: “Eyewitnesses wrote the Gospels.”
→ The Gospels were written decades after the events they describe by unknown authors relying on oral traditions and earlier written sources, not firsthand experience.

Myth #5: “The Gospels give a consistent picture of Jesus.”
→ Each Gospel portrays a strikingly different version of Jesus — from Mark’s suffering human to John’s divine Logos — revealing theological agendas more than biographical consistency.

Myth #6: “History confirms the Gospels.”
→ When examined critically, historical records outside the Bible don’t corroborate the key events of Jesus’ life, death, or resurrection narrative.

Myth #7: “Archaeology confirms the Gospels.”
→ Archaeological evidence supports the general backdrop of Roman-era Judea but fails to verify specific Gospel claims or the existence of Jesus himself.

Myth #8: “Paul and the Epistles corroborate the Gospels.”
→ Paul’s letters — the earliest Christian writings — reveal no awareness of a recent historical Jesus, focusing instead on a celestial Christ figure revealed through visions and scripture.

Myth #9: “Christianity began with Jesus and his apostles.”
→ Fitzgerald argues that Christianity evolved from earlier Jewish sects and mystery religions, with “Jesus” emerging as a mythologized figure around whom older beliefs coalesced.

Myth #10: “Christianity was totally new and different.”
→ The moral teachings, rituals, and savior motifs of early Christianity closely mirror surrounding pagan traditions and Greco-Roman mystery cults.


📘 Myth #1: “The Idea That Jesus Being a Myth Is Ridiculous”

This one sets the tone for the entire book — because it’s not even about evidence at first. It’s about social pressure.

Fitzgerald opens Nailed by calling out how the mythicist position (the idea that Jesus might never have existed) gets dismissed out of hand…even by secular historians. As he points out, the problem isn’t that the evidence disproves mythicism. The problem is that we don’t apply the same historical standards we would to anyone else.

Case in point: Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon.

Julius Caesar crossing the Rubicon at the head of his army, 49 BC. Illustration from Istoria Romana incisa all’acqua forte da Bartolomeo Pinelli Romano (Presso Giovanni Scudellari, Rome, 1818-1819).

When historians reconstruct that event, we have:

  • Multiple contemporary accounts from major Roman historians like Suetonius, Plutarch, Appian, and Cassius Dio.
  • Physical evidence — coins, inscriptions, and monuments produced during or shortly after Caesar’s lifetime.
  • Political and military documentation aligning with the timeline.

In contrast, for Jesus, we have:

  • No contemporary accounts.
  • No archaeological or physical evidence.
  • Gospels written decades later by anonymous authors who never met him.

That’s the difference between history and theology.

Even historian Bart Ehrman, who does believe Jesus existed, has called mythicists “the flat-earthers of the academic world.” Fitzgerald addresses that in the interview (not defensively, but critically) asking why questioning this one historical figure provokes so much emotional resistance.

As he puts it, if the same level of evidence existed for anyone else, no one would take it seriously.


✍️ Myth #4: “The Gospels Were Written by Eyewitnesses”

We dive into the authorship problem — who actually wrote the Gospels, when, and why it matters.


🔀 Myth #5: “The Gospels Don’t Describe the Same Jesus”

⚖️ Contradictions Between the Gospels

1. Birthplace of Jesus — Bethlehem or Nazareth?

Matthew 2:1 – “Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judea in the days of Herod the king.”
Luke 2:4–7 – Joseph travels from Nazareth to Bethlehem for the census, and Jesus is born there.
John 7:41–42, 52 – Locals say, “The Messiah does not come from Galilee, does he?” implying Jesus was known as a Galilean, not from Bethlehem.

🔍 Mythicist take:
Bethlehem was retrofitted into the story to fulfill the Messianic prophecy from Micah 5:2. In early Christian storytelling, theological necessity (“he must be born in David’s city”) trumps biographical accuracy.

2. Jesus’ Genealogy — Two Lineages, Zero Agreement

Matthew 1:1–16 – Jesus descends from David through Solomon.
Luke 3:23–38 – Jesus descends from David through Nathan.
Even Joseph’s father differs: Jacob (Matthew) vs. Heli (Luke).

🔍 Mythicist take:
Two contradictory genealogies suggest not historical memory but theological marketing. Each author tailors Jesus’ lineage to fit symbolic patterns — Matthew emphasizes kingship; Luke, universality.

3. The Timing of the Crucifixion — Passover Meal or Preparation Day?

Mark 14:12–17 – Jesus eats the Passover meal with his disciples before his arrest.
John 19:14 – Jesus is crucified on the day of Preparation — before Passover begins — at the same time lambs are being slaughtered in the Temple.

🔍 Mythicist take:
This isn’t a detail slip; it’s theology. John deliberately aligns Jesus with the Paschal lamb, turning him into the cosmic sacrifice — a theological metaphor, not an eyewitness timeline.

4. Jesus’ Last Words — Four Versions, Four Theologies

Mark 15:34 – “My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?” → human anguish.
Luke 23:46 – “Father, into your hands I commit my spirit.” → serene trust.
John 19:30 – “It is finished.” → divine completion.
Matthew 27:46 – Echoes Mark’s despair, but adds cosmic drama (earthquake, torn veil).

🔍 Mythicist take:
Each Gospel shapes Jesus’ death to reflect its theology — Mark’s suffering human, Luke’s faithful martyr, John’s omniscient divine being. This isn’t eyewitness diversity; it’s evolving mythmaking.

5. Who Found the Empty Tomb — and What Did They See?

Mark 16:1–8Three women find the tomb open, see a young man in white, flee in fear, tell no one.
Matthew 28:1–10Two women see an angel descend, roll back the stone, and tell them to share the news.
Luke 24:1–10Several women find the stone already rolled away; two men in dazzling clothes appear.
John 20:1–18Mary Magdalene alone finds the tomb, then runs to get Peter; later she meets Jesus himself.

🔍 Mythicist take:
If this were a consistent historical event, we’d expect some harmony. Instead, we see mythic escalation: from a mysterious empty tomb (Mark) → to heavenly intervention (Matthew) → to divine encounter (John).


6. The Post-Resurrection Appearances — Where and to Whom?

Matthew 28:16–20 – Jesus appears in Galilee to the eleven.
Luke 24:33–51 – Jesus appears in Jerusalem and tells them to stay there.
Acts 1:4–9 – Same author as Luke, now extends appearances over forty days.
Mark 16 (longer ending) – A later addition summarizing appearances found in the other Gospels.

🔍 Mythicist take:
The resurrection narrative grows with time — geographically, dramatically, and theologically. Early silence (Mark) gives way to detailed appearances (Luke/John), mirroring the development of early Christian belief rather than eyewitness memory.


🌿 Final Thought

Whether you end up agreeing with Fitzgerald or not, the point isn’t certainty… it’s curiosity. The willingness to look at history without fear, even when it challenges what we’ve always been told.

And here’s the fun part! David actually wants to hear from you. If you’ve got questions, pushback, or something you want him to unpack next time, drop it in the comments or send it my way. I’ll collect your submissions and bring a few of them into Part Two when we dig into Myth #7 — “Archaeology Confirms the Gospels.”

and as always, maintain your curiosity, embrace skepticism, and keep tuning in. 🎙️

📖 Further Reading 📖 

Foundational Mythicist Works:

  • Richard Carrier – On the Historicity of Jesus
  • Robert M. Price – The Christ-Myth Theory and Judaizing Jesus 
  • Earl Doherty – The Jesus Puzzle
  • Gospel Fictions – Randel Helms
  • The Fable of Christ – Joseph Wheless
  • The Pagan Christ – Tom Harpur
  • The Historical Jesus – William Benjamin Smith
  • The mythic past : biblical archaeology and the myth of Israel

Did Jesus Exist? Jacob Berman and Dr. Jack Bull Versus Dr. Aaron Adair and Neil Godfrey

Mainstream Scholarship & Context

  • Bart Ehrman – Did Jesus Exist?
  • Jonathan Haidt – The Righteous Mind Why Good People are Divided by Religion and Politics

Critiques of Bart Ehrman

Broader Philosophical & Cultural Context

  • Christianity before Christ  –  John G Jackson
  • The World’s Sixteen Crucified Saviors – Kersey Graves
  • The Christ Conspiracy – Acharya S (D.M. Murdock)